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Introduction
This thesis consists of three self-contained chapters. Although the rst two
chapters study dierent questions and contribute to distinct branches of the lit-
erature, they are related with respect to the research question. Both chapters
contribute to the eld of health economics, reecting my research interest in a
better understanding of the interdependence between the economic situation of
individuals and their health. This interest is motivated by the well-documented
correlation between health and income. Exemplifying this correlation, Figure 1
shows the average additional life expectancy at age 55 across earnings deciles.
The richest 10% have a 10 years longer life expectancy than the poorest 10%.
Figure 1: Average Additional Life Expectancy at Age 55, by Mid-career Income
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Poorest 10%
11-20%
21-30%
31-40%
41-50%
51-60%
61-70%
71-80%
81-90%
Richest 10%
Females Males
Source: Bosworth and Burke (2014), own illustration.
However, correlations without an understanding of causation are no sucient
guide for policy. Building on this insight, Chapter 1 and 2 investigate poten-
tial mechanisms to identify the link between health and the economic sphere.
Chapter 1 studies recuperation time and shows that fear of unemployment drives
a wedge between the long-run health of rich and poor workers. Chapter 2 in-
vestigates whether stress caused by a low economic performance compared to a
self-determined circle of acquaintances may pose a threat to health.
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Chapter 3 deviates from the rst two chapters in its nature as it contributes to
the literature of computational economics. More precisely, it develops a method
which deals with the computational challenges of heterogeneous agent models
that require a higher dimensional state space. The method can be applied to large-
scale overlapping generations as well as other models with heterogeneous agents
and could be applied in Chapter 2.
Chapter 1 The rst chapter studies the relationships among sick leave, income
and unemployment. It investigates these relationships under the generous Ger-
man sick leave regulation of 100% wage replacement, whereby workers do not
bear any direct costs from sick leave. Using information from the German So-
cioeconomic Panel (SOEP), I identify three stylized facts of sick leave in Germany.
First, the number of sick leave days shows a strong pro-cyclical pattern, i.e., work-
ers are on average less absent from work in times of high unemployment. Second,
the average use of sick leave is hump-shaped over income quintiles. Workers in
the medium income quintile have on average almost 10% more days of sick leave
than workers in the bottom income quintile. This gure is noteworthy because av-
erage health monotonically increases with income. Assuming sick leave is driven
only by health would therefore lead to a decrease in the number of days of sick
leave between bottom and medium income quintiles, and this is not observed.
Third, the number of days of sick leave is a strong predictor of future unemploy-
ment. Taking three additional days of sick leave increases the risk of becoming
unemployed by a factor of 1.1. Using micro-evidence, I develop a dynamic struc-
tural model with heterogeneous agents that rationalizes these facts. I argue that
in the absence of direct costs of sick leave, the fear of future unemployment is the
main driving force restraining sick leave. The model, calibrated to the German
labor market, is able to reproduce the (non-targeted) stylized facts of sick leave
days in Germany. The calibrated model allows me to conduct counterfactual pol-
icy analysis. For this purpose, I contrast the benchmark economy, for instance,
against an economy with no unemployment benets. An immediate implication
is that the average worker reduces her recuperation time by 1.2 days a year, and
a worker in the bottom income quintile reduces it by more than 1.7 days a year.
Chapter 2 The second chapter of this thesis investigates the relationship be-
tween an individual’s health and relative economic performance. Using a unique
dataset with explicit information on social circles, I nd robust and signicant
positive eects of relative performance on self-reported health and negative ef-
fects on detrimental health behavior such as smoking and obesity. People that
consider themselves poorer than their circle of acquaintances are signicantly
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less likely to report good health. I further show that this eect exhibits asymme-
tries, i.e., being worse o than one’s circle of acquaintances has a strong negative
eect, whereas being better o exhibits only a mild positive eect. Furthermore,
groups with lower absolute income are more strongly aected by the relative per-
formance eect than are groups with high absolute income. I also document that
the standard approach of articially constructing reference groups based on the
characteristics of the respondents yields weaker and insignicant results.
Chapter 3 The third chapter of this thesis is a slightly modied version of a
joint paper with Alexander Ludwig. It contributes to the computational meth-
ods to solve higher dimensional households problems. It investigates extensions
of the method of endogenous gridpoints (ENDGM) introduced by Carroll (2006)
to higher dimensions with more than one continuous endogenous state variable.
We compare three dierent categories of algorithms: (i) the conventional method
with exogenous grids (EXOGM), (ii) the pure method of endogenous gridpoints
(ENDGM) and (iii) a hybrid method (HYBGM). ENDGM comes along with De-
launay interpolation on irregular grids. Comparison of methods is done by eval-
uating speed and accuracy. We nd that HYBGM and ENDGM both dominate
EXOGM. In an innite horizon model, ENDGM also always dominates HYBGM.
In a nite horizon model, the choice between HYBGM and ENDGM depends on
the number of gridpoints in each dimension. With less than 150 gridpoints in
each dimension ENDGM is faster than HYBGM, and vice versa. For a standard
choice of 25 to 50 gridpoints in each dimension, ENDGM is 1.4 to 1.5 times faster
than HYBGM.
3
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Unemployment, Sick Leave and Health
– Sick, Poor and Forced to Work?
1.1 Introduction
Absence from work due to sickness poses a major threat to the economic situ-
ation of households. On the one hand, workers who take sick leave face direct
opportunity costs arising from a reduction of working time for which they would
otherwise be paid. In most countries, these costs are partially insured by paid sick
leave schemes. The extent of this insurance coverage varies greatly across indus-
trialized countries, cf. Scheil-Adlung and Sandner (2010).1 On the other hand,
workers have to take into account the indirect costs of sick leave that stem from
reductions in future expected earnings. The layo and promotion decisions of
employers depend on workers’ past days of sick leave, cf. Markussen (2012) and
further evidence below. To fully understand the role of sickness absence, it is
therefore important to distinguish between the two types of costs.
In this chapter, I identify the costs of sick leave stemming from lower employ-
ment prospects, and I analyze their economic implications. To do so, I focus on
Germany, which features a very generous sick leave system that almost com-
pletely rules out direct opportunity costs of sick leave. In cases of work absence
due to sickness, every (full-time, part-time or temporary) employee is eligible for
six weeks of 100% wage replacement.2
1An extreme case among developed countries is the US, where there is no statutory paid sick
leave, a situation US President Barack Obama recently urged to change in his State of the Union
in 2015. Paid sick leave may be provided by employers on a contractual basis. According to
the 2015 State of the Union, the number of workers without any sick leave scheme amounts
to 43 million.
2This generosity is not without a price. The expenditures of paid sick leave, which are borne by
employers, amounted to almost 40 billion e in 2013, or more than 1.5% of GDP, according to
the German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Aairs, cf. Bundeministerium für Arbeit
und Soziales (2014). This number does not include the contribution to the social insurance
system, which amounted to 6.9 billione. For more information on the German regulations on
paid sick leave, see Appendix 1.A.
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The rst objective of this chapter is to identify and document patterns of sick
leave utilization over business cycles and income groups in Germany. The second
objective is to rationalize these empirical ndings within a theoretical framework
and to highlight the main mechanism: the decision to trade o utility-enhancing
health against expected future earnings due to increased risk of job loss. The
third objective is to analyze the distributional eects of indirect costs of sick leave
and to evaluate counterfactual policies within a structural model calibrated to the
German labor market.
For the rst objective, I employ data from the German Sozio-oekonomische
Panel (SOEP), a nationally representative longitudinal dataset. With respect to
aggregated data, I nd three remarkable patterns of sick leave utilization in Ger-
many. First, claims of sick leave exhibit a strong pro-cyclical pattern; i.e., workers
are on average less absent from work in times of high unemployment. The cor-
relation coecient of average days of sick leave and the German unemployment
rate is minus 0.6383. Second, the average number of days of sick leave in Ger-
many displays a marked hump-shaped pattern across income quintiles. Workers
in the medium income quintile have on average almost 10% more days of sick
leave than workers in the bottom income quintile. This gure is noteworthy be-
cause average health monotonically increases with income.3 Assuming sick leave
is driven only by health would therefore lead to a decrease in the number of days
of sick leave between bottom and medium income quintiles, and this is not ob-
served. Third, the variance of sick leave diers greatly between income quintiles.
On the one hand, employees in the bottom quintile have the highest probability
of not missing any day in a year. On the other hand, they also have the highest
probability of missing more than two weeks. Top income employees miss a small
number of days but do so at a higher frequency.
Regarding the second objective, the mechanism that rationalizes these three
stylized facts of sick leave is that workers who become sick face the decision ei-
ther to stay at home and recover or to go to work sick. Staying at home restores
utility-enhancing health but simultaneously increases the risk of job loss. Exploit-
ing the panel structure of the SOEP, I show that sick leave is one key predictor
of future unemployment. Taking three additional days of sick leave increases
the risk of becoming unemployed by a factor of 1.1. Going to work sick pre-
serves expected future earnings, but a perpetual neglect of recuperation dimin-
ishes long-run health prospects.4 In times of high unemployment rates, work-
3A nding well documented in the health economics literature, cf. Smith (1999).
4Time requirements for recovery in the health economics literature go back to the very begin-
ning, c.f. the seminal paper of Grossman (1972). Clinical, experimental, and empirical evidence
in support of this idea can be found in the bio-medical science, public health, psycho-biology,
bio-sociology, and empirical health literature, which shows a negative eect of neglect of re-
6
1.1 Introduction
ers face both higher overall ring rates and lower reemployment probabilities.
Resulting higher marginal costs of unemployment shift the trade-o toward pre-
senteeism and drive the cyclical pattern. Workers facing nancial constraints, i.e.,
low skilled workers, are less able to smooth consumption over periods of unem-
ployment and have an overall higher risk to become unemployed. Therefore, they
are particularly compelled to go to work when sick. Consequently, optimal sick
leave utilization diers across income groups. The rich constantly use fewer days
absent from work to conserve their health. Poorer workers reduce their number
of days of missing work to keep their job; however, this practice comes with the
cost of a perpetual worsening of their health. In the long run, lower health in-
creases the number of sick leave days for the poor compared to the rich. This
outcome of the mechanism is armed by the nding of a widening sick leave gap
between bottom and top income quintiles over the life cycle. Beginning at almost
the same level of sick leave at age 20, workers in the bottom income quintile have
40% more days of sick leave at the end of their working life than those in the top
income quintile.
To quantify the distributional eects of sick leave, the third objective, I develop
a heterogeneous agent model with an endogenous health state. A shock process
mimics acute sickness. Additionally, I implement central characteristics of the
German labor market and worker protection system in my model.5 The govern-
ment imposes a at income tax on agents. The collected revenues are used to
nance (i) expenditures due to sick leave payments, (ii) unemployment benets,
including means-tested welfare, and (iii) a retirement system.
To implement my quantitative analysis empirically, I rst estimate and calibrate
the model using SOEP data to match key statistics on sick leave, health status and
unemployment. The estimated model is able to successfully explain the targeted
features of the data in the estimation (e.g., the distribution of days of sick leave
utilized by low income workers). It is also capable of reproducing other (non-
targeted) dimensions, such as the hump-shaped pattern of average days of sick
leave across income quintiles, the income gradient in health, and the cyclicality
of claims of sick leave. I then use the parameterized version of the model as a
laboratory to evaluate the consequences of dierent policy options. For this pur-
pose, I contrast the benchmark economy, for instance, against an economy with
no unemployment benets. An immediate implication is that the average worker
reduces her recuperation time by 1.2 days a year, and a worker in the bottom
income quintile reduces it by more than 1.7 days a year.
cuperation time, cf. Kivimäki et al. (2005), Bergström et al. (2009).
5German workers have universal health insurance that covers medical expenditures. For this
purpose, I omit medical expenditures in my model.
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Related Literature There is a sizable body of literature that documents a posi-
tive relationship between workers’ economic situation and their average claims of
sick leave, cf. Leigh (1985), Pfeifer (2013). Arai and Thoursie (2005) and Askildsen,
Bratberg, and Nilsen (2005) show that this pro-cyclical variation in sickness ab-
sence is caused by established workers reducing sick time rather than the absence
behavior of marginal workers entering or leaving the working population in var-
ious states of the business cycle. Another growing strand of literature studies the
eect of sick leave on individuals’ future labor market outcomes. Hesselius (2007),
Markussen (2012), and Chadi and Goerke (2015) show that an increase in the sick
leave rate lowers the probability of being employed in the future. Andersen (2010)
also nds that a high number of days of sick leave not only aects employment
status but also decreases post-sick leave earnings. I contribute to both strains of
the literature by showing that these ndings also hold for Germany. I add to the
literature by merging the ndings of sick leave, and I expand the discussion with
a cross-sectional dimension.6
The structural model I present in this chapter is part of a broad and growing
body of literature that incorporates endogenous health into dynamic life-cycle
models. Important related contributions include Grossman (1972), Ehrlich and
Chuma (1990), Hall and Jones (2007), Ales, Hosseini, and Jones (2012), Halliday,
He, and Zhang (2012), Ozkan (2014), Cole, Kim, and Krueger (2014). A small body
of literature allows for interactions between endogenous health, employment and
productivity. In a recent paper, Laun (2013) analyzes optimal insurance against
unemployment and disability in a private information economy with endogenous
health and search eorts. Little research has been conducted on such dynamic
models distinguishing between long run health and the onset of acute illnesses.
Gilleskie (1998) predicts changes in sickness-related absenteeism that arise with
improvements in access to health care through more complete health insurance
and sick leave coverage in the US. The paper, however, focuses only on the direct
costs of work absence and does not take into account the risk of unemployment.
It also falls short of providing a link to the endogenous health literature. To the
best of my knowledge, this is the rst study to incorporate endogenous health
and acute sickness into a heterogeneous agent life-cycle model.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I discuss the
main data source, the methodology and the empirical ndings. Then, I introduce
6There is also considerable literature exploiting reforms of sick pay provision in Scandinavian
countries (cf. Henrekson and Persson (2004), Johansson and Palme (2005), Dale-Olsen (2014))
and, more recently, Germany (cf. Ziebarth and Karlsson (2010), Ziebarth (2013), Ziebarth and
Karlsson (2014), Puhani and Sonderhof (2010)). They found that an increase in generosity in
the sick leave system induces a higher number of days missed at work, indicating a moral
hazard.
8
1.2 Empirical Facts on Sick Leave Days
a full structural model in Section 1.3. In Section 1.4, I discuss the estimation of the
model and the model’s t to the data. Section 1.5 presents counter-factual policy
experiments using the model. Finally, I conclude in Section 1.6.
1.2 Empirical Facts on Sick Leave Days
The purpose of this section is to carve out stylized facts of sick leave in Germany
and to motivate the key modeling assumptions of the structural model in Sec-
tion 1.3. After discussing the data source and the methodology in Section 1.2.1,
I present in Section 1.2.2 ndings on aggregated data that show that taking sick
leave is an endogenous choice of workers. Then, in Section 1.2.3, I show results
based on a panel analysis that underline the importance of this choice for the
employment prospects of workers.
1.2.1 Data and Methodology
Description of the Survey
My empirical analysis is based on the German Sozio-oekonomische Panel, a na-
tionally representative longitudinal dataset. Starting in 1984 and conducted an-
nually, it comprises 30 waves of household data. It oversamples foreigners, im-
migrants, and East Germans to allow for more precise estimates for population
subgroups that may be of particular policy interest.7 The SOEP provides detailed
information about demographic (e.g., sex, age), socioeconomic (e.g., educational
level, marital status) and economic characteristics. The respondents report their
current monthly income and their household income in the current and the pre-
vious year.8 The employment history contains the current employment status
(e.g., full time, part time), the point in time of the layo in the previous year, the
length o the unemployment spell and information about the time worked for
the same rm. Information about health since 1990 is requested. In addition to
self-reported health, the SOEP contains information about the number of doctor
visits and hospital stays.9 Further detailed information about the characteristics
of the SOEP is provided in Wagner, Frick, and Schupp (2007).
7I include all sub-samples of SOEP with the appropriate cross-sectional weights.
8All monetary variables are deated with the consumer price index contained in the SOEP using
2005 as the base year.
9It also includes an SF-12 indicator of physical health. This measure combines several self-
reported indicators; see Nuebling et al. (2007) for further information. This measure is avail-
able only every other year since 2002 and is of limited use for the panel analysis.
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The key variable for the purpose of this chapter is the number of working days
missed due to sickness. The SOEP asks respondents to state whether they missed
any day due to sickness in the previous year and, if so, how many days they
missed. Puhani and Sonderhof (2010) show that, though self-reported, the SOEP
adequately depicts the true number of days of absent from work. The SOEP also
contains information about the number of spells that last longer than six weeks.
However, the survey does not ask about occasions on which respondents go sick
to work.
The only information that is used and not contained in the SOEP is the un-
employment rate of Germany. I use ocial data from the federal employment
agency, cf. Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2014).
Determination of the Sample
For the following empirical results, not all observations of the SOEP are used.
Because I am interested in the sick leave utilization of workers, I focus only on
the working age population. I drop all observations of respondents younger than
18 years and older than 65 years (the ocial German retirement age). I restrict
the sample to respondents who report working in the current or the previous year
and those who report being unemployed. I exclude people doing military service,
people working in a sheltered workshop, and unemployed people not looking for
work. The number of sick leave days is reported in absolute numbers and not in
relative fractions of work time. The probability and the intensity of annual sick
leave are biased when respondents work only a fraction of the year. To control
for this bias, I exclude respondents who report fewer than ve days or 35 hours
of work a week. I also drop all respondents with a monthly income of less than
500 e.10
As for the time period, I use waves 1994 to 2013, corresponding to information
about sick leave from 1993 to 2012. Waves 1984, 1990 and 1993 do not contain
information about sick leave. Waves 1991 and 1992 capture the unique economic
situation of German reunication in 1990 and the liberalization of a state-owned
socialist economy. I drop both periods because the income distribution and em-
ployment situation changed dramatically.11 Waves 1985-1989 could potentially
be used in the analysis of pro-cyclicality. I drop them for various reasons. First,
these waves do not contain information about health and cannot be used in cross-
10Altering the limits of days or hours of work a week or the minimum income does not change
the qualitative results of the following empirical analysis.
11The following waves are also aected, but the eect is strongly mitigated over time. The clas-
sication in income quintiles is particularly disturbed because the income scale was lower in
East Germany.
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sectional or panel regressions. Second, the unemployment rate varied in these
years only between 7.9% and 8.1%. Hence, not much variation can be used to de-
termine the cyclicality of sick leave. Third, I want to use an uninterrupted sample
period for the time series analysis.
For the benchmark results, I exclude civil servants and self-employed workers
from the sample. Self-employed workers do not receive paid sick leave; it is pro-
vided by the employer. Civil servants have paid sick leave but are not eligible for
layos. Hence, they are not aected or are less aected by the indirect eect of
fear of job loss.12
The days of sick leave have a highly skewed distribution with many observa-
tions at the 0 boundary and few observations at the highest value of 365. Of
the observations, 95% percent report fewer than 42 days a year, and only slightly
more than one percent report more than 120 days. Hence, many results, e.g., the
average number of sick leave days, are prone to be driven by only a few observa-
tions. To control for outliers, I exclude in the benchmark results all observations
that have one or more spells of sick leave that last longer than six weeks. Of the
remaining sample, I cut o the highest two percentages, i.e., workers with more
than 30 days of sick leave a year.
After sample selection, the sample used for the benchmark results consists of
100,526 observations.13 The sample includes 20 waves, and each wave has at least
3,910 observations.14
Empirical Approach
In Section 1.2.2, I run cross-sectional regressions of sick leave on various regres-
sors, where I pool the observations of all waves in one sample. The regression
equations for OLS and Logit estimation are
Si = α + β log(Wi) + β Hi + β Ui + Xiθ + εi (1.1)
Logit
[
Sexti = 1
]
= P{α + β log(Wi) + β Hi + β Ui + Xiθ + εi} (1.2)
12The results of both groups are an additional argument for the proposed mechanism. The cyclical
pattern is either not existent for the self-employed or much weaker for the civil servants, a
result also found by Pfeifer (2013). Additionally, the income gradient in sick leave does not
exist for both groups. Unfortunately, both groups vary from the rest of the sample in various
respects (e.g., income, age, education). Therefore, they cannot be used as an adequate control
group.
13Further details on the sample selection can be found in Appendix 1.B.
14The size of the waves increases over time. There were refreshments of the SOEP in 1998, 2000,
2002 and 2006.
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where Si is a countable variable used to denote days of sick leave, whereas Sexti
is a dummy variable used to denote either missing any day in a year at work(
Sexti = 1
)
or not
(
Sexti = 0
)
. Wi is the monthly income of the respondent in the
previous year.15 Hi is self-reported health, Ui the German unemployment rate,
Xi,t is a set of control variables (e.g., sex, age, years of education, marital status,
number of children living in the household, year dummies), and εi is the random
error term.
In Section 1.2.3, I employ a logistic panel regression. I estimate the eect of
the number of sick leave days in the previous period on the current probability
of unemployment
[
IUi,t = 1
]
. I restrict the sample in this section to people who
were employed at least six months in the previous year. The panel structure of
the SOEP additionally allows me to use a xed-eects model. The xed eect will
incorporate all unobserved characteristics of the agent. The regression equations
are
Logit
[
IUi,t = 1
]
= P{α + β Si,t−1 + Xi,t−1θ + i,t} (1.3)
Logit
[
IUi,t = 1
]
= P{α + β Si,t−1 + Ci,t−1θ + ai + i,t} (1.4)
where Ci,t is a set of control variables that vary over time. It contains health, age
and the log income in the previous year. Days of sick leave in the previous period
are denoted by Si,t−1. The ais represent the individual specic and time-invariant
xed-eect component, and i,t is the random error term.
1.2.2 Stylized Facts on Aggregated Data
Time Series
Figure 1.2 shows for the benchmark sample the average annual number of sick
leave days per worker in the observed time period and a tted linear trend. The
average number of sick leave days varies between 4.5 and 6.2 days. An obvious
rst nding about the days of sick leave in Germany is the long-term decline. In
the last 19 years, the average claims of sick leave have dropped by almost one day,
or 20% relative to 1993.
A second characteristic is the strong pro-cyclical pattern of the average claims
of sick leave in Germany once the time series is de-trended. Figure 1.3 depicts
the absolute deviation of average days of sick leave from the linear trend (dashed
blue line) and the unemployment rate for Germany (solid black line). The average
number of days of sick leave is high when the German unemployment rate is low
15I use other measures of income that are also included in the SOEP such as gross income or
household net income. The qualitative results do not change.
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Figure 1.2: Average Days of Sick Leave per Worker 1993-2012
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Notes: Dots: Average annual claims of sick leave per worker in benchmark sample. Solid line:
Fitted linear trend, slope: -0.0578.
and vice versa. The correlation between the de-trended time series of days of sick
leave and the German unemployment rate for the benchmark sample is minus
0.6383.16
To control for a composition eect, i.e., the absence behavior of the marginal
worker, I construct a sub-sample consisting of workers who report never being
unemployed for at least ve consecutive years. This sub-sample shows, on the one
hand, a lower number of average days of sick leave compared to the benchmark
sample. On the other hand, the cyclical pattern of the always-employed sample
is still distinctively negative, with a correlation of minus 0.6576.17 The remaining
correlation supports the idea of an incentive eect. In times of low reemployment,
workers reduce their days of sick leave to avoid unemployment. The incentive
eect implicitly assumes that absence from work is not mechanically tied to the
incidence of sickness. Workers are free to decide whether to go to work sick or
stay at home and recover. This is a key assumption of the structural model in
Section 1.3.
16In Appendix 1.C, I provide additional robustness checks using other measure of central tenden-
cies, e.g., the number of days of sick leave for the median worker.
17Other composition eects would occur if specic occupation groups or sectors that exhibit
many days of sick leave, e.g., the construction sector, are hit stronger by business cycles than
others. In Appendix 1.C, I show that the general pattern of pro-cyclical behavior holds for all
occupation and sectors.
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Figure 1.3: De-trended Average Days of Sick Leave and Unemployment Rate
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Notes: Dashed line (left axis): Absolute deviation of average annual claims of days of sick leave
per worker from linear trend in benchmark sample. Solid line (right axis): German
unemployment rate.
Cross Section
This incentive eect, i.e., the economic trade-o between recuperation time on
the one hand and an increased layo probability on the other hand, can also be
observed in cross-sectional analyses. For each wave and age, I classify all re-
spondents into one of ve income quintiles based on their monthly earnings in
the previous year.18 Figure 1.4 plots the average claims of sick leave (solid line)
for each income quintile. It additionally shows the average self-reported health
(dashed line) for each quintile. Workers in the top income quintile miss the fewest
days at work due to sickness. Workers in the medium income quintile claim on
average 10% more days of sick leave than workers in the bottom income quintile.19
Conversely, the health prole across income quintiles is monotonically increas-
ing. The poorest workers have the lowest average health, whereas the top income
quintile shows the highest average health.20
18Controlling for age in the quintile classication is important; otherwise, older people are more
likely to be in the top income quintile. Because older respondents are, on average, less healthy,
the relationship between income and days of sick leave would be biased.
19These patterns also hold for each age bin separately and for both sexes; see Figure 1.15 and
Figure 1.16 in Appendix 1.C. The patterns also exist for the median number of days of sick
leave and other cut-o levels for days of sick leave.
20A simple probit regression of health (good or bad) on income controlling for age and sex con-
rms this pattern and yields a highly signicant positive eect for log income. This income
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Health and days of sick leave are naturally related; i.e., workers in generally bad
health conditions are more likely to become sick and stay at home. Consequently,
the observed dierences in health could explain the small use of sick leave in the
top income quintile compared to the rest of the workforce. Rich people are, on
average, in better health condition; they are therefore less sick and require fewer
days at home to recover. However, the same rationale is puzzling on the other side
of the income distribution. The workers who are most unhealthy use fewer days
at home to recover than medium income workers, who enjoy, on average, better
health. This nding shows that sick leave is not mechanically tied to health, and
the absence behavior of workers must have a second economic determinant.
Figure 1.4: Average Days of Sick Leave and Health across Income Quintiles
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Av. Days of Sick Leave (Left Axis)
Av. Self Reported Health (Right Axis)
Notes: Solid lines (left axis): Average days of sick leave of workers and 95% bootstrap condence
interval. Income quintiles are based on the monthly gross income of the respondent. Dashed
lines (right axis): Average self-reported health and 95% bootstrap condence interval. Health is
reported on an ordinal ve-point scale, where 0 denotes "bad" health and 4 denotes "very good"
health.
This graphical inspection is conrmed by estimating Equation (1.1) using days
of sick leave as the dependent variable. Both income coecients, for log income
and for log income squared, are highly signicant and suggest a hump-shaped
relationship of income and days of sick leave. Health has the assumed protective
eect against days of sick leave. Other coecients conrm former results; see
Table 1.1. There is a long-run negative trend in claims of sick leave of minus
0.0488 days per year. More importantly, related to the cyclicality of days of sick
gradient in health is well established in the literature; see Smith (1999)
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leave, the coecient of the unemployment rate is negative and highly signicant.
This indicates that during periods of high unemployment, the average days of
sick leave are reduced.
Table 1.1: OLS and Logit Regressions of Days of Sick Leave on Income
Days of Sick Leave (1) (2) (3)
Log Income 10.0384*** 0.0496*** -1.7516***
Log Income Squared -0.6633*** – –
Health -1.4626*** -0.0805*** -1.2924***
Wave -0.0488*** 0.0035*** -0.1383***
Unemployment Rate -0.1599*** -0.0063** -0.1878***
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 51,179 51,179 28,216
Notes: *** Signicant at α=0.01, ** Signicant at α=0.05, * Signicant at α=0.1.
All regressions are based on the benchmark sample. Other controls include sex, age, age2, years
of education, marital status, number of children and dummies for the industrial sector. Robust
standard errors are clustered on the personal level. Entries in Column (2) show marginal eects
at the means.
Further insights into the characteristics of claims of sick leave are provided by
distinguishing between the extensive margin, i.e., missing any day in a year or
not, and the intensive margin, i.e., conditional on missing at least one day a year,
the number of days the respondent is absent from work.
The left panel of Figure 1.5 shows the extensive margin of sick leave. Workers
in the bottom income quintile exhibit the lowest probability of missing any day
in a year. The higher the income quintile the higher is the probability to miss at
least one day. Only at the very top of the income distribution does the extensive
margin decrease. This pattern is conrmed by estimating Equation (1.2) using the
extensive margin as a dependent variable. The results are presented as marginal
eects at the means in the Column 2 of Table 1.1. The estimate for log income is
highly signicant and conrms the positive relationship between income and the
probability of missing any day. Further results show an unsurprising protective
eect of self-reported health against missing any day, and that cyclicality is also
present in the extensive margin.
The right panel of Figure 1.5 displays the average days of sick leave conditional
on missing at least one day (intensive margin). In contrast to the extensive margin,
the intensive margin is monotonically decreasing across income quintiles. The
decline in conditional averages originates from dierent distributions of claims of
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sick leave. The upper income quintiles have a higher probability of experiencing
few days of sick leave (1 up to 14 days). Workers in the lower income quintile have
a higher probability of claiming many days of sick leave (more than 14 days) once
they miss one day.21 Column 3 of Table 1.1 presents results of estimating Equation
(1.1) using the intensive margin as the dependent variable. The results conrm
that a high income has a protective eect against many days of sick leave. As the
income increases, the number of days of sick leave a year conditional on being
sick decreases. Health has again a protective eect against days of sick leave. The
coecient of the unemployment rate also conrms the cyclical pattern for the
intensive margin.
Figure 1.5: Composition of Sick Leave across Income Quintiles
(a) Extensive Margin
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Notes: Left panel: Frequency of absence at least one day a year from work (extensive margin) of
workers and 95% bootstrap condence interval separated for income quintiles. Right panel:
Average days of sick leave conditional on being at least one day absent from work (intensive
margin) and 95% bootstrap condence interval separated for income quintiles.
Summarizing, there is a remarkable dierence in the utilization of sick leave
between income groups. The top income quintile has the lowest average days of
sick leave but a high probability of missing a day. The medium income quintile
has the highest average days of sick leave. The bottom income quintile has the
worst health but only a moderate number of days of sick leave. Furthermore, the
lowest income group has the highest probability of both not missing any day and
missing more than 14 days compared to other income groups.
21The density functions of days of sick leave for the bottom and top income quintiles are shown
in Figure 1.14 in Appendix 1.C.
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Life Cycle
The left panel of Figure 1.6 presents the ratio of the average days of sick leave of
the bottom two to the top two income quintiles. It shows that the average number
of days of sick leave is almost the same across income quintiles for workers in their
twenties. Over the life cycle, the gap between the bottom and top income groups
widens, and shortly before retirement, low income workers have almost 40% more
days of sick leave than their high-income peers. The right panel of Figure 1.6
presents the same ratio but for average health. Here, I similarly nd that the gap
between rich and poor workers widens over the life cycle. At the beginning of
working life, the average health of both groups is almost the same. At retirement,
the average health of the bottom two income groups is considerably lower than
average health of the top two income groups.
Figure 1.6: Ratio of Bottom vs. Top of Sick Leave and Health over Life Cycle
(a) Ratio of Average Days of Sick Leave
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Notes: Left Panel: Ratio of average days of sick leave of the bottom two income quintiles (Bottom
& Q2) to the top two income quintiles (Q2 & Top) over 5-year age bins. Right Panel: Ratio of
average self-reported health of the bottom two income quintiles to the top two income quintiles
over 5-year age bins.
These empirical ndings are further evidence for the proposed mechanism that
poor people reduce their recuperation time to retain their jobs and hazard the
consequence of a reduction in overall health over time.
1.2.3 Micro Evidence Using Panel Data
The panel structure of SOEP allows me to carve out further features of sick leave
in Germany. A rst nding is that days of sick leave are persistent. People who
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claim sick leave in the last period also have higher claims of sick leave in the
current period. Including lagged days of sick leave in estimating Equation (1.1)
returns a positive and signicant estimate. All other results remain qualitatively
unchanged.
More important is the relationship of days of sick leave and the employment
prospect of workers. Table 1.2 shows descriptive statistics of workers who report
continuous employment in the entire previous year. In Column (2) and (3), this
sample is separated by employment status in the current period. Workers who
switched from employment to unemployment are not surprisingly poorer, less
educated and less healthy than respondents who stayed employed. They are also
slightly younger. Regarding the days of sick leave, respondents who are unem-
ployed in the current period missed in the previous year on average one day more
from work than workers who stayed employed.
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Workers Employed in t-1
Employed in t-1 Whole Sample Employed in t Unemployed in t
Days of Sick Leave in t-1 4.83 4.81 5.85
Days of Sick Leave in t-2 4.46 4.44 5.31
Age 41.1 41.1 40.2
Income in t-1 2,934e 2,952e 1,977e
Years of Education 12.3 12.4 11.5
Health in t-1 2.65 2.66 2.46
Male 64% 64% 52%
Observations 102,125 99,025 3,100
Notes: Descriptive statistics for the sample used in the panel logit model. Only workers who re-
port employment the entire previous year. Unemployed people in t are classied as people who
report at least one month of unemployment in t.
Table 1.3 shows the odds ratios of estimating Equation (1.3). In Column 1 are re-
sults of a regression that includes only controls contained in the structural model.
These coecients will later be used in the calibration of the model. Column 2
contains results of regressing Equation (1.3), additionally including other con-
trol variables, e.g., health, age, and education. In both columns, income in the
previous period has an odds ratio smaller than 1; i.e., the highest probability of
becoming unemployed is among workers in the bottom income quintile. To be in
good health, on the other hand, has a protective eect against the risk of unem-
ployment. Naturally, the risk of unemployment is large in times of a high overall
unemployment rate. The key results here are the coecients for the days of sick
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leave. In both columns, days of sick leave show odds ratios that are greater than
1 and highly signicant. Three additional days of sick leave lead to an increase in
the probability of being unemployed in the next period by a factor of 1.1; e.g., a
10% layo probability would then be 11%.
To account for unobserved heterogeneity in workers, I estimate Equation (1.4)
including a xed-eect component (Column 3). The eect of sick leave on the
probability of becoming unemployed is qualitatively not aected and is still highly
signicant. The results for the eect of income and the unemployment rate on
the risk of unemployment remain unchanged. Health still has the same qualitative
sign but becomes insignicant in the model with xed eects.
In the relationship between sick leave and employment exists the problem of re-
verse causality. Workers who know that they will lose their job could be tempted
to take sick leave because they do not fear retaliation. Note that the period length
is one year, and therefore, this eect should not be present in the preceding pe-
riod. Estimating Equation (1.4) using days of sick leave in t-2 instead of t-1 still
yields an odds ratio that is signicantly greater than 1 (Column 4).22
Table 1.3: Panel Results for Sick Leave and Unemployment
Unemployed in t (1) (2) (3) (4)
Days of Sick Leave in t-1 1.0328*** 1.0287*** 1.0270*** –
Days of Sick Leave in t-2 – – – 1.0149**
Income Quintile in t-1 0.6132*** 0.6132*** 0.9129** 0.9519
Unemployment Rate in
t-1
1.1626*** 1.0798*** 1.2376*** 1.2542***
Health in t-1 – 0.8873*** 0.9248 0.9242
Other Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Eects No No Yes Yes
Observations 60,052 60,052 7,578 4,868
Notes: *** Signicant at α=0.01, ** Signicant at α=0.05, * Signicant at α=0.1.
Unemployed in t is dened as reporting unemployment for at least one month in the current year.
Other controls include age, sex, years of education, number of children, marital status, and year
dummies. All columns report odds ratios at the population average. Robust standard errors are
clustered.
22This specication, however, has the disadvantage of reducing the sample size and potentially
biasing the results. In looking at the eect of days of sick leave in t-2 on the employment
status in t, I have to exclude all respondents who became unemployed in period t-1. Many days
of sick leave in t-2, however, increases the likelihood of unemployment in t-1 and therefore
downward biases the results seen in Column 4.
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1.3 Structural Model
In this section, I describe a dynamic stochastic model of work absence decisions
over the life cycle. It captures both the standard consumption-saving decisions
and sequential decision-making behavior of employed individuals regarding their
health. I will later use this model to evaluate the consequences of economic in-
equalities for the utilization of sick leave and health as well as the consequences
emanating from dierent policies.
1.3.1 Household’s Problem
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of a continuum of agents
that live up to a maximum age of JT .23
Health, Acute Sickness, and Sick Leave One important feature of this chap-
ter is the distinction between the general health status, Ht, the event of acute
sickness, St, and the time an agent missed work, lt.
Health status, Ht, reects the overall constitution of agents. It is a persistent
state that adjusts only gradually. Agents start their economic life in a certain
health state, H0. At the end of each period, agents may drop into the next lower
health state with probability ΠW , ascend into the next higher health state with
probability ΠB , or stay in the same health state with probability 1− ΠB − ΠW .
In contrast, acute sickness, St, has a transitory notion and mimics the contrac-
tion of an illness or an injury, e.g., the u or back pain. At the beginning of each
period, individuals face the risk of either staying well, S0t , or contracting one of
m types of acute illnesses, Smt , which vary in severity with Smt < Sm+1t .
Health and acute sickness are interdependent. On the one hand, the probabil-
ity of contracting an illness of type m, Ωm (Ht, j), depends on the overall health
status and the age, j, of an individual. As the general health status decreases, the
probability both to become ill (extensive margin) and to contract a more severe ill-
ness (intensive margin) increases. The severity of the contracted sickness, on the
other hand, aects the health transition probabilities, with ΠB(Smt ) < ΠB(Sm+1t )
and ΠW (Smt ) > ΠW (Sm+1t ).
The decision to take sick leave, lt, depends essentially on the presence of an
acute sickness shock. When staying well, St = S0t , there is no reason to be absent
from work, lt = S0t = 0. Only when becoming ill do individuals have to decide
whether to take sick leave. By being absent from work, I assume for simplicity
23Unlike most of the health economics literature, I abstract for simplication from survival rates.
Making the survival rate health dependent would further strengthen the mechanism because
rich people would have an additional incentive to invest in health.
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of the model that individuals are required to take a xed amount of days of sick
leave according to the severity of their illness, lt = Smt > 0. By going to work
sick, workers face two possible consequences. First, with the health state depen-
dent probability 1−Z(Ht, Smt ), workers are fortunate and recover without taking
recuperation time, i.e., lt = 0. The health transition probabilities are the same as if
they had stayed at home. Second, with probability Z(Ht, Smt ), the sickness aggra-
vates; e.g., a cold becomes the u. In this case, workers are forced to stay at home,
lt = S
m
t . In addition, an aggravation of sickness leads to lower health prospects;
i.e., the sickness factor in health transition is multiplied by a factor of κ.
Note that the decision of going to work sick or not is made simultaneously
with the consumption-saving decision at the beginning of the period. Workers
cannot change their consumption if their sickness aggravates. The model also
ignores preventive treatment, so individuals cannot improve their overall health
by taking sick leave without being sick.
Figure 1.7: Events and Decisions - Sickness, Sick Leave and Sickness Aggravation
1-∑ Ωm(H,j)
Contract Illness 
of type m
 S
m
~[1,30]
Ωm(H,j) 
Recovery:   L=Sm
  Π=Π (Sm)
1-Z(H,S
m
)
Z(H,S
m
)
Stay at home
-----------------
Sick at work
Recovery:   L=0
  Π=Π (Sm)
Aggravation:  L=Sm
   Π=Π(κ*Sm)
Stay Well:   L=0
  Π=Π (0)
Notes: Circles denote events, rectangles denote realizations, diamonds denote decisions.
Preferences Individuals value consumption, ct, and general health, Ht, over
their life cycle according to a standard time-separable utility function
E
{
J∑
j=0
βju (ct, Ht)
}
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where β is the raw time discount factor, and expectations are taken over a stochas-
tic employment, health and sickness history. Days of sick leave do not enter the
utility function directly but rather yield utility from an increased probability of
being in a higher health state in the future.24
Labor Income andEmployment Status There are two sources of heterogene-
ity that aect an agent’s labor productivity, Γj,k, in this model. First, the labor pro-
ductivity diers according to the age of an agent. Second, each household belongs
to a particular group, k, that shares the same productivity. Dierences in groups
stand in for dierences in education or ability, characteristics that are xed at en-
try into the labor market and aect a group’s relative income.25 It is important to
note that neither the general health status nor acute sickness directly aect labor
productivity.26 Agents get paid only for the time they work; i.e., working time is
reduced by sick leave lt.27 The wage rate is w. Labor income yj,k,t is then given
by
yj,k,t = Γj,kw(1− lt)
In addition to labor productivity and days of sick leave, the labor income of
agents depends crucially on their employment status It. At the end of each period,
agents may be dismissed with probability 1 − Φe. Central to this chapter is that
workers are able to inuence their layo probability by reducing absence from
work, and they take this into their optimization reasoning.28 The probability of
24Including both sick leave and overall health in the utility function would not alter the qualita-
tive predictions of the model; the main trade-o between consumption and health/sick leave
remains. Augmenting the utility function by an additional argument, however, signicantly
complicates the identication of preferences parameters.
25By focusing on innate dierences across workers instead of idiosyncratic skill shocks as the
main source of heterogeneity I follow Keane and Wolpin (1997), Storesletten, Telmer, and
Yaron (2004) and Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011). They estimate that innate heterogeneity
is a major contributor to the observed variations of lifetime earnings, contributing 50-90%.
26Health-dependent labor productivity would reinforce the inequality between ability groups be-
cause low-productivity workers are less healthy. For simplicity of the model, I refrain from
this additional channel.
27The maximum amount of working days per year in this economy is set to 250.
28For simplication reasons, I refrain from modeling the demand side of the labor market. There
are various theoretical explanations for the described linkage from an employer’s perspective.
First, health is important for the productivity of a worker. However, employers might be
unable to directly observe health and instead use days of sick leave as a signal for health.
Table 1.1 shows the high correlation of sick leave and health. Second, related to the literature
on shirking, employers can only imperfectly monitor workers in terms of work absence. As
the numbers of days of sick leave increases, so does the probability of being discovered when
shirking. Third, due to the structure of the German sick leave system, days of sick leave are
23
Chapter 1 Unemployment, Sick Leave, and Health
staying employed, Φe, depends, in addition to days of sick leave, on the skill type
of workers and the current unemployment rate, ut.
Φe = Φe (l, k,U)
The probability of nding a new job when unemployed, Φu, is again determined
by workers’ skill type and the current unemployment rate. Unemployed workers
do not take sick leave.
Φu = Φu (k,U)
Unemployment Rate The evolution of the unemployment rate, Ut, is exoge-
nous (i.e., I do not model general equilibrium eects). I assume that the unem-
ployment rate in the model follows an AR(1) process approximated by a 5-state
Markov process.
1.3.2 Government Policies
The government imposes a at income tax, τ . The collected revenues are used for
three main purposes:
(i) to nance unemployment benets bU . The unemployment insurance (Arbeit-
slosengeld I) replaces a constant fraction of the previous net income and therefore
depends on the age and skill of an individual. When this unemployment insur-
ance falls below some consumption oor cW , workers might become eligible for
government provided welfare (Arbeitslosengeld II). This welfare is means tested;
i.e., before workers receive welfare, they have to run down their assets to a certain
amount, aW . Unemployment benets are then given by
bUj,k,i =
{
cW if ρU (1− τ )Γj,kw < cW ∩ ai ≤ aW
ρU (1− τ )Γj,kw else
where ρU is the unemployment insurance net replacement rate, and ai are the
assets of worker i.
(ii) to nance paid sick leave bS . For the time absent from work, lt, workers get
reimbursed by the government with payments depending on their regular labor
costly for employers. Days of sick leave are persistent over time. A simple test for auto-
correlation yields a coecient of 0.34. Therefore, the incentive for employers is high to get
rid of workers with many days of sick leave to decrease these costs. In all these cases, a higher
number of sick leave days leads to a higher layo probability.
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income.29 Sick leave benets are given by
bSj,k = ρ
S(1− τ )Γj,kw
where ρS is the sick leave net replacement rate.
(iii) to nance retirement benets, bR. Workers receive these skill-dependent
retirement benets after their xed retirement age JR.30 Retirements benets are
given by
bRj,k = ρ
R(1− τ )ΓjR,kw
where ρR is the retirement system net replacement rate.
1.3.3 Individual’s Dynamic Program
I model the decisions to miss work during an episode of acute illness as the choices
of workers solving a discrete choice stochastic dynamic programming problem.
At each discrete period, the forward-looking individual chooses whether to miss
work based on expected utility maximization. Individuals can accumulate as-
sets, a, at a constant interest rate R. They are not allowed to borrow. They allo-
cate their total resources between consumption, c, and asset holdings at+1 for the
next period.
At the beginning of period t, individuals are indexed by their age j, their skill
group k, their asset holdings a, their health status H , their realization of acute
sickness S, and their employment status I . To simplify the analysis, I assume
that the factor prices are exogenous. Each individual starts her life in a specic
health state H0 and employment state I0 and is endowed with initial assets a0.
Thus, her maximization problem reads as
V (j, k, at, Ht, St, It) = max
ct,lt,at+1
u (ct, Ht)
+ β
∑
Ht+1
Π(j, k,Ht, St, lt)
∑
St+1
Ω(j,Ht+1)
∑
It+1
Φ(k, lt,Ut)
V (j + 1, k, at+1, Ht+1, St+1, It+1) (1.5)
29This reimbursement is actually provided not by the government but by the employer. Because
I do not model the rm site, I make this shortcut.
30To reduce the state space in the quantitative approach, these retirement benets do not depend
on the history of idiosyncratic employment shocks. This is a deviation from the actual German
system. Lower pension benets from increased periods of unemployment would strengthen
the underlying mechanism of the model because, again, more days of sick leave reduce future
expected earnings.
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subject to the constraints
at+1 + ct =

(1− τ )
(
Γj,kw (1− lt) + ltbSj,k
)
+ Rat if j < JR ∩ It = 1
bUj,k + Rat if j < JR ∩ It = 0
bRj,k + Rat if j > JR
at+1 ≥ 0
1.4 Q_uantitative Analyses
In this section, I begin by discussing the specication of the model parameters.
Then, in Section 1.4.2, I present simulation results and their counterparts in the
data to evaluate the model’s performance. These results contain cross-sectional
distribution and lifetime proles of days of sick leave and health and the average
days of sick leave for a time series of unemployment rates.
1.4.1 Parameter Estimation and Calibration
To fully determine the structural model, I need to choose parameters that govern
the employment status, incidence of sickness, health transitions, preferences, and
policy settings. The determination of the model parameters proceeds in three
steps. First, I x a subset of parameters exogenously. Second, parts of the model
parameters can be estimated from SOEP data directly. These include parameters
governing labor productivity Γ; probabilities to keep employment Φe, to nd a
new job, Φu, and to contract acute sicknesses Ω; health transition probabilities Π;
and the Markov process of the overall unemployment rate. Third (and given the
parameters obtained in steps 1 and 2), the remaining parameters (i.e., governing
sickness aggravation Z and κ) are determined through a method of moments
estimation. I now describe these three steps in detail.
A Priori Chosen Parameters
In the rst step, I choose parameters from the literature or set them according to
the data. All values of the a priori chosen parameters are shown in Table 1.11 in
Appendix 1.D.
General Settings The model period is one year. Workers start their economic
life at age 20, retire at age 65 and live until age 80. Because I do not model child-
hood of a household explicitly, I denote its 20th year of life by j=0, its retirement
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age by JR=45 and the terminal age of life by JT=60. After retiring, the problem
of agents is reduced to a consumption-saving decision.
I use self-reported health status as an empirical counterpart from the SOEP for
the model’s health state. Thus, Ht takes one of ve values: 0-"bad", 1-"not so
good", 2-"satisfactory", 3-"good", or 4-"very good".
I assume that the interest rate, R, is determined exogenously by world factors
in an open-economy equilibrium, and following Siegel (2002), I setR=1.0402. The
wage rate is normalized to w=1.
Preferences I choose for the instantaneous utility function the specication of
Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo (2013). They estimate using household
panel data a health state-dependent utility function with the functional form:
u (ct, Ht) = (1 + ψ (4−Ht)) c
1−σ
t
1− σ
where σ determines the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, and ψ captures
state dependence because it allows the state of health to aect the marginal utility
of consumption.
Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo (2013) estimate that a one standard devi-
ation increase in the number of chronic diseases is associated with an 11% decline
in the marginal utility of consumption relative to this marginal utility when the
individual has no chronic disease. This implies that ψ=0.112.31 I choose σ=2 to
obtain an inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of 0.5, which is a value widely
used in the literature (e.g., Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007)). Consis-
tent with values commonly used in the quantitative macroeconomics literature, I
choose a time discount factor of β=0.96 per annum.
Policy Parameters For the benchmark calibration, I choose the current insti-
tutional setting for Germany. It shuts down two direct eects of income on health.
First, Germany has universal health care coverage, so individuals do not have to
pay for standard medical expenditures, e.g., doctor visits. Second, I set the bench-
mark paid sick leave coverage to 100% of the current wage, ρS=1, ruling out any
reduction in the current income of workers due to sick leave; this step is impor-
tant to isolate the indirect eects of sick leave via the risk of unemployment. I set
the unemployment insurance net replacement rate to ρU=0.60. This is the current
German setting for the rst 12-24 months in Germany. The means-tested welfare
31I deviate from Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo (2013) by substituting the number of
chronic diseases (0-5) by the ordinal ve health-state variables used in this model.
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provision, cW , I set to 0.25 (, 700 e(2005)), which represents the German basic
tax-free allowance. The amount of assets of an individual that are protected with-
out losing eligibility of welfare, aW , I set to 0.44 (, 1220 e(2005)).32 Retirement
benets are set to ρR=0.50 of the former net labor income of a worker. I set the
tax rate τ to 33%.
Parameters Estimated Directly from the Data
In a second step, I estimate a part of the model parameters directly from the SOEP
data. Detailed results for the estimated parameters are shown in Table 1.12 - 1.13
in Appendix 1.D.
Γ – Labor Productivity Using SOEP data on labor income, I compute age-
dependent productivity for ve dierent income quintiles. For each age (20-65)
and wave separately, I split the sample into ve income quintiles. Within each
age-income cell, I take the median income as the labor productivity Γj,k of workers
in that quintile. Figure 1.8 shows the resulting income proles over the life cycle.
It exhibits the well-known increase in income at younger ages and the attening
out at older ages. The distance between the bottom and the top income quintiles
widens over age. I normalize the life-cycle proles using the income third quintile
at age 40 as a basis (1, 2768 e(2005)).33
Φ – Employment Transition For each combination of days of sick leave, skill
group, and unemployment rate, the model predicts a certain probability of retain-
ing the job Φe, which is given by
φ̂e = 6.775832− 0.0331853 ∗ l +
∑
k
βek ∗ kDummy − 0.1506627 ∗ U
Φe (l, k,U) = e
φ̂e
1 + eφ̂e
The used parameters are obtained by a panel logit regression using SOEP data.
The resulting odds ratios of this estimation are shown in Section 1.2.3.
The probability of nding new employment when unemployed in the last pe-
32The German unemployment insurance system underwent a major reform in 2005, which might
limit the historical comparison between the model predictions and the data.
33These results are broadly in line with other ndings on the German income structure, cf. Hujer
et al. (2001).
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Figure 1.8: Life Cycle Prole of Labor Income by Income Quintiles
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Notes: Labor income over the life cycle for ve quintiles computed for the benchmark sample.
Quintiles are dened for each age and wave separately.
riod, Φu, is computed the same way except using days of sick leave.
φ̂u = 4.347449 +
∑
k
βuk ∗ kDummy − 0.199108 ∗ U
Φu (k,U) = e
φ̂u
1 + eφ̂u
Ω – Incidence of Sickness One shortcoming of the dataset is that it contains
only days missed at work, l, and not the incidence of sickness, S. To compute the
probabilities of sickness, I make the identifying assumption that workers with a
high productivity always stay at home to recover, and therefore, observed sick
leave is equal to the occurrence of a sickness, S = l.34
The incident of sickness S depends on the current health state H of an agent.
Individuals with lower health have both a higher probability of contracting a sick-
ness and a higher probability that the sickness is more severe. In addition to
health, the number of days of sick leave also seems to depend on the age of work-
34In the benchmark calibration, I use only the second to the top income quintiles. The empirical
analysis and the later simulation results suggest that the top income quintile is an outlier. In a
robustness check, I include all observations in the estimation of the probabilities of sickness.
The qualitative patterns remain the same.
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ers.35 To take this trend into account, I estimate incident probabilities conditional
on the health status and the age group of workers. To ensure sucient observa-
tions for each sickness state, I restrict the number of sickness shock realizations
to m = 9 states, S ∈ [0, 1-2, 3-4, 5, 6-9, 10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-30]. Figure 1.9 shows
the frequency of days of sick leave conditional on health for the top two income
quintiles for the specic age group 40-50.36
Figure 1.9: Frequency of Days of Sick Leave Conditional on Health and Age
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Notes: Frequency of days of sick leave conditional on self-reported health state. The sample
consists of the fourth income quintiles for the age group 40-50.
Π – Health Transition To estimate the eect of acute sickness on the gen-
eral health status, it is important to dierentiate between sickness and sick leave.
Taking sick leave should be benecial to health, whereas an acute sickness itself
should harm overall health. As in the estimation of Ω, it is therefore necessary to
restrict the sample to those for whom observed sick days are equal to sickness,
i.e., the high-productivity workers.
To estimate health transition probabilities, I dene a new variable
∆i,t,t−2 =

1 Hi,t > Hi,t−2
0 Hi,t = Hi,t−2
−1 Hi,t < Hi,t−2
35This age dependency of sick leave can be observed in Figure 1.15 in Appendix 1.D. During early
working life, workers use on average more days of sick leave than later in their working life.
36The results for all age-groups are shown in Table 1.13 in Appendix 1.D.
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which marks a change, either better or worse, in the health status of an individ-
ual between period t-2 and t.37 To assess the transition probabilities of health, I
employ an ordered logistic panel regression. The regression equation is
OLogit
[
∆i,t,t−2
]
= F{α + β1 Si,t−1 + HDumi,t−2 β2 + β3 ki + β4 ji,t−1 + i,t}
where days of sick leave are denoted by Si,t−1,Hdumi,t−2 are dummies for each health
state, ki is the income quintile (skill type), and ji,t−1 the age of the respondent.
i,t is a random error term.
Table 1.4 shows the results for the specication used for calibration (Column 1)
and a regression in which numerous additional controls are included (Column 2).
In both specications, sickness has a negative eect on the probability of an im-
provement in health and consequently a positive eect on the probability of a
deterioration in health. Age has a detrimental eect on health, reecting a wors-
ening health status over the life cycle. Being in a high income quintile has, in
contrast to age, a protective eect against health deterioration. Including years of
education makes the income eect insignicant, reecting the strong correlation
between income and education.
Table 1.4: Ordered Logit Results for Changes of Health
∆t,t−2 (1) (2)
Days of Sick Leave (t-1) -0.0459*** -0.0414***
Age (t-1) -0.0292*** -0.0296***
Income Quintile (t-1) Yes Yes
Health State Dummies(t-2) Yes Yes
Other Controls No Yes
Observations 40,460 34,935
Notes: *** Signicant at α=0.01, ** Signicant at α=0.05, * Signicant at α=0.1.
Other controls include sex, years of education, number of children, marital status, recession, and
year dummies. All columns report the regression coecient.
37I choose a lag of two periods to compute health transitions. Doing so is necessary because
the question about health refers to the point in time at which the interview is conducted
(distributed over the year), whereas the question about days of sick leave refers to the time
span of the whole previous year. This might lead to a situation in which the acute sickness
occurs later in the year than the respondent answers the health question. In a robustness
check, I look at a one lag health transition and nd qualitatively similar results.
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U – Unemployment Rate I estimate the unemployment rate with an AR(1)
process using the time span from 1994 to 2012 (with ρ=0.9152). This continuous
AR(1) process is then approximated by a nite state Markov process applying
Tauchen’s method, cf. Tauchen (1986). I restrict the number of unemployment
rate states to n=5. Doing so leads to an unemployment rate state grid U ∈ [7.5%,
9%, 10.5%, 12%, 13.5%] and a transition matrix, Ξ, given by
Ξ =

0.7939 0.2056 0.0005 0 0
0.0733 0.7752 0.1512 0.0002 0
0.0001 0.1072 0.7853 0.1072 0.0001
0 0.0002 0.1512 0.7753 0.0733
0 0 0.0005 0.2055 0.7939

Parameters Calibrated Within the Model
In the nal step, I use my model to nd parameters that govern the probability
and severity of sickness aggravation. All estimated parameters and the t of the
targeted moments to the data can be found in Table 1.16 in Appendix 1.D.
Sickness Aggravation Important for the decision to stay at home to recover
or go to work sick is the aggravation probability, Z , and the aggravation factor κ.
For the aggravation probability, Z , I make two assumptions. On the one hand,
it depends negatively on the overall health constitution, i.e., that people in a bad
health state are much more likely to face an aggravation than people in very good
health. On the other hand, the aggravation probability depends positively on the
severity of the sickness; i.e., being hit by a bad illness makes it very unlikely not
to recover without taking sick leave. The functional form for Z is given by
Ẑ =(H − 1)Sζ
Z (H,S) =2
e−Ẑ
1 + e−Ẑ
where 0 ≤ Z ≤ 1 and ζ ≤ 0. Parameters ζ and κ are calibrated to minimize
the distance between the distribution of days of sick leave of the bottom income
quintile found in the data and predicted by the model.
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1.4.2 Model Fit and Benchmark Results
In this section, I examine the t of the model to the non-targeted data moments.
Moments of the model are computed by aggregating over the state distribution of
the population. The initial states for health, H0, and employment, I0, are drawn
from distributions conditional on the skill type that match the data; see Table 1.14
- 1.15 in Appendix 1.D. All individuals start their lives with no initial assets, a0=0.
For cross-sectional and life-cycle patterns, I x the general unemployment rate
constant at U=10.8%.
Cross Section The left panel of Figure 1.10 plots the simulated average days of
sick leave across income quintiles (the solid black line) and the data counterpart
(the dashed red line). The model is able to endogenously generate the key hump-
shaped prole of average days of sick leave, particularly the increase in days of
sick leave between the bottom and the medium income quintiles. This increase
is driven by the indirect cost eect, i.e., that low income people reduce their re-
cuperation time to reduce their layo probability. Note that the model is also
able to reproduce the decrease in the average days of sick leave for high-income
individuals compared to medium-income workers, although the dierence is not
as large as that observed in the data.38 The right panel of Figure 1.10 shows the
simulated average health for each income quintile and the data counterpart. The
cross-sectional pattern is very close to the data moments and reects the income
gradient in health. Only in the very top income quintile does the model predict a
higher average health than is found in the data.
Figure 1.11 shows the decomposition of the average days of sick leave into the
extensive (left panel) and intensive (right panel) margins. The t of the model
prediction to the data for the probability of missing any day in a year is good.
The model can account for the sharp increase in the probability of missing any
day across the income quintiles. Again, the top income quintile has the worst
t. Looking at the intensive margins (the number of days missed conditional on
being absent for at least one day), the model can generate the monotonic decrease
over income quintiles. However, particularly for the top two income quintiles, the
simulated level of the intensive margins exhibits a poor t to the data moments.
38The not-so-good t of the model for the top income quintile hints that characteristics of very
high income jobs, e.g., high responsibility, might also have an eect on the utilization of sick
leave. Additionally, a higher work exibility (e.g., a home oce) allows for fewer days of sick
leave compared to workers on an assembly line.
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Figure 1.10: Health and Days of Sick Leave across Income Quintiles
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Notes: The dashed red lines show moments taken from the SOEP data. The solid black lines show
averages from simulating the structural model using the parameters explained in Section 1.4.1.
Figure 1.11: Extensive and Intensive Margins of Days of Sick Leave across Income
Quintiles
(a) Extensive Margins
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Notes: The dashed red lines show moments taken from the SOEP data. The solid black lines show
averages from simulating the structural model using the parameters explained in Section 1.4.1.
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Life Cycle In addition to cross-sectional moments, the model can replicate the
widening gap in average health across the income quintiles over the life cycle.
The left panel of Figure 1.12 shows the ratio of the two bottom to the two top
income quintiles for average health. At the beginning of working life at age 20,
average health is almost identical between the bottom and the top.39 Over the life
course, the simulated health ratio decreases (the health gap widens). At the end
of working life at age 60, the model predicts a clear income gradient in health, as
observed in the data.
The right panel of Figure 1.12 shows the ratio for the average days of sick leave
of the bottom to top income groups. The simulated model is able to reproduce
the increase in the ratio, i.e., the low-income workers used more days of sick
leave compared to their high-income peers as they advanced in age. However,
the match of the level of this ratio is poor, which, as mentioned, is due to the fact
that the very top income quintile has a low utilization that cannot be explained
only by their overall good health.
Figure 1.12: Inequalities in Days of Sick Leave and Health over Life Cycle
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Notes: The dashed red lines show moments taken from the SOEP data. The solid black lines show
averages from simulating the structural model using the parameters explained in Section 1.4.1.
Business Cycle The model is able to represent the cyclical behavior of the av-
erage claims of sick leave in Germany. Figure 1.13 shows the simulated average
days of sick leave for all workers. The unemployment is set according to the Ger-
39The prediction of the model at age 20 is matched to the data by construction; I set the initial
values of the model according to the data.
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man unemployment rate in the time span from 1994 to 2012. When the unem-
ployment rate is high, the average days of sick leave are reduced and vice versa.
The magnitude is, however, less distinctive than that observed in the data. The
model is particularly able to reproduce the drop in days of sick leave in times of
high unemployment. The strong increases in the days of sick leave in times of
low unemployment are not well matched.
Figure 1.13: Cyclicality of Average Days of Sick Leave for German Business Cycle
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Notes: The dashed red lines show moments taken from the SOEP data. The solid black lines show
averages from simulating the structural model using the parameters explained in Section 1.4.1.
1.4.3 Effects of Indirect Costs of Sick Leave
To illustrate the quantitative dimension of the indirect costs of sick leave, I sim-
ulate a counterfactual model in which the layo probability, Φ, is independent of
workers’ past days of sick leave. Table 1.5 shows the central sick leave moments
for the population average and bottom income quintile workers. The average
number of days of sick leave for all workers is increased by 4% compared to the
benchmark economy. This dierence in work absence is primarily driven by low
skilled workers. The bottom income group would increase their average num-
ber of days of sick leave by more than 11%. A similar pattern is shown for the
extensive margin of sick leave, where the bottom income is 10% higher than the
benchmark case. The drop in the intensive margin follows from the fact that more
people stay at home and reduce the conditional average of sick leave.
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Table 1.5: Quantitative Eect of Indirect Costs of Sick Leave
Benchmark
Case
Sick Leave
Independent
Layo
Dierence
Average sick leave days 5.64 5.84 +4%
Average sick leave days (Bottom) 5.43 6.02 +11%
Extensive Margin 0.56 0.59 +3%
Extensive Margin (Bottom) 0.50 0.60 +10%
Intensive Margin 10.06 9.90 -2%
Intensive Margin (Bottom) 10.69 10.06 -6%
Notes: Results are shown for the benchmark economy and a model without a sick-leave-
dependent layo probability.
1.5 Policy Evaluation
The determination of policy-invariant structural parameters allows for the intro-
duction and evaluation of dierent counterfactual policies that aect the nancial
constraints of a worker’s decision-making problem. These policies include vari-
ations in the paid sick leave coverage and the benet structure of unemployed
workers.
1.5.1 Paid Sick Leave Coverage
Having identied the importance of sick leave for households, the model allows
for the analysis of the eect of introducing direct costs of sick leave, i.e., a reduc-
tion in the replacement rate of paid sick leave. Table 1.6 shows the average days
of sick leave of the whole work force and of workers in the bottom income quin-
tile for dierent sick leave replacement rates. Introducing the additional costs of
being absent from work naturally leads to a decrease in the average days of sick
leave. A reduction from 100% (benchmark economy) to only 80% of the current
income reduces the days an average worker is absent from work by more than
one day or 19% relative to the benchmark economy. These numbers are broadly
in line with those of Ziebarth and Karlsson (2010), who estimated the reduction of
sick leave for such a policy change as 12% using a natural experiment. Reducing
the replacement rate further to zero (as in the US) would lower the average days
of sick leave to 3.29 days or only 58% of the days of sick leave of the benchmark
economy.
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Although both direct and indirect costs of sick leave reduce the number of days
missed at work, it is important to note that these reductions are borne by dierent
groups of the income distribution. Although indirect costs primarily aect the
bottom income quintile (see results above), Table 1.6 shows that direct costs of
sick leave also have a strong eect on the higher income groups. The reduction
of paid sick leave to 80% reduces the days of sick leave of the average worker
by 20%. Bottom income quintile workers reduce their days of sick leave by only
17%. The underlying reason for this nding is that the sick leave replacement rate
is a fraction of income, and therefore, high-income agents lose more income in
absolute terms than their low-income peers.
Table 1.6: Variation of Income Replacement Rate of Paid Sick Leave
All Workers Bottom Income Quintile
Policy Change Days of
Sick Leave
Dierence
to
Benchmark
Days of
Sick Leave
Dierence
to
Benchmark
bS=100% (benchmark) 5.64 – 5.43 –
bS= 99% 5.61 -0.5% 5.38 -0.9%
bS= 90% 5.27 -6.5% 4.73 -12.9%
bS= 80% 4.52 -19.8% 4.51 -16.9%
bS= 50% 4.07 -27.8% 3.89 -28.3%
bS= 0% 3.29 -41.7% 3.08 -43.2%
Notes: Simulations of structural model using the parameters explained in Section 1.4.1, varying
the income replacement rate of sick leave.
1.5.2 Unemployment Benefits
Corresponding to the replacement rate bS for direct costs of sick leave, unemploy-
ment benets are a main determinant of the indirect costs. Altering the nancial
situation for workers who are laid o changes the incentives to go to work sick;
e.g., full unemployment insurance would completely eliminate the indirect costs
of sick leave. Table 1.7 shows the average days of sick leave of all workers and of
workers in the bottom income quintile for various changes in the unemployment
benet structure, i.e., the unemployment insurance net replacement rate bU , the
level of means tested welfare cW , and the amount of protected assets a household
is allowed to save before losing welfare eligibility aW .
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A 10% increase in the unemployment insurance net replacement rate leads to
a 2% increase in the days of sick leave for all workers. This increase is strongest
among low-income workers, whose days of sick leave would increase by more
than 5%. Similarly, a 10% reduction in the unemployment benet level would
reduce sick leave by 1%. Important to note here is that due to the unemploy-
ment benet structure in Germany, when most low-income workers become un-
employed, they will fall directly into means-tested welfare and are therefore not
aected by this reduction.
Table 1.7: Variation of Unemployment Benets Structure
All Workers Bottom Income Quintile
Policy Change Days of
Sick
Leave
Dierence
to
Benchmark
Days of
Sick
Leave
Dierence
to
Benchmark
bU=70% 5.75 +2.0% 5.71 +5.1%
bU=60% (benchmark) 5.64 – 5.43 –
bU=50% 5.58 -1.1% 5.38 -0.9%
cW= 770e 5.68 +0.7% 5.58 +2.8%
cW= 700e (benchmark) 5.64 – 5.43 –
cW= 630e 5.61 -0.7% 5.29 -2.6%
cW= 0e 5.56 -1.4% 5.10 -9.4%
bU= 0% & cW= 0e 4.41 -21.8% 3.70 -31.9%
aW=5000e 5.68 +0.7% 5.61 +3.3%
aW=1200e (benchmark) 5.64 – 5.43 –
aW= 0e 5.58 -1.1% 5.16 -5.0%
Notes: Simulations of structural model using the parameters explained in Section 1.4.1, varying
the income replacement rate of unemployment benets and changing the means-tested welfare
consumption oor and the asset exemption.
Reducing means-tested welfare has, on average, a weaker eect on the popu-
lation average but a much stronger eect on low-income workers. Reducing the
level of welfare by 10% reduces the days of sick leave by almost 3%, whereas in-
creasing the level of welfare by 10% increases the days missed at work by almost
3%. Taken to the extreme, setting both the unemployment benets and the wel-
fare to zero reduces by more than 1.2 days the days missed at work for all workers
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and by more than 1.7 days for poor workers in absolute terms; in relative terms,
these reductions are 22% for all workers and 32% for poor workers.
In addition to the level of welfare benets, it is also important to look at the
amount of assets that unemployed people are allowed to save without reducing
their welfare. These protected assets enable workers to smooth their consumption
over an unemployment period and therefore ease the negative eect of unemploy-
ment. Setting aW to zero has the same eect as setting cW to 450e. Both reduce
the days of sick leave by 5%.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have studied disparities in the utilization of sick leave across in-
come quintiles, over the life course and during business cycles. Using data from
the SOEP, I have found rst that in times of high unemployment, days of sick
leave are, on average, low. Second, low-income workers use surprisingly few
days of sick leave taking into account their general low overall health state. Fur-
thermore, I have documented that the eect of the number of days of sick leave on
future employment is empirically relevant and serves as the economic rationale
behind these stylized facts of aggregated days of sick leave. Based on this nding,
I have developed and estimated a life-cycle model that includes an endogenous
health state. I have estimated this model intensively using micro panel data and
have shown that it is able to replicate data moments on the aggregated number
of sick leave days in many dimensions, e.g., the hump-shaped pattern across in-
come quintiles. I have found that the costs of sick leave stemming from reductions
in future expected earnings primarily aect the lowest income quintile, whereas
the costs stemming from reductions in current income (i.e., a reduction in paid
sick leave coverage) also aect higher income quintiles. Furthermore, my results
from counterfactual policy experiments suggest that changing the unemployment
benets (particularly means-tested welfare) would lead to sizeable changes in the
number of sick leave days in Germany.
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Appendix 1.A German Sick Leave Policy
Compulsory sick pay with 100% wage replacement was established in 1930 for
white-collar employees and in 1969 for blue-collar workers. The current regula-
tion of sick leave (Entgeltfortzahlung im Krankheitsfall) in Germany is determined
in the Entgeltfortzahlungsgesetz. According to the law, employees eligible for paid
sick leave are those (also including part-time and temporary workers) that fulll
the following conditions:
• The employment has to be in place for four weeks.
• The worker has to be incapable of working.
• The incapability has to be a consequence of an illness.
• The illness is not a result of a gross negligence.
Sick pay has to be provided by the employer from the rst day (no grace pe-
riod) up to six weeks. After six weeks, sick pay is provided by the health insurance
with a reduced wage replacement rate of 80%. The claim of full wage replacement,
however, renews if the worker contracts a dierent illness, or more than 6 months
has elapsed in which the worker was sick with the same illness. Workers receive
the average earnings that they would have earned if they had not been sick. These
earnings include the xed salary potential commissions. Furthermore, if work-
ers become sick while they are on vacation, holiday entitlement is not reduced.
Workers absent from work have to inform the employer immediately about their
incapability to work. On the fourth day of a sick spell, workers have to send a
sick certicate issued by a health practitioner.
Monitoring the worker is highly restricted. The German Federal Labor Court
decided that the observation of employees by their employer is illegal without
concrete evidence supporting the suspicion of fraud. (Court decision 19. Febru-
ary 2015 - 8 AZR 1007/13). The employer can only request that the employee be
reexamined by the practitioner of the Medical Service of the Health Funds (Medi-
zinischer Dienst der Krankenversicherung).
Between October 1996 and December 1998, there was a temporary change in
the law. The main changes were a reduction of wage replacement from 100% to
80%. However, this reduction applied to only a fraction of the German work-
force, as collective labor agreements between unions and rms mostly kept 100%
wage replacement. Empirical research on this law discontinuity is conducted by
Ziebarth and Karlsson (2010) and Ziebarth (2013).
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Appendix 1.B Sample Selection
Table 1.8 shows the descriptive statistics before and after sample selection. I use in
these statistics weighted samples. Weights are provided by the SOEP to match the
German micro-census. The nal sample is younger due to a focus on the working
age population. The higher percentage of men in the sample can be explained by
their higher participation rate in the labor force. The average number of reported
days of sick leave is lower as the upper tail of the sick day distribution is cut o.
Table 1.8: Descriptive Statistics for Sample Selection
Whole Sample Benchmark Sample
Male 46% 63%
Age 49 41
Years of Education 11.7 12.1
Health 2.32 2.60
Income 2,359e 2,814e
Unemployed 6.80% 5.40
Sick Leave 9.73 5.26
Observations 393,245 100,526
Notes: Descriptive statistics before and after sample selection. A benchmark sample used in the
cross-sectional and panel analysis.
Appendix 1.C Robustness Check of Empirical Part
1.C.1 Different Measures of Sick Leave
Workers’ number of sick leave days has a skewed distribution. Table 1.9 provides
results for the correlation of the unemployment rate and dierent measures of sick
leave days. First, it shows the result for the median worker. The second column
shows the correlation with the extensive margin, i.e., whether the respondent
has missed a day or more. In the last three columns, dierent cut-o levels for
the maximum days of sick leave are used. All results are negative and in the same
range as the benchmark result. The pro-cyclical pattern is extremely robust.
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Table 1.9: Days of Sick Leave and Unemployment - Dierent Sick Leave Measures
Correlation Median Ext. Marg. Max 120 Max 60 Max 40
Unemployment Rate -0.5605 -0.4960 -0.7033 -0.6951 -0.6347
Notes: Times series correlation of dierent measures of days of sick leave and unemployment
rate. First, the days of sick leave of the median respondent; second, the cyclical behavior of the
extensive margin. The last three columns represent the correlation of the mean with dierent
cut-o levels for the maximum number of sick days.
1.C.2 Composition Effects
A potential dierent explanation for the cyclicality of days of sick leave could
arise if sectors (e.g., the construction sector) with a high usual number of days
of sick leave are more prone to business cycles than the rest of the economy. To
ensure that the general eect is not driven by this reason, I check whether the
exclusion of dierent sectors alter the general nding. Table 1.10 shows that the
exclusion of the construction sector does not alter the benchmark result. The
correlation coecient is reduced only slightly to -.7188.
I also check whether this cyclical behavior is dierent for dierent occupation
types. The SOEP provides the ISCO88 classication and uses the white/blue collar
distinction as in the European working conditions surveys. Table 1.10 shows that
for both subgroups, the pro-cyclicality of days of sick leave holds.
Table 1.10: Days of Sick Leave and Unemployment - Dierent Sectors and Occupations
Correlation No Con-
struction
Blue
Collar
White
Collar
Never Un-
employed
Unemployment Rate -0.7032 -0.6289 -0.6272 -0.6576
Notes: Time-series correlation of average days of sick leave and unemployment rate for selected
subgroups.
1.C.3 Density Function of Days of Sick Leave
Figure 1.14 shows the density functions for the top and the bottom income quin-
tiles conditional on missing any day in a year. The frequency of a low number
of sick leave days is higher for the top income quintile, whereas the frequency
of a high number of days of sick leave is higher for the bottom income quintile.
Combined with the dierences in the extensive margin, this shows that workers
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in the bottom income quintile have either no or many days of sick leave, whereas
workers in the top income quintile have few days of sick leave but at a higher
frequency.
Figure 1.14: Density Function of Days of Sick Leave for Bottom and Top Income
Quintiles
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Notes: Density function of days of sick leave for bottom and top income quintiles. Graphs
exclude the probability of having no days of sick leave.
1.C.4 Age Profiles of Days of Sick Leave and Health
The left panel of Figure 1.15 conrms that the observed hump-shaped income
prole also holds within all but one age group (20-25). It is noteworthy that there
is no signicant increase in days of sick leave with age, which is driven in part
by the exclusion of a very high number of sick leave days (>30). The right panel
shows that the income gradient in health increases with age.
1.C.5 Controlling for Gender in Sick Day Profiles over
Income Q_uintiles
Figure 1.16 shows the average annual claims of days of sick leave and the average
self-reported health separated by gender. Both groups show a hump-shaped pro-
le in the average number of sick leave days across income quintiles. On average,
women miss more days at work due to sickness than men. Health increases mono-
tonically with income for both groups, with better average health for woman than
for men.
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Figure 1.15: Days of sick leave and Health over Life Cycle by Income Quintiles
(a) Average Sick Days
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Notes: Left Panel: Average self-reported health of bottom (solid), medium (dashed) and top
(dotted) income quintiles over the life cycle. Right Panel: Average number of sick leave days of
the bottom (solid), medium (dashed) and top (dotted) income quintiles over the life cycle. Age
bins: 18-22, 23-27, 28-32, 33-37, 38-42, 43-47, 48-52, 53-57, 58-62.
Figure 1.16: Average Days of Sick Leave and Health over Income Quintiles - Gender
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Notes: Dashed and dotted-dashed lines (right axis): Average self-reported health separated by
gender. Health is reported on an ordinal ve-point scale, where 1 denotes "bad" health, and 5
denotes "very good" health. Solid and dotted lines (left axis): Average days of sick leave of
workers separated by income quintile and gender.
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Appendix 1.D Parameters of Structural Model
Table 1.11: Fixed Parameters
Parameter Description Value
Economy
JT Life Span 60
JR Retirement Age 45
R Interest Rate 1.04
w Wage Rate 1
Preferences
β Time Discount Factor 0.9659
σ Inter-temporal Elasticity of Substitution 2
ψ0 Health Weight (level) 0.011
ψ1 Health Weight (marginal) 0.19
Policy
ρU Unemployment Benet (ALGI) 60%
cW Consumption Floor Welfare (ALGII) 0.25,700e
aW Asset Limit for Welfare (ALGII) 0.44,1225e
ρS Sick Leave Replacement Rate 100%
ρR Retirement Benet 50%
τ Tax Rate 33%
Notes: Parameters used in the structural model and taken from the literature or chosen to match
the German labor market.
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Table 1.12: Labor Productivity of Income Quintile over Life Cycle - Γ
K1 K2 K3 K4 K5
J20 0.224826037 0.328405423 0.456578007 0.587303446 0.732877732
J21 0.250005566 0.409269009 0.560519145 0.685354277 0.850657669
J22 0.311148441 0.509774966 0.622307323 0.724721362 0.884406497
J23 0.350360594 0.552927485 0.656849717 0.754174695 0.924644522
J24 0.425638928 0.598862981 0.700761760 0.809373763 0.979296359
J25 0.453304887 0.633908213 0.749711757 0.848907970 1.043437128
J26 0.486555339 0.666411652 0.784269193 0.909526063 1.105854970
J27 0.505469995 0.689869703 0.819220306 0.957395861 1.196744849
J28 0.526567728 0.729833055 0.848928302 1.009396469 1.256001953
J29 0.534257324 0.749711757 0.892406923 1.043371438 1.333614431
J30 0.552043113 0.775403025 0.923040554 1.094749559 1.398805958
J31 0.588814584 0.811998956 0.964703602 1.141444947 1.461369255
J32 0.581567748 0.813786468 0.967081217 1.143405056 1.507091996
J33 0.590600670 0.827264526 0.997438473 1.182487624 1.598022908
J34 0.610923651 0.844675221 1.0 1.195602273 1.638440613
J35 0.605390496 0.850657669 1.019549932 1.236543287 1.696821211
J36 0.587309058 0.841163678 1.035278366 1.258038975 1.730506925
J37 0.595460368 0.850998814 1.034804554 1.262927700 1.803819125
J38 0.588814584 0.851471889 1.046094062 1.291190800 1.845452180
J39 0.598372424 0.854338956 1.050974415 1.293505670 1.844733642
J40 0.596219571 0.856083687 1.053135456 1.324056682 1.900608466
J41 0.596219571 0.850717011 1.053102151 1.303667321 1.891957676
J42 0.598372424 0.854338956 1.051454666 1.293505670 1.899733341
J43 0.587912961 0.852549696 1.051454666 1.299490326 1.910960195
J44 0.597444858 0.842776110 1.030489463 1.275986504 1.913979709
J45 0.601222195 0.844669241 1.028788249 1.275986504 1.913979709
J46 0.595460368 0.845894251 1.033453225 1.261745563 1.913979709
J47 0.588814584 0.842776110 1.027148308 1.265043937 1.910960195
J48 0.590662450 0.850657669 1.035278366 1.275986504 1.921742678
J49 0.598372424 0.862337174 1.043399683 1.262927700 1.934141825
J50 0.591030413 0.851508322 1.035278366 1.257473805 1.974699741
J51 0.592397659 0.842936838 1.035278366 1.275231717 1.986756456
J52 0.575729560 0.854603003 1.034199823 1.284230276 1.958125531
J53 0.574158805 0.840822441 1.031918443 1.264579325 1.971260512
J54 0.571549022 0.837721413 1.018490066 1.275348100 1.955603380
J55 0.565836095 0.838220617 1.033453225 1.278164842 1.987566444
J56 0.560519145 0.834560214 1.020789203 1.263601985 2.009223412
J57 0.570354465 0.818330276 0.993699316 1.259025884 1.919270208
J58 0.566708552 0.827973127 0.995205761 1.232760613 1.976734648
J59 0.562409792 0.835161909 0.991687686 1.213715589 1.943266795
J60 0.573288049 0.824682942 0.992062779 1.222188079 2.009503467
J61 0.567814006 0.857883160 1.031918443 1.254869129 2.060114657
J62 0.575595834 0.849653188 1.050129374 1.262336586 2.084111243
J63 0.609652318 0.891687833 1.095787160 1.333614431 2.155842844
J64 0.611094040 0.807900162 0.993699316 1.217998479 2.135917358
Notes: Parameters directly estimated from the SOEP.
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Table 1.13: Incident Probability of Sickness Conditional on Age & Health - Ω
J Sm H1 H2 H3 H4 H5
0 0.11111 0.16842 0.28280 0.35153 0.42068
1-2 0 0.05263 0.04977 0.05870 0.08275
3-4 0.22222 0.03157 0.07239 0.09556 0.10000
5 0 0.12631 0.14932 0.11058 0.11379
20-29 6-9 0.11111 0.10526 0.10633 0.09965 0.07241
10 0.11111 0.15789 0.10633 0.10784 0.06896
11-15 0.11111 0.12631 0.10859 0.09419 0.08793
16-20 0.22222 0.08421 0.06108 0.04641 0.02931
21-30 0.11111 0.14736 0.06334 0.03549 0.02413
0 0.38461 0.26499 0.32163 0.37864 0.49342
1-2 0 0.07500 0.06140 0.10097 0.08717
3-4 0 0.10000 0.08966 0.10368 0.10361
5 0.07692 0.09000 0.12280 0.11378 0.09046
30-39 6-9 0.07692 0.07500 0.08187 0.07495 0.08881
10 0 0.10499 0.11306 0.08854 0.05756
11-15 0.07692 0.11999 0.10428 0.07184 0.04934
16-20 0.23076 0.09000 0.05360 0.03495 0.01480
21-30 0.15384 0.07999 0.05165 0.03262 0.01480
0 0.44444 0.30662 0.41076 0.47238 0.57420
1-2 0 0.06629 0.07349 0.08451 0.09245
3-4 0.11111 0.10220 0.08727 0.09916 0.07785
5 0.05555 0.07458 0.09908 0.08577 0.08272
40-49 6-9 0.05555 0.05524 0.06364 0.07531 0.02676
10 0.05555 0.09944 0.08858 0.06569 0.05109
11-15 0.16666 0.12154 0.09186 0.06108 0.05839
16-20 0.05555 0.09944 0.04396 0.02928 0.02433
21-30 0.05555 0.07458 0.04133 0.02677 0.01216
0 0.30769 0.33756 0.43397 0.52779 0.65730
1-2 0 0.04568 0.05489 0.06657 0.04494
3-4 0.11538 0.06852 0.05934 0.07892 0.09550
5 0.03846 0.09644 0.09272 0.09334 0.06741
50-65 6-9 0.07692 0.08883 0.08160 0.05422 0.04494
10 0.19230 0.08883 0.08234 0.05628 0.01685
11-15 0.15384 0.10659 0.09421 0.07275 0.02808
16-20 0.07692 0.08375 0.04747 0.02059 0.02808
21-30 0.03846 0.08375 0.05341 0.02951 0.01685
Notes: Parameters directly estimated from the SOEP.
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Table 1.14: Initial Distribution of Health States Conditional on Income Quintile - H0
H1 H2 H3 H4 H5
K1 0.53% 5.60% 20.68% 56.28% 17.23%
K2 0.33% 4.54% 19.50% 57.13% 18.83%
K3 0.37% 4.88% 18.88% 57.69% 18.55%
K4 0.45% 4.36% 17.97% 58.66% 19.01%
K5 0.25% 3.37% 17.21% 57.61% 21.81%
Notes: Parameters estimated directly from the SOEP.
Table 1.15: Initial Distribution of Unemployment Conditional on Income Quintile - I0
K1 K2 K3 K4 K5
I0 = 0 8% 5% 2.5% 1.5% 0.4%
I0 = 1 92% 95% 97.5% 98.5% 99.6%
Notes: Parameters estimated directly from the SOEP.
Table 1.16: Calibrated Parameters - Sickness Aggravation
Param. Statistics Data Model
ζ=0.1135
Probability of l ∈{0} for K1 0.4874 0.4885
Probability of l ∈{1-2} for K1 0.0449 0.0315
Probability of l ∈{3-4} for K1 0.0632 0.0613
Probability of l ∈{5} for K1 0.0751 0.0845
Probability of l ∈{6-9} for K1 0.0633 0.0721
κ=4.021
Probability of l ∈{10} for K1 0.0760 0.0824
Probability of l ∈{11-15} for K1 0.0920 0.0883
Probability of l ∈{16-20} for K1 0.0462 0.0436
Probability of l ∈{21-30} for K1 0.0517 0.0475
Notes: Calibrated parameter values and match of model to data.
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2
Social Comparison and Health
– Does Envy Make You Sick?
2.1 Introduction
Health is highly related to economic performance. Wealthy people experience
a longer and healthier life than poor people, cf. Deaton and Paxson (2001). A
straightforward interpretation regards this income gradient in health as an in-
dividual -level phenomenon. The relationships of income or wealth with health
operate through individuals capacities to purchase medical goods and services.
Without disputing the eect of absolute economic resources on health, part of
the literature argues that this gradient also possesses a social component. Indi-
viduals with greater wealth enjoy better health not only because of some process
aecting the individual in isolation but also because of the individuals position in
a social hierarchy, cf. Cutler, Lleras-Muney, and Vogl (2011).
This theory posits that a low relative economic position is associated with feel-
ings of inferiority, depression, and isolation and triggers chronic stress and anx-
iousness. Recent medical studies, e.g., by Blackburn and Epel (2012), show that
chronic stress places the body permanently in a “ght or ight” situation. It chan-
nels bodily energy to the physiological processes essential for producing rapid re-
sponses to an immediate threat and puts recreational processes on hold. Whereas
this “ght or ight” behavior might be benecial in the short run, it increases
the general vulnerability of the body in the long run, cf. McEwen (1998), See-
man et al. (2001). Finally, stress and anxiety are often linked to behaviors that are
detrimental to health such as smoking, alcohol drinking and a diet that leads to
obesity. Elstad (1998) provides a good overview of other mechanisms of relative
deprivation on health.
Contrary to absolute measures of economic performance, relative measures
necessarily require a reference point. It is crucial to carefully select this reference
point. The dominant approach used in the literature to determine this socioeco-
nomic reference group is to articially assign it according to sorting assumptions
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such as demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, race, education, age) and geo-
graphic proximity (e.g., country, state, zip code). Studies employing this approach
generally indicate that there is an eect, cf. Eibner, Sturm, and Gresenz (2004),
Kondo et al. (2008), Subramanyam et al. (2009), McLaughlin et al. (2012), Cuesta,
Cottini, and Herrarte (2012). Others nd that the eect is, if anything, weak and
not signicant, cf. Jones and Wildman (2008). For a good survey of the existing
literature, see Adjaye-Gbewonyo and Kawachi (2012).
Constructing articial reference groups based on demographic characteristics
does not stem from deep sociological understanding. To a large extent, such an
approach is taken because links between people are hard to identify empirically,
cf. Soetevent (2006). Clark and Senik (2010) show that reference groups tend
to be localized and are mostly limited to family, friends, neighbors and work col-
leagues. Their study also reveals that the personal reference point diers based on
personal characteristics.1 As reference groups are heterogeneous and likely not
solely determined by age and education, a more natural approach is to directly
ask households to evaluate their own performance within their social circle.
This chapter follows such an approach. Specically, I use unique information
from the Dutch National Bank Household Survey (DNBHS) that includes such
questions and circumvents the need for articially constructing social circles. Re-
spondents have to answer by referring to a self-determined circle of acquain-
tances explained as “people with whom [they] associate frequently, such as friends,
neighbors, acquaintances, or maybe people at work”. This open denition does not
restrict the circle of acquaintances to a specic group but, in contrast to the tra-
ditional approach, accounts for the results of Clark and Senik (2010). In addition
to the unique features of households’ subjective relative economic performance,
this central bank questionnaire contains rich information on absolute income and
assets. This is needed to carefully distinguish between absolute and relative eco-
nomic performance. As the survey provides a panel data structure over 20 years,
it allows for xed eects analysis, which is largely absent from the existing liter-
ature.
I nd a robust and signicant positive eect of relative performance on self-
reported health and negative eects on detrimental health behavior such as smok-
ing and obesity. These ndings are based on subjective relative performance in-
formation, and I control for both demographic characteristics and absolute eco-
nomic performance. People that consider themselves poorer than their circle
of acquaintances are signicantly less likely to report good health. I further
1Men rely less on comparisons with family members than do women. Employees in more pro-
fessional occupations rely more on comparisons with their colleagues than do those in ele-
mentary occupations.
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show that this eect exhibits asymmetries, i.e., being worse o than one’s circle
of acquaintances has a strong negative eect, whereas being better o exhibits
only a mild positive eect. Furthermore, lower absolute income groups are more
strongly aected by the relative performance eect than are high absolute income
groups. I also show that exploiting the same data set but pursuing the traditional
approach of using a reference group based on demographic characteristics yields
weaker and insignicant results.
Related Literature There are a few papers that follow this direct approach to
determining the reference group, but they are limited to either a fraction of the
population or to non-developed countries. Pham-Kanter (2009) uses the National
Social Life, Health, and Aging Project (NSHAP) data set that reports the income
positions of people older than 55 within their self-dened social networks. She
examines whether there is an association between relative position and health in
the US. She nds signicant results for lower rank deprivation with self-reported
health and cardiovascular disease. Mangyo and Park (2011) analyze a nation-
ally representative data set from China and nd support for the relative depriva-
tion hypothesis. They suggest that relatives and classmates are salient reference
groups for urban residents and that neighbors are important for rural residents.
Using a representative data set from a developed country (with universal health
insurance) signicantly advances this literature.
My analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents the data set and highlights
important features that this chapter exploits. Section 2.3 describes the results of
a cross-sectional nonlinear model, whereas section 2.4 provides the results from
a dynamic nonlinear panel model. In section 2.5, I compare these results with
the traditional approach using an articially constructed reference group, and in
section 2.6, I discuss endogeneity problems. I conclude in section 2.7.
2.2 Data Set and Estimation Methods
The Dutch National Bank Household Survey (DNBHS) is an online household
survey beginning in 1993. The DNBHS covers work, pensions, housing, mort-
gages, income, assets, debts, health, economic and psychological concepts and
other variables. It thus allows the study of the health consequences of both ab-
solute material resources and perceptions of relative economic status. The initial
survey was administered to approximately 2,790 Dutch households over-sampled
from the top 10% of the income distribution and weighted to be representative of
the Dutch-speaking population. Since then, households have been re-interviewed
annually, with new households added each year to counteract the non-negligible
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attrition and maintain the representativeness of the cross-sectional sample.2 The
household survey underwent a major overhaul in 2001, resulting in a sample of
1,861 households.
2.2.1 Measures of Absolute Economic Performance
The most concerning issue in an analysis of relative economic performance is to
separate the eect of relative performance from the eect resulting from natu-
rally related eects of absolute economic performance. Absolute economic per-
formance has both a positive association with relative economic performance and
a positive impact on health. Assuming that there were be no connection between
relative performance and health, a simple OLS regression omitting measures of
absolute economic performance would falsely report a positive coecient for a
relative measure. Therefore, neglecting absolute measures biases the eect of rel-
ative performance upwards.
To address this problem, I include both absolute household income and abso-
lute household net wealth as control variables. The DNBHS includes detailed
questions on the sources of income that respondents may have. These sources of
income serve as the basis for computing total gross income at a personal level.
The DNBHS also provides rich information on personal assets and liabilities. I
construct a proxy for total wealth consisting of real and nancial assets and lia-
bilities (including mortgages). Both income and assets are adjusted for ination
using OECD price deators. Personal income, assets and liabilities are predomi-
nantly reported by males, and few households report assets for dierent members.
To increase the number of observations, I aggregate household incomes and net
assets. I further adjust for household size using the Luxembourg Income Study
approach of dividing assets or income by the square root of the number of house-
hold members, (cf. Buhmann et al. (1988)) and ascribe it to each member of the
household. I allow for nonlinear eects of household income and net wealth (all
of which have skewed distributions) by means of a log transformation and an in-
verse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation, respectively.3 The advantage of this
near-logarithmic IHS transformation is that it is dened for zero and negative
values (see also Pence (2006)). The qualitative results of relative position are ro-
bust to alternative specications of the aforementioned covariates (e.g., dummies
2The DNBHS is based on the CentERpanel, which is largely representative of the Dutch popu-
lation, exceptions are under-representation of those with moderate education, single house-
holds and people living in a highly urbanized area, cf. Teppa and Vis (2012). A comparison
with Netherlands Ocial Statistics is provided in appendix 2.A.
3The functional form of the hyperbolic inverse sine is log[x + [x2 + 1]1/2], where x denotes
assets.
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denoting absolute economic performance quartiles).4
2.2.2 Measures of Relative Economic Performance
The key features of the DNBHS for this analysis are questions that the respondent
has to answer by referring to a self-determined circle of acquaintances.5 Previous
to the questions, the DNBHS denes this circle of acquaintances as “people with
whom [the respondents] associate frequently, such as friends, neighbors, acquain-
tances, or maybe people at work”. This phrasing of the question allows the compo-
sition of reference groups to dier across respondents. The DNBHS also asks the
respondents to report various characteristics of their acquaintances. In addition
to the (perceived) average household income of their circle of acquaintances, they
provide information on the age category to which most of their acquaintances be-
long, average education, average household size, the most prevalent type of em-
ployment (e.g., employed, self-employed or no paid work) and the average hours
of work per week, distinguished by gender.
Direct Answers to Relative Performance amongAcquaintances. The cen-
tral variables that are used in subsequent sections are derived from direct ques-
tions on the respondents’ relative performance with respect to that of their ac-
quaintances. To answer these questions, the respondents have to indicate the
extent to which they agree or disagree with certain statements on a seven-point
ordinal scale from “strongly disagree”to “strongly agree”. The exact statements
of the questionnaire are provided in Table 2.1. The statements cover how re-
spondents perceive their relative nancial situation, their relative asset holding,
or their ability to spend more than their acquaintances. The answers to these
statements are correlated but not identical. Taking the average of the seven-point
scale answers of Assets, Spending, and Financial, I construct the additional mea-
sure Combined.6
The answers to these statements are not based on objectively calculated in-
comes and assets of the reference group, as would be the case in the traditional
4I experiment with dierent categories of assets, as there are many missing observations in the
assets section (which leads to a decline in the total number of observations), but the results
are insensitive to these variations.
5This unique feature is also used in other studies that investigate social eects. Georgarakos,
Haliassos, and Pasini (2012) nd considerable eects of relative economic performance on
borrowing and on indebtedness, suggesting a link to nancial distress.
6Appendix 2.B contains the coecients of correlation between all three statements and Com-
bined. Importantly, Spending is less related to the two other statements. This might be due to
the reverse formulation of the statement.
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Table 2.1: Statements of Relative Economic Performance
Assets I think my household has more assets than others in my
environment.
Spending Other people in my environment have more money to spend
than I do.
Financial If I compare myself with my friends, I think in general I am
nancially better o.
Notes: Spending has an opposing formulation. In later results, I transform this variable such that
the coecients have consistent signs.
approach. Rather, they reect the respondents’ subjective perceptions of their en-
vironment. This is particularly valuable because the main mechanism connecting
relative economic performance and health is assumed to operate via the percep-
tion of inferiority. Actual dierences in absolute economic performance com-
puted in the standard approach might dier from the perception and are a less
accurate match for the proposed link.
A potential problem with subjective relative measures is that too many people
consider themselves to be average. If the answers exhibit only little variation, re-
gression results will be less signicant. The last column of Table 2.2 refutes this
suspicion, showing that the responses to Financial have a reasonable distribution.
More than 31.7% of the respondents report performing below their acquaintances,
while 27.3% report performing better. A second concern arises from the natural
relationship between relative and absolute measures, e.g., given a constant ref-
erence point, increasing absolute income improves the relative income position.
Perfect correlation between the two variables would prohibit distinguishing be-
tween the associated eects. Table 2.2 provides evidence that this is not an issue
in this study. While 17.5% of the lowest income quintile feel themselves in a rel-
atively better position than their milieu, 46.6% feel that they are worse o. On
the opposite side of the income scale, 17.8% believe that others in their milieu do
better, whereas only 44.1% of the respondents think that they are better o than
other people in their environment.7
7Appendix 2.C contains a cross-tabulation of wealth and the perception of relative position that
shows similar results. The results also hold for dierent classications of absolute economic
performance and for other measures of relative economic performance.
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Table 2.2: Absolute Income vs. Relative Perception
Compared to Other I’m
Financially Better O
Absolute Income Quintiles
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Total
Totally Disagree 11.63 7.17 4.64 3.71 2.45 5.92
2 15.26 11.64 8.50 7.50 4.59 9.50
3 19.80 18.91 18.34 13.91 10.78 16.35
4 35.85 42.49 43.81 43.80 38.01 40.79
5 10.44 12.27 16.45 18.48 23.55 16.24
6 4.89 5.96 6.79 10.15 16.38 8.83
Totally Agree 2.12 1.57 1.46 2.45 4.24 2.37
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Cross tabulation of absolute adjusted household income quintiles and perception of rela-
tive performance among circle of acquaintances. Entries are in percentages.
Indirect Answer to Relative Performance Although I argue that it is more
plausible to use subjective perceptions, I compute two additional measures of rel-
ative economic performance that rely on more quantitative measures. To do so,
I use responses to the following DNBHS question: “If you think of your circle of
acquaintances, how much do you think is the average total net income per year
of those households?”
The rst indirect measure of relative economic performance is a binary vari-
able denoting whether a household has a higher income than its acquaintances.
The second indirect measure is the dierence between the natural logarithms of
household income and the reported income of its acquaintances.8
Ind_IncDisti =
{
1 if Inci > IncAcqi
0 if Inci < IncAcqi
(2.1)
Log_IncDisti = log(Inci)− log(IncAcqi) (2.2)
As the DNBHS provides no information on the asset holdings of the circle of
acquaintances, these measures are restricted to household income only.
8The answer to the question concerning the net income of the circle of acquaintances is reported
in brackets. To avoid the diculty of comparing income brackets to continuous household
income, I use a question that directly asks the respondents to classify own income in the
same brackets. I use the midpoints of these brackets as household income and adjust it using
reported average household size.
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2.2.3 Measures of Health and Health Behavior
In the DNBHS, the respondents report the standard survey measure of self- re-
ported health (SRH) on a ve-point ordinal scale (“excellent”, “good”, “fair”, “not
so good”, “poor”). In the benchmark case, I collapse this multidimensional an-
swer to a binary variable, either being in good health (“excellent ”, “good”) or
in poor health (“fair”, “not so good”, “poor”). In addition to capturing an indi-
vidual’s subjective well-being, poor self-reported health has been shown to be a
robust predictor of mortality and correlates highly with other objective health in-
dicators, especially in the context of the working age population and developed
countries, cf. Miilunpalo et al. (1997), Idler and Benyamini (1997).
In addition to self-reported health, this chapter investigates the relationship
between relative economic performance and various behaviors that are related to
health. This proxies for the mechanism connecting relative position with health
explained above. People with low relative standing may compensate for the re-
sulting unhappiness with short-term pleasant but unhealthy activities. Smok-
ing is often considered to reduce acute stress symptoms, heavy and permanent
alcohol consumption may be employed to drown one’s frustrations, and eating
for comfort mitigates bad mood, cf. Wilkinson (2000). Given these considera-
tions, relative economic performance has negative long-term eects on health.
The DNBHS contains information on three health-related behaviors. Smoking
is reported in various intensities. I assume smoking to be harmful when the re-
spondent reports smoking every day. Drinking alcohol is reported only in terms
of whether one drinks more than four alcoholic drinks alcohol per day. The sur-
vey also includes information on a respondent’s height and weight, which allows
me to compute the body mass index (BMI).9 I classify someone as obese when the
BMI exceeds 30, following the criteria used by the World Health Organization.
2.2.4 Data Selection
Not all of the observations in the DNBHS are applicable to the following analysis.
First, as I am interested in a respondent’s economic performance, I focus only on
adults and drop all observations of respondents younger than 18. Second, all ob-
servations that have at least one non-response among health or control variables
are excluded. Third, as with many surveys that include questions on nancial sta-
tus, the greatest constraints on sample size are the response rates for the income
and asset questions. The response rate in the DNBHS for the questions on abso-
lute income, absolute assets and questions regarding the circle of acquaintances
9The BMI is computed as BMI=weight[kg]/(height[m])2.
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is 61%, leading to a nal sample size of 19,811 observations.10
If the non-responding households dier from the responding households in a
relevant characteristic, this could bias the results. Table 2.3 presents the sum-
mary statistics for the complete DNBHS, the sample excluding non-responses to
health and control variables and the nal sample excluding also non-respondents
to absolute economic performance and questions concerning relative economic
performance. The sample that answered the control and health questions and
the sample that also answered the income, asset and relative performance ques-
tions are quite similar in terms of demographic characteristics. The nal sample
includes more males and is slightly older. This is also reected in the fact that
the nal sample includes fewer students and more retirees. Fortunately, there are
only small dierences between the two samples with respect to economic char-
acteristics. Respondents who do not answer one of the economic questions are
on average only a somewhat less wealthy and have a lower income. The aver-
age evaluation of one’s relative position does not dier between the two samples.
The summary statistics for the health variables also signal that there is no system-
atic bias from non-responders. In both samples, approximately 80% report good
health and 20% poor health. Health behavior is not aected.
2.2.5 Model Estimation
Estimating the association between relative economic performance and health re-
quires addressing the problem of omitted variables. I have already discussed this
for the most obvious case of absolute economic performance, but there are other
variables that might bias my results. To address biases from omitted variables,
two general strategies can be applied: (a) introduce the omitted measure explic-
itly into the analysis and estimate the adjusted degree of association between
relative position and health, and (b) estimate “xed eects”models. Fixed eect
models dierence out eects of persistent characteristics (both measurable and
not) of households, cf. Daly et al. (1998). In this section, I follow both strategies
and in the rst part incorporate several control variables in a cross-sectional esti-
mation of a reduced-form nonlinear model. In second part, I exploit the DNBHS
panel structure and use a nonlinear dynamic model with xed eects. For both
approaches, I use data from 15 waves of the DNBHS, i.e., 1995-2007/2009/2011.
10Unfortunately, many of the questions central to relative economic performance, which are key
variables for this chapter, are not included in the 1993, 1994, 2008, 2010, and 2012 waves.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics of Complete DNBHS and Final Sample
Sample Complete
Sample
Responded to
Health & Control
Final
Sample
Variable Mean or Proportion
Age 45.9 48.0 49.6
% Male 50.5 54.0 55.7
Household Size 2.8 2.7 2.6
% Urban 60.7 60.9 60.4
% Less than High School 15.3 14.5 11.6
% High School 39.1 37.0 37.0
% College 43.8 46.7 49.9
% Employed 54.7 53.6 56.8
% Unemployed 1.8 1.8 1.7
% Retired 13.4 15.7 17.5
% Students 7.0 4.3 1.5
% Others 23.1 24.6 22.6
Net Assets 199,350 200,683 202,602
(686,468) (723,604) (293,218)
Gross Income 30,287 30,300 33,226
(35,849) (36,441) (39,734)
% Fin. Better O than Others 26.3 26.5 27.4
% Fin. Worse O than Others 33.1 32.9 31.8
Self-Reported Health
% Excellent 17.4 16.6
% Good 62.2 63.7
% Fair 16.4 15.8
% Not so Good 3.4 3.3
% Poor 0.6 0.6
% Smoking (Every Day) 22.0 20.7
% Alcohol (Drinks/Day>4) 7.2 7.5
Body Mass Index (BMI) 25.2 25.3
(4.3) (4.2)
% Obese (BMI>30) 10.0 10.0
Observations 57,656 32,486 19,766
Notes: Summary statistics of the pooled 15 waves of DNBHS 1995-2007/2009/2011 and only re-
spondents with age≥18. The base year for the deation of assets and income is 2010. Standard
deviation in parentheses
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Cross-Sectional Model In the rst approach, I consider the observations of
all 15 waves as one huge cross-sectional data set. The cross-sectional results are
estimated by a nonlinear probit model with following regression equation
Pr[Healthi = H ] = Φ{α + β RPi + Xiθ + i} (2.3)
where Healthi is a binary health variable of respondent i, i.e., being in good or
poor health, smoking or not smoking, andRPi is a relative economic performance
measure (either direct or indirect). Xi represents a set of explanatory variables
that may aect health, including the natural logarithm of adjusted household in-
come, the inverse hyperbolic sine of adjusted net household assets and other con-
trol variables. These control variables are age, age2, gender, educational attain-
ment, degree of urbanity, labor market status dummies and general variables such
as year dummies. The β and the vector θ are parameters to be estimated. The er-
ror term i is individual specic, is assumed to be uncorrelated withXi and across
individuals and is assumed to be drawn from a distribution with mean zero and
constant variance. I cluster standard errors at the individual level to account for
correlations of individual health over time.
In my models, I do not control for possible reverse causality running from health
to absolute and relative economic performance, and hence I may overestimate the
impact of income. I interpret the models in reduced form.
Panel Models In the second approach, I exploit the panel structure of the data
set. I estimate two dynamic logit models, one with xed eects and one without
a xed eect.
Pr[Healthi,t = H ] = Φ{α + β RPi + Xi,tθ + i,t} (2.4)
Pr[Healthi,t = H ] = Φ{α + β RPi + Xi,tθ + ui + i,t} (2.5)
where Healthi,t is health of individual i at time t. Xi,t consists of the same con-
trol variables as above except for those that do not vary over time, as these are
incorporated in the xed eect. The uis represent the individual-specic and
time-invariant xed eect component.
I additionally estimate a panel ordered logit and a panel OLS with a xed eects
using the ve-point ordinal scale of health condition as the dependent variable.
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2.3 Cross-Sectional Estimation
2.3.1 Self-Reported Health
First, I run separate probit regressions of equation (2.3) for all direct variables As-
sets, Spending, Financial and the constructed measure Combined. As my interest
lies in the role of absolute and relative economic performance, I focus solely on
these results.11 The main result of the cross-sectional estimation are shown in Ta-
ble 2.4. The rst two rows of Table 2.4 show the standard result that absolute eco-
nomic performance (household income and household net wealth) is positively
associated with self-reported health. All regression coecients are positive and
highly signicant. The probit estimates in the last four rows show that all relative
performance measures are also positively associated with self-reported health.
The regression coecients of Assets, Spending, Financial and Combined are all
positive and highly signicant, with the strongest association being observed for
the combined measure. This is clear evidence that relative economic performance
has a signicant aect on reporting good health.12
Table 2.4: Probit Regression Coecients for Direct Measures
Self-Reported
Health
I II III IV
Log Income 0.1120*** 0.1077*** 0.1096*** 0.0980***
IHS Assets 0.0057** 0.0057** 0.0053** 0.0036
Assets 0.0537***
Spending 0.0666***
Financial 0.0616***
Combined 0.1117***
Notes: *** Signicant at α=0.01, ** Signicant at α=0.05, * Signicant at α=0.1.
All regressions include age, age2, gender, degree of urbanization of place of residence, education
dummies, dummies for employment status and year dummies. Clustered robust standard errors.
To facilitate interpretation of the quantitative results of these nonlinear estima-
tions, Table 2.5 presents the marginal eects of relative economic performance
11The estimations also yield standard results, i.e., the probability of good health is decreasing
in age, and education has a protective eect on health. They are omitted for clarity, but full
results are available from the author upon request.
12In Appendix 2.D, I provide results of an ordered probit regression. Therefore, I use the original
ve-point health variable instead of the collapsed binary variable as the dependent variable.
This estimation produces similar results.
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measures for the median respondent. The marginal eects indicate how the odds
of reporting good health are changed by varying an independent variable by one
degree.13 14 A strong perception that one is better o than one’s circle of acquain-
tances is highly related to the probability of reporting good or excellent health.
Increasing the subjective perception of own relative performance by one degree
would increase the probability of reporting good health by up to 3.07%.15
Table 2.5: Marginal Eects for Median Respondent
Self-Reported
Health
Assets Spending Financial Combined
Marginal Eect 0.0145*** 0.0188*** 0.0169*** 0.0307***
Notes: *** Signicant at α=0.01, ** Signicant at α=0.05, * Signicant at α=0.1.
Marginal eects at median of independent variables included in probit estimation.
Non-Linearity of Relative Performance Eect The eect of relative per-
formance on self-reported health seems to be highly nonlinear. I estimate Equa-
tion (2.3) using dummies for either being below or above the relevant peer group
instead of the continuous measure. The resulting estimates exhibit strong asym-
metries in the impact of relative economic performance. The regression coe-
cient for being in a low position is -0.1891, whereas the coecient of being in a
better position is 0.0634. The absolute magnitude of the negative eect of being in
a relatively poor position is higher than the absolute magnitude of the positive ef-
fect of being in a relatively high position. In terms of marginal eects, this means
that feeling deprived compared with one’s circle of acquaintances reduces one’s
probability of being in good health by 5.2%. Being in an economic situation that
is advantageous compared with one’s acquaintances increases the likelihood of
being in good health by only 1.7%. This result also holds for a ner distinction of
being in the lower or upper position, but due to few observations at the boundary,
the estimates are statistically insignicant.16
13The median respondent in the sample used here is a 49-year-old male who is employed, has
a high school degree, an adjusted income of 30,662e, and net assets of 134,951e. He neither
agrees nor disagrees with the relative economic performance questions.
14I also computed the average marginal eect instead of the marginal eect of the median worker,
but the two sets of results are similar. For more a detailed discussion on which is the appro-
priate measure, see Long and Freese (2006).
15These results seem sizable, but they are not inconsistent with other studies on socioeconomic
status and mortality. For instance, Marmot et al. (1991), nd that British civil servants from
the lowest socioeconomic class were three times more likely to die than their high-status
counterparts.
16The results of this estimation are contained in appendix 2.E.
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Gender, Age, Absolute Economic Performance Dierences In the previ-
ous estimations, I control for various demographic characteristics using dummy
variables. This approach does not take into account that the relationship be-
tween relative economic performance and health might dier across demographic
groups. To determine whether the results are stronger for specic groups, I in-
clude in the probit estimation interaction terms of the relative economic perfor-
mance measure and the respective sub-sample group. Table 2.6 presents the esti-
mates of relative economic performance and the interaction terms.17
Column 2 reports the result of incorporating interaction terms for dierent age
groups (young working (25-45), old working (45-65) and retired (>65)). For all
three age groups, the relative economic performance eect remains positive and
signicant. The interaction terms are nearly zero and insignicant. There are no
notable dierences in the relative economic performance eect across dierent
age groups.
The third column reports the results for dierences in the eect between men
and women. For each gender, relative economic performance has highly signif-
icant eects. It seems that the eect is stronger for the males than for females.
This dierence, however, is not statistically signicant.
I further examine whether the eect is the same for dierent absolute economic
performance groups. I divide the full sample into three dierent income groups
(poor, medium, rich) and include interaction terms. For each income group, the
estimate of relative economic performance remains positive and signicant. The
magnitude of this eect, however, diers remarkably across the groups. The
health of the top income group is much more weakly aected by relative perfor-
mance measures than is the bottom or medium income group. The coecient of
the top income group is reduced to nearly one-third of the estimate of the medium
and bottom income groups. The dierence between the bottom and medium in-
come groups is not statistically signicant, but the ndings suggest that the eect
of relative economic performance is strongest for the bottom income group.18
Indirect Measure of Relative Income Analogous to the previous section, I
run probit regressions of Equation (2.3) for both indirect relative economic perfor-
mance measures Ind_IncDist and Log_IncDist. The estimates in Table 2.7 generate
qualitatively identical results to those obtained for the direct relative performance
measures. Both Ind_IncDist and Log_IncDist are statistically not signicant. Par-
17I do not report the marginal eects for the sub-sample regressions. Each sub-sample has a
dierent median respondent, and a comparison across groups cannot be reasonably made.
18This pattern in absolute economic performance is not signicant when groups are constructed
by placing respondents into low, medium and high net wealth categories.
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Table 2.6: Probit Regression Including Interaction Terms
Self-Reported
Health
Age Gender Abs.
Income
Abs.
Wealth
Rel. Income 0.1206*** 0.0963*** 0.1225*** 0.1111***
Rel. Income * Young 0.0082
Rel. Income *
Retired
-0.0358
Rel. Income * Male 0.0263
Rel. Income * Poor 0.0294
Rel. Income * Rich -0.0897***
Rel. Income * Poor 0.04934
Rel. Income * Rich -0.07401**
Notes: *** Signicant at α=0.01, ** Signicant at α=0.05, * Signicant at α=0.1.
Probit regression coecients. Older working, female and medium income group are the omitted
reference groups in the respective regressions. Clustered robust standard errors.
tially, this is because the sample size in this regression is much smaller (8,009 ob-
servations) than in Table 2.4. The income of the circle of acquaintances is reported
in income bands, and to match this information to the income of the respondents,
I had to use a dierent variable for income that has more non-respondents.
2.3.2 Health-Related Behavior
The results for behaviors that are considered detrimental to health are mixed.
The marginal eects of this estimation for the median respondent are displayed
in Table 2.8.
The estimates in the second column display the estimates for absolute and rel-
ative economic performance on the probability of daily smoking. They suggest
that smoking and one’s economic situation are linked. For both absolute eco-
nomic measures, the coecient is negative and highly signicant. One can see
that poor people are more likely to smoke than rich people. This is result is in line
with the rest of the literature, cf. Auld (2005). The estimate for relative economic
performance is also negative but not signicant.
Unlike smoking, the entries in the third column show inconclusive results re-
garding the relationship between absolute economic performance and alcohol.
This relationship is negative and highly signicant for net assets. However, indi-
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Table 2.7: Probit Regression Coecient for Indirect Relative Performance Measures
Self-Reported
Health
I II
Log Income 0.1120*** 0.1134***
IHS Assets 0.0055 0.0057
Ind_IncDist 0.0786**
Log_IncDist 0.0901***
Notes: *** Signicant at α=0.01, ** Signicant at α=0.05, * Signicant at α=0.1.
All regressions include age, age2, gender, degree of urbanization of place of res-
idence, education dummies, dummies for employment status and year dummies.
Clustered robust standard errors.
viduals with high income seem more prone to consume alcohol. Both results can
also be found in the literature, cf. Ettner (1996). The marginal eect for relative
economic performance is is positive and signicant. Alcohol is more common
among people that are nancially better o than among their acquaintances.
The clearest evidence for a relationship between economic variables, absolute
and relative, and health behavior is found for the probability of being obese. The
estimates in the fourth column signal that income and net assets reduce the preva-
lence of obesity. A good relative economic performance measure is also negatively
related to the probability of reporting obesity. An improved perception of one’s
relative position by one step is associated with a greater than one percent decrease
in the probability of being obese.
Table 2.8: Marginal Eects for Health-Related Behavior
Health Behavior Smoking Alcohol Obesity
Log Income -.0138** 0.0046 -0.0136**
IHS Assets -.0056*** -0.0016*** -0.0045***
Combined -.0072 0.0076** -0.0092**
Notes: *** Signicant at α=0.01, ** Signicant at α=0.05, * Signicant at α=0.1.
Marginal eects for the median respondent from probit estimation. All regressions include
age, age2, gender, degree of urbanization of place of residence, education dummies, dummies
for employment status and year dummies. Clustered standard errors.
66
2.4 Dynamic Logit Model
2.4 Dynamic Logit Model
By exploiting the advantages of the data set’s panel structure, I can estimate a
dynamic logit model with xed eects. These xed eects should account for
possible time-invariant characteristics of the household, as a respondent’s self-
esteem could aect both his self-reported health and his relative social position.
In Table 2.9, I report the baseline results estimated for the dynamic logistic
model with and without xed eects, the panel ordered logit model panel and
the panel OLS with xed eect estimation for the relative performance measure
Combined. In all four regressions, the coecients for relative economic perfor-
mance have the expected positive sign. In all but the logit with xed eects, the
eect is statistically signicant. These results support the evidence obtained in
the cross-sectional estimations that the relative economic comparisons control-
ling for unobserved factors are associated with health. The coecients of absolute
economic performance are inconclusive. Whereas the coecient on absolute in-
come has a positive sign and is signicant in two of four models, the coecient
on wealth is insignicant and varies in sign.
Table 2.9: Panel Results for Self-Reported Health
Self-Reported
Health
Logit - RE Logit - FE Ordered
Logit
OLS - FE
Log Income 0.1212*** 0.0244 0.1039*** 0.0033
IHS Assets 0.0098 -0.0092 0.0050 -0.0015
Combined 0.2510*** 0.0111 0.2140*** 0.0119**
Notes: *** Signicant at α=0.01, ** Signicant at α=0.05, * Signicant at α=0.1.
All regressions include age, dummies for employment status and year dummies. Clustered ro-
bust standard errors.
2.5 Comparison with the Traditional Approach
In the following, I show why the results of the previous sections improve on prior
studies employing articially constructed peer groups. First, I illustrate that the
self-determined peer group signicantly deviates from the demographic and so-
cioeconomic characteristics of the respondents. Second, I show that running the
same regression using the economic performance relative to the articial refer-
ence group yields weaker or even insignicant results.
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2.5.1 Differences of Respondents from the Circle of
Acqaintances
Table 2.10 shows the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of respon-
dents and the characteristics of their self-determined circle of acquaintances. Most
people with no high school degree (86%) have a peer group that possess at least a
high school diploma. Just over half of the people with a high school degree report
that individuals in their circle of acquaintances have the same educational level.
The only group for which the characteristics of the respondents and their peer
group mostly coincide are college graduates.
Dependent employees are the largest group in the sample. In this group, nearly
all (92%) report having a circle of acquaintances who also work as dependent
employees. A more surprising observation is that in the other employment cate-
gories, only a fraction of the respondents state that their peer group has the same
employment status. Only less than one-third of self-employed people report that
their circle of acquaintances is mostly self-employed. Even more astonishing is
that only 9% of unemployed people report that most people in their environment
people are unemployed. The response options to the question regarding the em-
ployment status of the circle of acquaintances do not include retirement, but it is
nevertheless remarkable that nearly two-thirds of retirees indicate that their peer
group is predominantly working. Thus, similar to education, there is a mismatch
between respondents and their peer group with respect to employment status.
The third important category on which most traditional approaches base their
reference group is age. The last part of Table 2.10 shows the age of the respondents
and the answers to the question of into what age bin most of their acquaintances
fall. A clear pattern is that younger people are more likely to have a peer group
that is older and less likely to have a group that is younger. At older ages, this
pattern is reversed. On average, only 44% of the respondents indicate that their
peer group falls into the same age bin as they do. More people report that their
peer group is younger than people that state that their peer group is older. This
dierence may hint at a misperception of the true circle of acquaintances. For
the research question addressed in this chapter, however, only the perception of
the respondent is important, as the primary mechanism for the eect of relative
deprivation runs through subjective feelings and need not reect the objective
situation.
To summarize, constructing a peer group based on the demographic and so-
cioeconomic characteristics of respondents seems not to acknowledge the fact
that people have diverse peer groups.19
19 Further information on the peer group reveals that the size of the household of the respondent
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Table 2.10: Comparison of Respondent with the Circle of Acquaintances
Respondents Circle of Acquaintances
Education
No High School
(%)
High School (%) College (%)
No high School 14.13 44.49 41.39
High school 12.89 51.62 35.49
College 1.39 21.28 77.34
Employment Status
Employed (%) Self-employed (%) No Paid Work (%)
Employed 92.44 5.73 1.82
Self-employed 66.28 29.70 4.03
Unemployed 80.56 10.80 8.64
Retired 50.97 12.35 36.68
Age
Younger (%) Same Age Group
(%)
Older (%)
16-20 0.00 70.64 29.36
21-25 3.29 65.13 31.58
26-30 6.61 58.02 35.36
31-35 14.13 66.20 19.67
36-40 27.89 55.14 16.97
41-45 37.77 50.09 12.14
46-50 47.86 42.63 9.51
51-55 53.43 38.59 7.98
56-60 58.87 33.89 7.24
61-65 61.52 33.23 5.25
66-71 70.61 26.69 2.70
older than 71 68.87 31.13 0.00
Total 44.02 44.40 11.57
Notes: Demographic characteristics of respondents and the reported average characteristics of
the circle of acquaintances.
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2.5.2 Results of the Traditional Approach
As shown, the circle of acquaintances and an articial reference group based on
respondents’ characteristics do not appear to coincide. Nevertheless, it is interest-
ing to determine whether the approaches produce dierent results concerning the
eect of one’s relative income position on health. For this purpose, I generate the
same two indirect measures as in Section 2.3 ((2.1) and (2.2)) but replace average
income of acquaintances with the average income of the constructed reference
group that is based on age, educational level, and sex. Additionally, I compute
both indirect measures using net asset holdings of the respondents and their ar-
ticial reference group.
For all four measures, I run separate probit regressions of equation (2.3). The
results are shown in Table 2.11. For both measures of absolute economic per-
formance, the results exhibit positive and (mostly) highly signicant estimates
for all regressions. The results for relative economic performance reect incon-
clusive and weak results. The indicator variables (2.1) display the same sign as
in the previous section, i.e., having a higher income or wealth than one’s ref-
erence group seems to increase average health. However, neither coecient is
statistically signicant. Columns III and IV show the results for measure (2.2).
Here, the extent of the dierence between the absolute economic performance of
the respondents and their reference group is also taken into account. Only the
coecient for relative income is statistically signicant.20 The relative wealth co-
ecient is insignicant and even exhibits a reversed sign. Using the traditional
approach, I do not nd a relationship between relative performance measures and
self-reported health, which is contrary to my previous ndings.
2.6 Discussion
The results shown in the previous section suggest that there is a strong relation-
ship between relative economic performance and self-reported health status and
various health-related behaviors. Some aspects of the setting, however, limit a
causal interpretation of this link.
and the size of the circle of acquaintances is only the same in 50% of the observations.
20Note that individual absolute economic performance is used to construct indirect measures (2.2).
This results in a high correlation between the two variables and might limit a separate inter-
pretation of the results of absolute and relative measures of economic performance.
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Table 2.11: Probit Regression Coecients for Articial Reference Group
Ind_Dist_Trad Log_Dist_Trad
I II III IV
Log Income 0.0436*** 0.0251*** 0.0158 0.0208***
IHS Assets 0.0015*** 0.0018*** 0.0016*** 0.0167**
Relative Income 0.0119 0.0401*
Relative Assets 0.0107 -0.0063
Notes: *** Signicant at α=0.01, ** Signicant at α=0.05, * Signicant at α=0.1.
All regressions include age, age2, gender, degree of urbanization of place of residence, education
dummies, dummies for employment status and year dummies. Robust standard errors clustered
at the group level.
Endogeneity Problem of Circle of Acquaintances A potential challenge to
the presented results is presented the fact that the self-determined circle of ac-
quaintances is aected by the individual’s health and might change over time.
People aware of the negative impact of wealthier friends on their health might
select their circle of acquaintances, or change their milieu, to feel more comfort-
able. According to this logic, everyone would select a circle of acquaintances such
that his own performance would be equal to or better than theirs. This is clearly
ruled out by the strong dispersion of perceptions shown in Table 2.2. Although
some of one’s acquaintances are chosen endogenously, this is likely not the case
for others such as sisters or work colleagues.
Relative Performance and Causality This analysis carefully attempted to
ensure that the correlation between health and relative economic performance is
not due to omitted variables. What is still an open question is in which direction
the mechanism operates, i.e., whether health is aected by relative position or
relative performance is aected by health (without directly being aected by ab-
solute performance). In general, it is not possible to interpret the above estimates
as unambiguously causal. Pham-Kanter (2009) notes that these non-causal esti-
mates might be helpful because they suggest an upper bound for the causal eects
operating through relative position. That is, one could hypothetically assume that
there was no reverse causality or omitted variables and interpret the estimate as
giving us the largest possible causal eect of relative position on health. 21
21 Although reverse causality might be at work in the overall eect, it is less clear how this reverse
causality could explain the asymmetries found in the results.
71
Chapter 2 Social Comparison and Health
2.7 Conclusion
Using subjective relative performance measures and controlling for demographic
characteristics and absolute economic performance, this chapter reports a signif-
icant positive eect of relative position on self-reported health and a negative
eect on detrimental health behaviors such as smoking and obesity. It further
indicates that the eect on self-reported health exhibits asymmetries, i.e., lower
income groups are more strongly aected than are high income groups and that
being worse o than one’s circle of acquaintances has a strong eect, whereas
being better o shows only mild positive eects. In this chapter, I also show that
compared with the traditional approach of using a reference group constructed
based on demographic characteristics, the approach based on self-reported groups
generates stronger results.
This chapter suggests that social comparisons based on economic performance
are both an independent risk factor, in addition to absolute economic perfor-
mance, as well as a conciliating mechanism to explain the association between
income inequality and health. This result might imply that a reduction of in-
equality within peer groups could improve average health in the population.
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Appendix 2.A Comparison of DNBHS to the
Dutch Census
Table 2.12 compares the DNBHS to the ocial census for the Netherlands taken
from the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS). It shows that the DNBHS
matches this census in important demographic characteristics such as age, gender
and education and in economic data such as unemployment.
Table 2.12: Comparison of DNBHS to the Dutch Census
Variable CBS DNBHS
Average Age 39 38
% Male 49 51
% Urban 45 63
% Less high school 9 8
% Master, Doctoral 9 10
% Unemployed 5 3
Notes: Summary statistics of the pooled 15 waves of DNBHS 1995-2007/2009/2011
compared to ocial CBS data.
Appendix 2.B Correlation Direct Measures
Table 2.13 shows the correlation among the various direct relative performance
measures. Most of the correlations are strong but not perfect. In particular, Spend-
ing has a weaker connection to the other variables, potentially resulting from of
its reverse formulation.
Table 2.13: Correlation among Statements
Assets Spending Financial Combined
Assets 1
Spending 0.19 1
Financial 0.64 0.25 1
Combined 0.81 0.64 0.83 1
Notes: Correlation among the several measures of relative position.
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Appendix 2.C Relative vs. Absolute Performance
Table 2.14 shows the distribution of the responses to Financial for quintiles of
absolute wealth. As for income in all columns, there is a range of perceptions
concerning whether the households are better or worse o than their circles of
acquaintances.
Table 2.14: Absolute Wealth vs. Relative Perception
Compared to others I’m
nancially better o
Absolute Net Wealth Quintiles
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Total
Totally disagree 13.07 5.43 4.01 4.12 2.98 5.92
2 17.69 10.78 7.75 6.54 4.75 9.50
3 20.64 18.25 16.25 14.95 11.66 16.35
4 32.27 42.10 43.83 43.12 42.63 40.79
5 10.37 14.66 16.50 18.96 20.70 16.24
6 4.44 6.71 9.34 9.85 13.83 8.83
Totally agree 1.51 2.07 2.32 2.47 3.46 2.37
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Cross tabulation of absolute adjusted household net wealth quintiles and perception of
relative position among acquaintances. Entries are in percentages.
Table 2.15 shows the distribution of the responses to Financial for dierent in-
come bands.
Appendix 2.D Ordered Logit
In Table 2.16, I report the margins estimated from an ordered logit for all relative
performance measures on health condition, which is an ordinal measure ranging
from 1 excellent to 5 poor. The results are in line with the results of the binary
probit model and indicate that an increased relative position is associated with
a better self-assessed health condition including for a ner distinction of health.
All results are statistically signicant.
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Table 2.15: Absolute Income vs Relative Position - Income bands
Comp. to others
I’m n. better o
Absolute Income Bands
<7 7-14 14-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 >50 Total
Totally disagree 8.49 15.09 8.95 5.58 4.08 2.60 2.48 5.92
2 11.37 16.77 14.62 10.09 7.39 6.70 3.84 9.50
3 20.85 18.44 19.80 18.81 15.40 12.07 10.42 16.35
4 37.98 34.79 38.84 43.49 44.02 42.70 36.63 40.79
5 11.98 8.44 11.58 14.31 17.79 20.59 24.68 16.24
6 6.29 4.61 4.76 6.31 9.05 12.44 17.34 8.83
Totally agree 3.03 1.86 1.40 2.05 2.26 2.89 4.61 2.37
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Cross-tabulation of absolute adjusted household income bands and perception of relative
position among acquaintances. Income bands measured in 1000 e. Entries in percentages.
Table 2.16: Self-Reported Health Condition - Ordered Probit
Self-reported
Health Condition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Income 0.0007** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0010***
IHS assets 0.0001** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001**
Combined 0.0018***
Assets 0.0009***
Spending 0.0012***
Financial 0.0011***
Notes: *** Signicant at α=0.01, ** Signicant at α=0.05, * Signicant at α=0.1.
All regressions include age, age2, gender, education dummies, degree of urbanization of place of
residence, and dummies for employment status. All results are from ordered probit regressions.
Clustered robust standard errors.
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Appendix 2.E Asymmetric Effect
Table 2.17 reveals the asymmetry of the general eect for a ner distinction of the
relative economic performance measure. In absolute terms, the marginal eects
of being worse o than one’s peer group are much stronger than the eect when
one is better o than one’s friends at the extreme, and this insignicance might
be due to the limited number of observations for these cases.
Table 2.17: Self-Reported Health - Asymmetric Eect
Compared to
other better o
Totally
Agree
Totally
disagree(2) (3) (5) (6)
Marginal Eect -0.054*** -0.080*** -0.062*** 0.025*** 0.029** 0.001
Notes: *** Signicant at α=0.01, ** Signicant at α=0.05, * Signicant at α=0.1.
All regressions include age, age2, gender, education dummies, degree of urbanization of place
of residence, and dummies for employment status. Clustered robust standard errors.
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Endogenous Grids in Higher
Dimensions – Delaunay Interpolation
and Hybrid Methods
3.1 Introduction
Dynamic models of equilibrium in discrete time are workhorse models in Eco-
nomics. However, most of these models do not have an analytic closed form
solution and equilibria have to be approximated numerically. To this purpose,
numerous procedures have been developed in the literature, cf. Judd (1998), Mi-
randa and Fackler (2004). If the problem is dierentiable, a popular approach is
to use rst-order methods, i.e., to iterate on rst-order conditions. An important
contribution to this literature is Carroll (2006) who introduces the method of en-
dogenous gridpoints (ENDGM). In comparison to the method of exogenous grid-
points (EXOGM), ENDGM greatly enhances computational speed because part of
the problem can be computed in closed form.
This chapter investigates extensions of Carroll’s ENDGM to dynamic problems
with more than one continuous endogenous state variable. The key insight of
ENDGM is that the choice of the variable on which to dene the grid is subject to
the user in any dynamic problem. A smart choice may then lead to closed form
solutions of rst-order conditions, greatly enhancing speed of computations. We
here introduce this general idea by rst considering the standard implementation
of ENDGM in a one-dimensional problem, i.e., in a setup with one endogenous
state variable. To this purpose, we introduce some minimal notation, otherwise
keeping the presentation as informal as possible. A more in depth treatment is
contained in Section 3.3.
We base the exposition on a consumption-savings problem, as in our applica-
tion. In a standard exogenous grid method (EXOGM), one solves in each time
period (or iteration) for each grid point on grid Ga of today’s state variable a (=as-
sets) some non-linear problem. The solution is given by the associated control
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variable c (=consumption) and next period’s endogenous state variable assets, a′.
Solution of this equation also requires interpolation on some function(s) f on a′
because generally a′ /∈ Ga—e.g., f could be the derivative of the value function or,
depending on the nature of the problem, the value function itself. Given a, c, a′,
the additional control savings, s, can be computed. To summarize, the mapping in
EXOGM is a→ (c, a′)→ s where the mapping a→ (c, a′) requires, among other
numerical operations, solving a non-linear equation and interpolation. Also ob-
serve that, for some regular grid Ga—think, for simplicity, of equally spaced grid
points—the “endogenous” grid of a′ is generally irregular because the spacing be-
tween grid points is a result of the entire mathematical operation.
The trick of ENDGM in such a setup is to revert the mapping, i.e., s→ (a′, c)→
a. Instead of working on an exogenous grid for a, this is achieved by dening a
grid on savings, Gs. Depending on the nature of the problem it is then possible
to solve for c (and a′) analytically. This is the crucial step: The speed advantage
of ENDGM relative to EXOGM is achieved because the mapping s → (a′, c) has
a closed form solution. For given contemporaneous variables s, c, and next pe-
riod’s a′ one can then endogenously compute today’s endogenous state a. Again
observe that, for some regular grid Gs, the “endogenous” grid of a is generally
irregular. In subsequent iterations, it is necessary to interpolate on such an irreg-
ular grid. In one dimension this does not cause any specic problems.
In this chapter we highlight, however, that this irregularity of endogenous grids
is the source of a problem specic to ENDGM in higher dimensions. We empha-
size that this drawback is not related to the solution of the system of equations per
se but results from the endogenously computed states. As we show, the resulting
state grid is generally not rectangular, i.e., gridpoints are irregularly distributed
in the space. In consequence, even linear interpolation is much more costly than
for conventional rectangular grids.
This is easiest to understand again by example. Consider two endogenous
state variables a and h, where h is human capital, as in our application. Ac-
cordingly, (a′, h′) are next period’s endogenous state variables. Control vari-
ables are consumption c, as before, as well as investment in human capital, i.
In addition, consider the endogenous controls s (=savings, as before) and cur-
rent period gross holdings of human capital, z, where z is some function of the
human capital stock, h, and the ow investment into human capital, i. Corre-
sponding to the one-dimensional problem the mapping in EXOGM is (a, h) →
(c, i, a′, h′) → (s, z) where the mapping (a, h) → (c, i, a′, h′) requires solution of
a system of two non-linear equations. In ENDGM, the mapping is again reversed,
i.e., (s, z) → (a′, h′, c, i) → (a, h). Depending on the nature of the problem, the
mapping (s, z) → (a′, h′, c, i) has a closed form solution. As in the application
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in one dimension, the endogenous grid formed of a, h is irregular. In subsequent
iterations one has to interpolate on such an irregular grid. While such an interpo-
lation is unproblematic in one dimension, this irregularity severely complicates
location of points for interpolation in higher dimensions.
This exposition claries that there exists a fundamental trade-o between EX-
OGM and ENDGM in higher dimensions. On the one hand, EXOGM requires
the use of numerical routines throughout whereas ENDGM computes solutions
to rst-order conditions in closed form. On the other hand, interpolation in EX-
OGM is on regular grids and therefore simple. Interpolation in ENDGM on irreg-
ular grids is much more complex.
We solve this complex interpolation by Delaunay triangulation, cf. Delaunay
(1934). Delaunay interpolation, originally coming from the eld of geometry.
It was only recently introduced to the eld by Brumm and Grill (2014). Broer,
Kapicka, and Klein (2013) is the only other (unpublished) paper in Economics we
are aware of that applies the method. Our contribution is to investigate its per-
formance in combination with ENDGM.
In addition to EXOGM and ENDGM, we consider a third algorithm, a hybrid
method of exogenous gridpoints in one dimension and endogenous gridpoints in
the other (HYBGM).1 Consequently, the endogenously computed grid is only ir-
regular in one dimension. This is a so-called rectilinear grid. Interpolation on
a rectilinear grid is easy, just as in the one-dimensional problem. The trade-o
between HYBGM and ENDGM is therefore between numerically more costly rou-
tines, e.g. Broyden’s method, in some dimensions vis-à-vis analytical solutions in
all dimensions but a more complex interpolation.
To analyze and to compare these methods we use a simple human capital model.
As we already discussed above, this model features two endogenous state vari-
ables, nancial assets and human capital. Evaluation of methods in this two di-
mensional setup is done by comparing speed and accuracy of the dierent ap-
proaches.
Our main nding is that HYBGM and ENDGM both dominate EXOGM. They
are both substantially faster. In our innite horizon application, ENDGM also
dominates HYBGM. In our nite horizon application, the choice between HY-
BGM and ENDGM depends on the number of gridpoints in each dimension. For
a relatively low number of gridpoints, ENDGM is advantageous and vice versa
for HYBGM. We also discuss limitations of ENDGM and HYBGM which are both
only applicable to specic problems at hand.
To the best of our knowledge ENDGM in higher dimensions is not yet fully
understood. This chapter is an important contribution to ll this gap. Related
1This is similar to the approach of Hintermaier and Koeniger (2010), also see below.
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work by Krueger and Ludwig (2007) and Barillas and Fernandez-Villaverde (2007)
extends ENDGM to problems with two control variables but just one endogenous
state variable. Hintermaier and Koeniger (2010) use ENDGM in a durable goods
model with two endogenous state variables. The main dierence of their approach
to ours is that ENDGM is only applied in one dimension. Their method still re-
quires solving a nonlinear equation and is thereby very similar to our HYBGM.2
Our contribution is to implement ENDGM in two dimensions.
Other related literature extends ENDGM to a class of dynamic programming
problems with both discrete and continuous choices in which the value function
is non-smooth and non-concave, cf. Fella (2014) and Iskhakov et al. (2014).
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the simple human cap-
ital setting on which we base the evaluation of methods. Section 3 introduces
the main features of the methods under evaluation, the method of exogenous
gridpoints, the pure method of endogenous gridpoints and the hybrid method.
Section 4 presents results according to speed and accuracy of all three methods.
Section 5 concludes. Additional material is contained in an appendix.
3.2 General Framework
We develop a consumption and savings model which allows us to illustrate and to
compare three approaches to solve dynamic models with two endogenous states
using rst-order methods. In addition to assets there is a second endogenous
state variable, a human or health capital stock (we will use both interpretations
interchangeably). Human capital can be accumulated over time and is produced
with a nonlinear production function. For expositional purposes we keep the
model very simple. For example, despite the degenerate risk of survival, we ignore
any stochasticity to the eect that, e.g., wage processes are fully deterministic. Of
course, the underlying trade-o between solution methods will also hold in more
complex problems.
3.2.1 A Simple Human Capital Model
A risk averse agent with maximum time horizon T , T = ∞ possible, derives
utility from consumption, ct, in each period, with standard additive separable life
2One dierence to our version of HYBGM is that we solve this non-linear equation with a uni-
variate solver whereas Hintermaier and Koeniger (2010) use interpolation techniques that are
generally less accurate. This is essentially analogous to applying a bisection method for one
iteration only.
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time utility
U =
T∑
t=1
βt−1s (ht)u (ct) ,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. The instantaneous utility function u (ct) as
well as the probability to survive to the next period s (ht) are assumed to be strictly
increasing and concave in their respective arguments. Income of the agent, yt,
consists of labor income which depends on the amount of accumulated human
capital, ht, hence
yt = wht,
where w is the wage rate.
In each period the household faces the decision to consume, ct, to invest sav-
ings, st, in a risk-free nancial asset, at, which earns (gross) interest R and to in-
vest an amount it into human capital, ht. Human capital depreciates at constant
rate δ and is produced by the production function f (i). We assume that fi >
0, fii < 0 and that the Inada conditions are satised, i.e., limit→0 fi = ∞ and
limit→∞ fi = 0.3 The human capital accumulation equation is accordingly given
by
ht+1 = (1− δ) (ht + f (it)) , (3.1)
where h0 is given.
Financial markets are imperfect and households are not allowed to hold nega-
tive nancial assets. The dynamic budget constraint writes as
at+1 = R(at + wht − ct − it) ≥ 0,
where a0 is given.
Recursive Formulation of the Household Problem The recursive formula-
tion of the household problem is as follows:
Vt(at, ht) = max
ct,it,at+1,ht+1
{u(ct) + βs (ht+1)Vt+1(at+1, ht+1)}
3These conditions are crucial because otherwise it could turn out to be optimal to invest in only
one asset. The other asset would be redundant and our problem would collapse to a problem
in one dimension.
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subject to the constraints
at+1 = R (at + wht − ct − it)
ht+1 = (1− δ) (ht + f (it))
at+1 ≥ 0
ht+1 > 0. (3.2)
Assumptions on Functional Forms For our numerical approach we assume
that instantaneous utility has the CRRA property with coecient of relative risk
aversion denoted by θ > 0:
u (ct) =
c1−θt − 1
1− θ .
The human capital production function is
f (it) =
1
α
iαt
for curvature parameter α ∈ (0, 1). As to the functional form of the per-period
survival probability we follow Hall and Jones (2007) and assume that
s (ht) = 1− φ 1
1 + ht
,
for φ ∈ (0, 1].
We assume that the value function is strictly concave and unique maximizers
are continuous policy functions, cf. Stokey and Lucas (1989). It is well-known that
strict concavity of the value function may be violated in models with endogenous
human capital formation (value functions may have concave and convex regions).
Hence, rst-order conditions are generally necessary but not sucient. In appli-
cations, one way to accommodate this is to use rst-order methods at the cali-
bration stage of the model (where speed is an issue). Upon convergence, one can
then test for uniqueness by checking for alternative solutions by use of global
methods. To focus our analysis we do not further address these aspects here.4
4We checked ex-post if value functions are globally concave which they are for the parameter
space considered here. A crucial parameter is α as it governs the curvature of the human
capital production function. If we were to choose a higher degree of curvature (lower α) than
non-concavities may arise. These results are available upon request.
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Solution The optimal solution is fully characterized by the following set of
rst-order conditions and constraints:
c−θt = βR
(
1− φ 1
1 + ht+1
)
Vt+1a (at+1, ht+1) (3.3a)
γi
−(1−α)
t =
R
(1− δ)
Vt+1a (at+1, ht+1)
φ
(1+ht+1−φ)(1+ht+1)Vt+1 (at+1, ht+1) + Vt+1h (at+1, ht+1)
(3.3b)
at+1 = R (at + wht − ct − it) (3.3c)
ht+1 = (1− δ) (ht + f (it)) (3.3d)
at+1 ≥ 0. (3.3e)
Vta and Vth are derivatives of the value function with respect to nancial assets
and human capital, respectively. The rst equation relates today’s consumption to
consumption of tomorrow, whereas the second equation relates costs and gains of
investing in human capital. Notice that constraint (3.2) can be dropped because of
the lower Inada condition of the human capital investment function f (i). Search-
ing for the solution of this model amounts to nding the four optimal policies for
consumption, ct (·, ·), investment in human capital, it (·, ·), next period’s nancial
assets, at+1 (·, ·), and next period’s human capital, ht+1 (·, ·), as functions of the
two endogenous state variables, nancial assets, at, and human capital, ht, that
solve equation system (3.3).
The envelope conditions are:
Vta (at, ht) = uc = c
−θ
t (3.4a)
Vth (at, ht) =
(
w +
1
fi
)
uc =
(
w +
1
γi
−(1−α)
t
)
c−θt . (3.4b)
Using (3.3a) together with (3.4a) gives the standard Euler equation of consump-
tion.5
3.2.2 Calibration
We choose the same parametrization of the model for all solution methods de-
scribed in Section 3.3. The coecient of relative risk aversion is set to θ=0.5 to
assure a positive value of life. We set the time preference rate to ρ=0.04. In or-
der to provide sucient incentives to save in the nite horizon setting without
5For derivation of (3.3) and the Envelope conditions see Appendix 3.A.
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introducing risk we set an interest rate of R-1=0.05. In the innite horizon set-
ting we set an interest rate of R-1=0.03 which is smaller than ρ in order to assure
that nancial assets are bounded. For the depreciation rate of human capital we
take δ=0.05. The curvature parameter of the human capital production function
is α=0.35. The wage rate w is set to 0.1. The survival rate parameter is φ=0.5.
3.3 Solution Methods
The main idea of all methods is to exploit the FOCs (3.3a) and (3.3b) to compute
optimal policies at discrete points that constitute a mesh in the state space. All
three methods use the recursive nature of the problem. Correspondingly, in the
nite horizon version, the model is solved backwards from the last to the rst
period (t = T, T − 1, . . . , 0). In the innite horizon implementation the iteration
continues until convergence on policy functions.
Dierences between methods arise because of dierent solution procedures
to the multi-dimensional nonlinear equation system (3.3) and dierent interpo-
lation methods, respectively. To provide a preview: The rst algorithm (EX-
OGM) applies a multi-dimensional Quasi-Newton method. Standard interpola-
tion methods are used. The second algorithm (ENDGM) uses the method of en-
dogenous gridpoints and thereby solves the system of equations (3.3) analyti-
cally. It is accompanied by Delaunay interpolation. The third algorithm (HYBGM)
combines the former two, i.e., it applies the method of endogenous gridpoints
(and closed form solutions) in one dimension and uses a one-dimensional Quasi-
Newton method in the other dimension. As EXOGM, HYBGM comes along with
a standard interpolation procedure.
3.3.1 Multi-Dimensional Root-Finding with Regular
Interpolation (EXOGM)
The most direct approach to solve (3.3) is to insert the constraints into the FOCs
and to rely on a numerical multi-dimensional root-nding routine. Multi- dimen-
sional solvers are necessary because c and i show up on both sides of the re-
spective non-linear equations in (3.3). In our application we use a Quasi-Newton
method, more specically Broyden’s method, cf. Press et al. (1996).
The implementation steps of EXOGM are as follows:
1. To initialize EXOGM predene two grids, one for nancial assets a, Ga ={
a1, a2, ..., aK
}
and one for human capital h, Gh = {h1, h2, ..., hJ} and
construct Ga,h = Ga ⊗ Gh.
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2. In period T , savings and investment in human capital are zero as both as-
sets are useless in period T + 16 and income is completely consumed for all(
ak, hj
) ∈ Ga,h:
cT (·, ·) = akT + whjT
iT (·, ·) = 0.
Using the above in equations (3.4a) and (3.4b) the value function and its
derivatives with respect to a and h in T are
VT
(
akT , h
j
T
)
=
1
1− θ
(
ck,jT
)1−θ
VTa
(
akT , h
j
T
)
=
(
ck,jT
)−θ
VTh
(
akT , h
j
T
)
=
(
w +
1
γ
(
ik,jT
)1−α)(
ck,jT
)−θ
= w
(
ck,jT
)−θ
.
3. Iterate backwards on t = T − 1, . . . , 0. In each t for each
(
akt , h
j
t
)
∈ Ga,h:
a) Given (suitably interpolated values of) Vt+1, Vt+1a and Vt+1h , solve the
two-dimensional equation system
(
ck,jt
)−θ
= βR
1− φ 1
1 + (1− δ)
(
hjt +
γ
α
(
ik,jt
)α)

Vt+1a

ak,jt+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
R
(
akt + wh
j
t − ck,jt − ik,jt
)
,
hk,jt+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− δ)
(
hjt +
γ
α
(
ik,jt
)α)

γ
(
ik,jt
)−(1−α)
=
R
(1− δ)
Vt+1a
(
ak,jt+1, h
k,j
t+1
)
φ
(1+hk,jt+1−φ)(1+hk,jt+1)
Vt+1
(
ak,jt+1, h
k,j
t+1
)
+ Vt+1h
(
ak,jt+1, h
k,j
t+1
)
for ck,jt and i
k,j
t using Broyden’s method.
6This rationale does not imply that h must be zero in period T + 1 because human capital is—in
contrast to nancial assets—inalienable.
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If ck,jt + i
k,j
t > a
k
t +wh
j
t (binding borrowing constraint) recompute i
k,j
t
by solving
(
akt + wh
j
t − ik,jt
)−θ
− 1(
(1− δ)
(
hjt +
γ
α(i
k,j
t )
α
))2 ·
Vt+1a
(
0, (1− δ)
(
hjt +
γ
α
(ik,jt )
α
))
β (1− δ) γ(ik,jt )−(1−α)
−
1− 1(
(1− δ)
(
hjt +
γ
α(i
k,j
t )
α
))
 ·
Vt+1h
(
0, (1− δ)
(
hjt +
γ
α
(ik,jt )
α
))
β (1− δ) γ(ik,jt )−(1−α) = 0
for ik,jt . Next, re-compute c
k,j
t = a
k
t + wh
j
t − ik,jt .
b) Save/Update both the value function and its derivatives
Vt
(
akt , h
j
t
)
=
1
1− θ
(
ck,jt
)1−θ
+ β
(
1− φ 1
1 + hk,jt+1
)
Vt+1(a
k,j
t+1, h
k,j
t+1)
Vt+1a
(
akt , h
j
t
)
=
(
ck,jt
)−θ
Vt+1h
(
akt , h
j
t
)
=
(
w +
1
γ
(
ik,jt
)1−α)(
ck,jt
)−θ
.
Since EXOGM requires to apply the solver for each point in Ga,h, this procedure
entails solving the multidimensional equation system [K · J ] times in each t =
T − 1, . . . , 0. Depending on the stopping criterion in the numerical routine this
could be either quite costly in terms of computing time or the computed solutions
suer under low accuracy. An additional shortcoming of EXOGM compared to
ENDGM and HYBGM is that the region where the borrowing constraint is binding
is not determined.7 In consequence, policy functions are imprecise at the kink.
This may also cause convergence problems. Furthermore, numerical methods
often require ne tuning so that stability of numerical routines is ascertained. We
initially encountered several such instability problems which we managed to x
by setting options of the solver accordingly.8
7In principle, this could be accommodated by an additional rootnder to detect the kink—i.e.,
the a, h-combination at which the borrowing constraint just becomes unbinding—and to add
in additional grid points there. We do not extend the method along this dimension. A naive
extension along these lines would further slow down EXOGM. However, see Brumm and Grill
(2014) for a sophisticated application.
8An alternative would be to avoid multivariate solvers and to instead use xed point iterations
with nested univariate solvers. However, this would further slow down EXOGM.
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Interpolation on a Rectilinear Grid Step 3a requires evaluation of both the
value functionVt+1 and its derivatives,Vt+1a andVt+1h . As, in general, (a
k,j
t+1, h
k,j
t+1)
/∈ Ga,h we have to interpolate these functions. We apply bilinear interpolation.
Precisely, we determine interpolation nodes by the concept “grid square”, cf. Press
et al. (1996). In order to apply this procedure it is necessary to have a rectilinear
grid, i.e., the state space has to be tessellated by rectangles.9 In this case all grid-
points in row G•,j have the same value of hj , and all gridpoints in column Gk,•
have the same value of ak. The problem of locating a point in a multi-dimensional
grid is split up into several problems of locating the point in one dimension.
Within each dimension and a total number of N points in the point set closest
neighbors in the grid are identied in about log2N trials using bisection meth-
ods. Figure 3.1 shows the location of interpolation nodes [A;B;C;D] for pointX
in a two-dimensional rectilinear grid.
Figure 3.1: Rectilinear Grid
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Notes: Interpolation on rectilinear grids. In any row locate the two columns (Gk,• and Gk+1,•)
that form the most narrow bracket of at+1. In any column locate the two rows (G•,j
and G•,j+1) that form the most narrow bracket of ht+1. Interpolation
nodes: (k, j); (k + 1, j); (k, j + 1); (k + 1, j + 1).
In EXOGM, Ga ⊗ Gh is predetermined as a rectilinear grid (in every iteration).
After locating the nodes, bi-linear interpolation of any function of F—in our case
the value function in t as well as its rst derivatives with respect to a and h—at
point X requires computing F (X) = ϕAF (A) + ϕBF (B) + ϕCF (C) + ϕDF (D)
9Notice that these rectangles do not necessarily have to be congruent to each other.
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with the four basis functions ϕwhere ϕA = p ·q, ϕB = (1− p) ·q, ϕC = p · (1− q)
and ϕD = (1− p) · (1− q) with p = aX−aAaB−aA and q = hX−hAhC−hA , cf. Judd (1998).
3.3.2 Analytical Solution with Delaunay Interpolation
(ENDGM)
The above setting has a straightforward economic interpretation. Given an ex-
ogenous state today (at, ht) compute the endogenous state variables (at+1, ht+1).
The main idea of ENDGM is to redene exogenous and endogenous objects in the
numerical solution: the grid of contemporaneous control variables is taken as ex-
ogenous whereas the grid of today’s state variables is determined endogenously.
In our two-dimension setup, implementation of the method requires denition
of two endogenous control variables on which to base the exogenous grids. To
this purpose dene by
st ≡ at + wht − ct − it = at+1
R
(3.5a)
zt ≡ ht + f (it) = ht+1
1− δ (3.5b)
return adjusted stock of physical and human capital, respectively. Our implemen-
tation of the method denes grids on (st, zt) and maps from (st, zt) to (at+1, ht+1)
by at+1 = Rst and ht+1 = (1− δ) zt.10 Next, the system of FOCs can be solved
analytically to determine the corresponding set of contemporaneous controls,
(ct, it). Finally, we use the budget constraint and the law of motion for human
capital to get the corresponding endogenous state variables, (at, ht). Precisely,
the implementation steps are as follows:
1. To initialize ENDGM predene two grids, one for gross savings s, Gs ≡{
sn, sn+1, ..., sK
}
and one for gross investment in human capital z, Gz ≡{
z1, z2, ..., zJ
}
as dened in (3.5) and form Gs,z = Gs ⊗ Gz .
2. Dene Ga,h = Ga ⊗ Gh for T . Compared to Gs, the grid Ga includes n
additional gridpoints. These gridpoints represent the region in which the
borrowing constraint is binding (see step 3e). In period T , as in EXOGM,
cT (·, ·) = ak,jT + whk,jT
iT (·, ·) = 0
10In deterministic model such as ours, this mapping is of course deterministic. We could therefore
directly work on a grid of (at+1, ht+1). However, this would generally not be possible in a
stochastic model because the realizations of (at+1, ht+1) depend on the realizations of shocks
in period t+ 1. For sake of generality, we therefore dene the grid on (st, zt).
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for all
(
ak,j, hk,j
) ∈ Ga,h and
VT
(
ak,jT , h
k,j
T
)
=
1
1− θ
(
ck,jT
)1−θ
VTa
(
ak,jT , h
k,j
T
)
=
(
ck,jT
)−θ
VTh
(
ak,jT , h
k,j
T
)
=
(
w +
1
γ
(
ik,jT
)1−α)(
ck,jT
)−θ
= w
(
ck,jT
)−θ
.
3. Iterate backwards from t = T − 1, ..., 0. In each t, for each (sk, zj) ∈ Gs,z:
a) Compute akt+1 and h
j
t+1:
akt+1 = Rs
k,
hjt+1 = (1− δ) zj .
b) GivenVt+1, Vt+1a andVt+1h interpolate the value function and its deriva-
tives at
(
akt+1, h
j
t+1
)
to get (interpolated values of) Vt+1
(
akt+1, h
j
t+1
)
,
Vt+1a
(
akt+1, h
j
t+1
)
and Vt+1h
(
akt+1, h
j
t+1
)
using Delaunay interpola-
tion (see below).
c) Compute ck,jt and i
k,j
t :
ck,jt =
βR(1− φ 11 + (1− δ) zj
)
Vt+1a

akt+1︷︸︸︷
Rsk ,
hjt+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− δ) zj


− 1
θ
,
ik,jt =
1
γ
(
R
(1− δ)
)− 1
1−α
· Vt+1a
(
akt+1, h
j
t+1
)
φ
(1+hjt+1−φ)(1+hjt+1)
Vt+1
(
akt+1, h
j
t+1
)
+ Vt+1h
(
akt+1, h
j
t+1
)

− 1
1−α
d) Compute ak,jt and h
k,j
t :
hk,jt = z
j − γ
α
(
ik,jt
)α
ak,jt = s
k − whk,jt + ck,jt + ik,jt .
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e) If an+1,jt > 0, dene for each j an auxiliary grid Gaux ≡
{
a1, a2, ..., an
}
between 0 and an+1,jt .11 In this region the borrowing constraint is bind-
ing. Compute ik,jt by solving(
akt + w
(
hjt+1
1− δ −
γ
α
(ik,jt )
α
)
− ik,jt
)−θ
− 1(
hjt+1
)2Vt+1a (0, hjt+1)β (1− δ) γ(ik,jt )−(1−α)
−
(
1− 1
hjt+1
)
Vt+1h
(
0, hjt+1
)
β (1− δ) γ(ik,jt )−(1−α) = 0
using a non-linear solver. Then compute
ck,jt = a
k
t + w
(
hjt+1
1− δ −
γ
α
(ik,jt )
α
)
− ik,jt .
f) Save/Update both the value function and its derivatives
Vt
(
ak,jt , h
k,j
t
)
=
1
1− θ
(
ck,jt
)1−θ
+ β
(
1− φ 1
1 + hjt+1
)
Vt+1
(
akt+1, h
j
t+1
)
Vta
(
ak,jt , h
k,j
t
)
=
(
ck,jt
)−θ
Vth
(
ak,jt , h
k,j
t
)
=
(
w +
1
γ
(
ik,jT
)1−α)(
ck,jt
)−θ
.
The clear advantage of ENDGM compared to EXOGM becomes obvious in step
3c. By conditioning on the grid of st and zt the system of FOCs can be solved for ct
and it analytically and hence no numerical root-nder is needed. Furthermore,
ENDGM provides, by construction, an exact determination of the range of the
borrowing constraint and produces higher accuracy of the solution than EXOGM
in this region. However, in contrast to the standard one-dimensional problem
considered by Carroll (2006), the policy function itself does not have a closed
form solution in this range, see step 3e.12
11If an+1,jt ≤ 0, the borrowing constraint is not binding and we add in some articial numbers
for the solution here. Observe that the method can be further improved by working with t-
(or iteration-) dependent grids, an approach we do not adopt here.
12In a standard consumption-savings model with only one endogenous continuous state variable
the policy function is computed by linearly interpolating between the policy at zero saving
and the origin, cf. Carroll (2006).
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Remark 3.1. In contrast to EXOGM, ENDGM is not a general method. Suppose we
were to adopt a general Ben-Porath human capital function, cf. Ben-Porath (1967),
in which the level of human capital directly aects the productivity of human
capital investments, i.e., we replace f (i) in equation (3.1) with f (h, i). ENDGM is
no longer applicable in such a formulation. This exemplies that an application
of ENDGM often requires specic modeling assumptions.
Delaunay Interpolation In EXOGM the grid is rectilinear by construction
whereas in ENDGM the endogenously computed grid Ga,h is not. This consti-
tutes the main drawback of ENDGM because location of interpolation nodes is
not obvious. As illustrated in Figure 3.2, separating the multi-dimensional prob-
lem into several one-dimensional problems is not possible. In each row not just
the value of a changes but also the value of h so that the concept of bi-linear
interpolation in a square grid is not applicable. ENDGM hence generates a situ-
ation where neighboring points in the state space do not need to be neighboring
elements in the grid matrix.
Figure 3.2: Irregular Grid
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Notes: Interpolation on irregular grids. Multidimensional interpolation cannot be separated into
several one-dimensional interpolations as the values of a and h change in each column or row.
The most common approach adopted in other scientic elds such as geome-
try or geography to locate neighboring points in an irregular grid is the concept
of Delaunay triangulation and its related geometric construct, the Voronoi dia-
gram. We explain the geometric construction of the Voronoi diagram by use of
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Figure 3.3. The Voronoi diagram (polygon)—shown in Panel (a) of Figure 3.3—is
the region of the state space consisting of all points closer to gridpoint P1 than
to any other gridpoint. The Voronoi diagram is obtained from the perpendicu-
lar bisectors of the lines connecting neighboring points. Voronoi diagrams for all
points form a tessellation of the space, cf. Panel (a). Edges of the Voronoi diagram
are all the points in the plane that are equidistant to the two nearest gridpoints,
cf. Panel (b). The Voronoi vertices are the points equidistant to three gridpoints,
i.e., they are the center of circumcircles including the three neighboring grid-
points, cf. Panel (c). Connecting these gridpoints constitutes the unique triangu-
lation known as the Delaunay triangulation as displayed in Panel (d), cf. Baker
(1999). The vertices of a triangle are the nearest neighbors of all points contained
in that triangle. These concepts can also be generalized to more than two dimen-
sions.
The computational implementation of a Delaunay triangulation is done by the
so-called randomized incremental algorithm, illustrated in Figure 3.4. It is in-
cremental in the sense that it adds points to the triangulation one at a time to
maintain a Delaunay triangulation at each stage. It is randomized in that points
are added in a random order which guaranteesO(N log N) expected time for the
algorithm where N is the total number of points in the point set, cf. Press et al.
(2007). To construct the Delaunay triangulation for a given point set we initially
have to add three “ctitious” points [Θ1,Θ2,Θ3], forming a large starting triangle
which encloses all “real” points, cf. Panel (a) of Figure 3.4. This is necessary in
order to ensure that added points lie within an existing triangle. These “ctitious”
points are deleted once the triangulation is complete. In each following step of
Delaunay triangulation a point from the point set is added to the existing trian-
gulation and connected to the vertices of the enclosing triangle. We illustrate this
step in Panel (b) of the gure. Consider the existing triangle P1, P2, P3 and a new
point from the point set, P5, which is not yet connected to other points. Connect-
ing P5 to P1, P2 and P3, respectively, gives rise to three new triangles. Next, it is
checked whether the newly created triangles are “legal”, i.e., whether the circum-
circle of any triangle does not contain any other point of the point set.13 In our
example, we rst visit triangle P2, P3, P5 in Panel (c). As shown in the gure, the
circumcircle contains point P4. Hence, triangle P2, P3, P5 is not legal. Therefore,
ip the edge opposite of P5 connecting P5 with P4. This operation creates two
new triangles, P3, P4, P5 and P2, P4, P5, cf. Panel (d) of the gure, which must be
checked for legality. In our example, triangle P3, P4, P5 is legal because the cir-
13This principle is derived from the denition that a triangulation fullls the Delaunay property
if and only if the circumcircle of any triangle does not contain a point in its interior, cf. Berg
et al. (2008).
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Figure 3.3: The Voronoi Diagram
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Notes: Panel (a): Generating the Voronoi polygon: Edges are perpendicular bisectors of lines
connecting neighboring points. Panel (b): Several Voronoi tiles in mesh grid. Panel (c): Circle
with center at vertex includes three closest points. Panel (d): Delaunay Triangulation: Vertices
are nearest neighbors of all points within triangle.
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cumcircle does not contain other existing points from the point set. The process
is recursive and never wanders away from any point P (point P5 in our example).
The only edges that can be made illegal by inserting a point P are edges opposite
P (in triangles with P as a vertex).14
At interpolation, to locate a (query) point X in a given planar triangular mesh
we adopt a procedure referred to as visibility walk, illustrated in Figure 3.5. The
search starts from an initial guess of a triangle, ∆1. Then, it is tested if the line
supporting the rst edge e separates ∆1 from the query point X which reduces
to a single operation test. If this is the case, the next triangle being visited is the
neighbor of ∆1 through e, ∆2. Otherwise the second edge is tested in the same
way. In case the test for the second edge also fails then the third edge is tested.
The failure of this third test means that the goal has been reached. In Figure 3.5,
this would be the case at triangle ∆X which contains X .15 Devillers, Pion, and
Teillaud (2001) nd that performance of the visibility walk is better than other
possible algorithms. The location step for the visibility walk takes only O log (N)
operations, cf. Press et al. (2007). The starting triangle may be arbitrary. How-
ever, an informed choice may radically shorten the length of the walk. We ac-
commodate this by initializing the search with our solutions to gridpoints visited
previously.
After locating the triangle we compute the normalized barycentric coordinates
(weights) of the query point X with respect to the vertices (A,B,C) of the trian-
gle ∆X ,
ϕA =
(aX − aC) (hB − hC) + (aC − aB) (hX − hC)
(aA − aC) (hB − hC) + (aC − aB) (hA − hC)
ϕB =
(aX − aC) (hC − hA) + (aA − aC) (hX − hC)
(aA − aC) (hB − hC) + (aC − aB) (hA − hC)
ϕC = 1− ϕA − ϕB.
Finally, the interpolated value of any functionF at pointX is given as the weighted
average of the respective function values at the vertices,
F (X) = ϕAF (A) + ϕBF (B) + ϕCF (C).
In our code we also incorporate the option of a multi-linear interpolation used
14This procedure is described in Press et al. (2007). We use the numerical package geompack3
based on Joe (1991) for both the Delaunay triangulation and the “visibility walk”, described
next.
15In non-Delaunay triangulations, the visibility walk may fall into a cycle, whereas in Delaunay
triangulations the visibility walk always terminates, cf. Devillers, Pion, and Teillaud (2001).
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Figure 3.4: Incremental Algorithm
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Notes: Panel (a): Three "ctional" points added to constitute the rst triangle which includes all
"real" points of the point set. Panel (b): Point added to existing Delaunay Triangulation and
connected to vertices of enclosing triangle. Panel (c): Circumcircle contains a point and the
triangle is therefore illegal. Panel (d): Circumcircle does not contain any point and is therefore
legal.
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Figure 3.5: Visibility Walk
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Notes: Visibility walk in Delaunay triangulation - Locate triangle ∆X containing X with initial
guess ∆1. If the line supporting e separates ∆ from X , which reduces to a single orientation
test, then the next visited triangle is the neighbor of ∆ through e.
by Broer, Kapicka, and Klein (2013). This alternative interpolation method is very
useful in applications in which existing triangles are visited frequently. In our
specic applications, this is, however, not the case so that the method does not
have an advantage over the simple interpolation method we use. We therefore do
not apply it when generating our results below.16
16The basic idea of multilinear interpolation is as follows: We can write[
aX
hX
]
=
[
aA
hA
]
+ s
[
aB − aA
hB − hA
]
+ t
[
aC − aB
hC − hB
]
=
[
aA
hA
]
+A
[
s
t
]
, for A =
[
aB − aA aC − aB
hB − hA hC − hB
]
and some scalars s and t. Given (aX , hX), the solution for (s, t) is accordingly given by[
s
t
]
= A−1
[
aX − aA
hX − hA
]
= A−1
[
aX
hX
]
− b, where b = A−1
[
aA
hA
]
. (3.6)
The value of function F (X) then follows as
F (X) = F (A) + s (F (B)− F (A)) + t (F (C)− F (B)) . (3.7)
Matrix A−1 and vector b must only be computed once when triangle ∆X is visited for the
rst time and can accordingly be stored. In subsequent visits of ∆X one can compute, for any
point X˜ ∈ ∆X , the scalars (s˜, t˜) directly from equation (3.6) and the interpolated value from
equation (3.7).
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3.3.3 One-Dimensional Root-Finding with Hybrid
Interpolation (HYBGM)
We next consider a hybrid method (HYBGM) which combines EXOGM and END-
GM. Specically, we use ENDGM in one dimension of the problem only. Hence,
we dene one of the two state variables on an “endogenous” grid, whereas the
other is on an “exogenous” grid. The algorithm proceeds in three steps. In the
rst step, conditioning on control variable st and period t endogenous state ht,
we compute next period’s endogenous state variable at+1 and exploit one of the
two FOCs to derive the value of one period t control variable—in this setup invest-
ment in human capital, it. In this step a one-dimensional solver is required. To
preserve comparability with the previously described methods we choose Broy-
den’s method.17 In the second step, control it is used to get the value of the second
period t+ 1 endogenous state variable, ht+1 from the budget constraint. Exploit-
ing the second FOC we can then compute the second control variable, ct. In the
third step, we compute the corresponding endogenous state variable at from the
budget constraint. The implementation steps are as follows:
1. To initialize HYBGM predene two grids, one for gross savings s, Gs ≡{
s1, s2, ..., sK
}
and one for human capital h, Gh ≡ {h1, h2, ..., hJ} and form
Gs,h = Gs ⊗ Gh
2. In period T , dene an initial guess for Ga,h = Ga ⊗ Gh. Ga includes n
additional gridpoints compared to Gs. These gridpoints represent the region
in which the borrowing constraint is binding (see step 3d). Compute
cT (·, ·) = ak,jT + whjT
iT (·, ·) = 0
for all
(
ak,jT , h
j
T
)
∈ Ga,h and
VT
(
ak,jT , h
j
T
)
=
1
1− θ
(
ck,jT
)1−θ
VTa
(
ak,jT , h
j
T
)
=
(
ck,jT
)−θ
VTh
(
ak,jT , h
j
T
)
=
(
w +
1
γ
(
ik,jT
)1−α)(
ck,jT
)−θ
.
3. Iterate backwards on t = T − 1, ..., 0. In each t, for each (sk, hj) ∈ Gs,h:
a) Compute akt+1 = Rsk.
17Using Brent’s method instead turns out to slow down speed of HYBGM.
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b) Given (suitably interpolated values of) Vt+1, Vt+1a and Vt+1a , solve the
one-dimensional equation system for ik,jt
ik,jt =
1
γ
(
R
(1− δ)
)− 1
1−α
·
Vt+1a

akt+1︷︸︸︷
Rsk ,
hk,jt+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− δ)
(
hjt +
γ
α
(
ik,jt
)α)

φ
(1+hk,jt+1−φ)(1+hk,jt+1)
Vt+1
(
akt+1, h
k,j
t+1
)
+ Vt+1h
(
akt+1, h
k,j
t+1
)

− 1
1−α
using Broyden’s method. This includes several computations of
hk,jt+1 = (1− δ)
(
hjt +
γ
α
(
ik,jt
)α)
and hybrid interpolations —described
below— on Vt+1, Vt+1aand Vt+1h .
c) Compute ck,jt as
ck,jt =
(
βR
(
1− φ 1
1 + hk,jt+1
)
Vt+1a
(
Rsk, hk,jt+1
))− 1θ
.
d) If an+1,jt > 0, dene for each j an auxiliary grid Gaux ≡
{
a1, a2, ..., an
}
between 0 and an+1,jt . In this region the borrowing constraint is bind-
ing. Compute ik,jt by solving(
akt + wh
j
t − ik,jt
)−θ
− 1(
(1− δ)
(
hjt +
γ
α(i
k,j
t )
α
))2 ·
Vt+1a
(
0, (1− δ)
(
hjt +
γ
α
(ik,jt )
α
))
β (1− δ) γ(ik,jt )−(1−α)
−
1− 1
(1− δ)
(
hjt +
γ
α(i
k,j
t )
α
)
Vt+1h (0, (1− δ)(hjt + γα(ik,jt )α)) ·
β (1− δ) γ(ik,jt )−(1−α) = 0
for ik,jt . Next, compute c
k,j
t = a
k
t + wh
j
t − ik,jt .
e) Compute ak,jt from the budget constraint, hence
ak,jt = s
k − whjt + ck,jt + ik,jt .
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f) Save/Update both the value function and its derivatives
Vt
(
ak,jt , h
j
t
)
=
1
1− θ
(
ck,jt
)1−θ
+ β
(
1− φ 1
1 + hk,jt+1
)
Vt+1(a
k
t+1, h
k,j
t+1)
Vta
(
ak,jt , h
j
t
)
=
(
ck,jt
)−θ
Vth
(
ak,jt , h
j
t
)
=
(
w +
1
γ
(
ik,jT
)1−α)(
ck,jt
)−θ
.
As EXOGM, HYBGM requires to run a numerical solver [K · J ] times in each t =
T − 1, . . . , 0. However, computational burden is alleviated by reducing complex-
ity of the equation system. Furthermore, as in ENDGM, it is possible to exactly
determine the range of the borrowing constraint. In contrast to ENDGM in two
dimensions, there is no need for a complex interpolation method.
Remark 3.2. As ENDGM, HYBGM is not a general method. Suppose that con-
sumption has an additional eect on human (or health capital). Consider for
example an application where health capital is negatively aected by the con-
sumption of junk food. Correspondingly rewrite (3.1) to
ht+1 = (1− δ) (ht + f (it)− g (ct))
to the eect that both controls ct and it appear on both sides of the equation
system even after applying the reformulation of endogenous states. This renders
HYBGM inapplicable.
Hybrid Interpolation Hybrid interpolation, illustrated in Figure 3.6, is dened
on a curvilinear grid where one dimension is being held constant. To locate any
query point X hybrid interpolation proceeds in three steps. First, in the dimen-
sion of the exogenous grid (current state ht) nd the most narrow bracket of ht+1
and compute the weights according to the relative distance to these gridpoints.
Second, in both rows, nd those gridpoints that form the most narrow bracket
of at+1 and compute the according weights. Third, interpolation of any function
of F at point X requires computing F (X) = ϕAF (A) + ϕBF (B) + ϕCF (C) +
ϕDF (D) with the four basis functions ϕ where ϕA = p · q, ϕB = (1− p) · q,
ϕC = r · (1− q) and ϕD = (1− r) · (1− q) with p = aX−aAaB−aA , r = aX−aCaD−aC and
q = hX−hChC−hA . Thus, HYBGM reduces complexity of the problem without involving
advanced interpolation procedures.
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Figure 3.6: Hybrid Interpolation
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Notes: Hybrid Interpolation. First, in the exogenous dimension, locate the two rows G•,j and
G•,j+1 that form the most narrow bracket of ht+1. Second, locate in these two rows the
gridpoints that form the most narrow bracket of at+1. Interpolation nodes: (k, j); (k, j + 1);
(l, j + 1); (l + 1, j + 1).
3.4 Results
We present results separately for the nite and innite horizon versions of our
model. Throughout, we use triple exponential grids for a, h, s, z, respectively.
We set the range of grid Gs to [0, 500] and of Gz to [1,500]. The according grids Ga
and Gh are adjusted to cover the corresponding range of the state space.18
3.4.1 Error Evaluation
In both the nite and the innite horizon version of the model, evaluation of accu-
racy of the solution is done by applying normalized Euler equation errors, cf. Judd
(1992), as has become standard in the literature, cf., e.g., Santos (2000) and Baril-
las and Fernandez-Villaverde (2007). In our approach we get the Euler equation
errors e1 and e2 by using the respective envelope conditions and combine them
18Also observe, by construction, there is only one occasionally binding constraint in our model.
This would be dierent in a situation with durable consumption goods as in Hintermaier and
Koeniger (2010). As ENDGM is a very ecient way in dealing with occasionally binding con-
straints such an alternative model may further improve the relative performance of ENDGM.
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with the FOCs to get:
e1,t = 1−
(
Rs(ht+1)β (ct+1)
−θ
)− 1θ
ct
, (3.8a)
e2,t = 1−
(
R
(1−δ)
(
sh(ht+1)Vt+1
s(ht+1)(ct+1)
−θ + w +
1
γ i
1−α
t+1
)−1)− 1α
it
. (3.8b)
These errors are dimension free quantities. Equation (3.8a) expresses the opti-
mization error as a fraction of current consumption. An error of e1,t=10−3, for
instance, means that the household makes a $1 mistake for each $1000 spent,
cf. Aruoba, Fernandez-Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramirez (2006). These errors are ex-
pressed in units of base 10-logarithm which means that -4 is an error of 0.0001.
3.4.2 Finite Horizon
We iterate over T=100 time periods. Computational speed of the respective al-
gorithms is measured in seconds. To compare all three methods in terms of ac-
curacy we simulate 100 life-cycles proles and evaluate Euler equation errors ac-
cordingly. Initial assets a0 are set in the range [10, 100] whereas initial human
capital h0 is drawn from the range [50,100]. For each simulation and each age we
compute e1,t and e2,t from equation (3.8).19 We next compute average and maxi-
mum errors across all simulations and ages. These are provided in Table 3.1. Both
are of similar magnitudes across algorithms. To evaluate the relative performance
of the dierent algorithms, we can therefore further concentrate on comparison
of speed only.
Table 3.1 shows computing times for EXOGM, ENDGM and HYBGM for dier-
ent numbers of gridpoints. We report absolute computing time as well as relative
speed, i.e., relative to the ENDGM method. As our model is (on purpose) very
stylized, absolute computing times are low across all models. However, relative
speed is the relevant measuring rod because absolute speed scales up in the com-
plexity of the model’s specication, e.g., in fully stochastic models, applications
in general equilibrium or estimation of models with structural methods. With re-
gard to this relative comparison, observe from Panel (a) of Figure 3.7 that EXOGM
is outperformed by both ENDGM and HYBGM.
Panel (b) of Figure 3.7 shows that ENDGM has a relative advantage in compari-
son to HYBGM in solving the model with a relatively small number of gridpoints.
19Euler equation errors are not computed if the borrowing constraint is binding.
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Table 3.1: Finite Horizon Model: Performance Results
Speed Euler Equation Error
Number of
Gridpoints for
(a, h)
Seconds Relative
to
ENDGM
Maximum for
c ; i
Average for
c ; i
ENDGM
(25,25) 0.094 – -2.56; -2.17 -3.70; -2.94
(50,50) 0.437 – -2.92; -2.60 -4.36; -3.53
(100,100) 2.090 – -3.37; -3.07 -4.91; -4.05
(200,200) 11.278 – -3.84; -3.47 -5.44; -4.51
HYBGM
(25,25 0.156 1.7 -2.62; -2.25 -3.88; -2.90
(50,50) 0.624 1.4 -2.99; -2.71 -4.43; -3.52
(100,100) 2.496 1.2 -3.43; -3.10 -5.00; -3.98
(200,200) 10.218 0.9 -4.16; -3.52 -5.54; -4.45
EXOGM
(25,25) 0.234 2.5 -2.60; -2.24 -3.89; -2.90
(50,50) 0.982 2.3 -2.95; -2.71 -4.42; -3.52
(100,100) 3.868 1.9 -3.42; -3.10 -4.99; -3.98
(200,200) 15.663 1.4 -4.18; -3.52 -5.54; -4.45
Notes: Computing time for T=100 and resulting maximum and average Euler equation errors.
Computing time is reported in seconds and absolute errors in units of base-10 logarithms.
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At a grid size of 252, ENDGM is about 1.7 times faster than HYBGM. For solv-
ing the model with a higher number of gridpoints, however, HYBGM is advanta-
geous. At a grid size of 3002, HYBGM is about 1.3 times faster than ENDGM. In
our setting the break-even point between both algorithms is at a number of 1802
gridpoints and a computing time of 8.8s. As can be seen from Table 3.1, for a
standard choice of 25 to 50 gridpoints in each dimension, ENDGM is 0.6240.437 ≈ 1.4
to 0.1560.094 ≈ 1.7 times faster than HYBGM and 0.9820.437 ≈ 2.3 to 0.2340.094 ≈ 2.5 times faster
than EXOGM.
Figure 3.7: Finite Horizon Model: Speed
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Notes: Panel (a): Computing time as a function of gridpoints in seconds (with equally many
gridpoints in both dimensions). Solid line: computing time of EXOGM; dotted line: computing
time of HYBGM; dashed-dotted line: computing time of ENDGM. Panel (b): Ratio of computing
time of ENDGM to HYBGM as a function of gridpoints (with equally many gridpoints in both
dimensions).
3.4.3 Infinite horizon
To compare the algorithms in the innite horizon setting, we make the same ini-
tial guesses for derivatives V0a and V0h and iterate until convergence on policy
functions subject to convergence criterion ε = 10−6 in terms of the maximum
absolute distance of policy functions. In the innite horizon setting, speed of
ENDGM can be increased if the Delaunay Triangulation is not constructed every
iteration. Instead, we hold the triangulation pattern xed after a certain number
of iterations—50 in our case. We call this modication of the algorithm “Approx-
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imate Delaunay”. Figure 3.8 illustrates this. Panel (a) of the gure shows how
endogenous grid-points move in the (a, h) space from one iteration to the next.
Panel (b) shows the new triangulation, holding constant the respective triangles
from Panel (a). However, this triangulation is not Delaunay because edge P1-P2
becomes illegal.
In “Approximate Delaunay” it is necessary to ensure that the endogenously
computed gridpoints form a convex hull. This might be violated without further
adjustments. For example, in our illustration in panel (b) of Figure 3.8 violation
of convexity would occur if point P3 is shifted even further to the right. In such
cases we redo the entire Delaunay tessellation.
Figure 3.8: Innite Horizon Model: Approximate Delaunay
(a) Panel (a)
a
h
(b) Panel (b)
a
h
Notes: Panel (a): In each iteration of ENDGM the gridpoints are relocated. Distance and direction
of this movement is dierent for each gridpoint. Panel (b): The resulting grid might not be
Delaunay - Edge between P1 and P2 becomes illegal and must be ipped to P3 and P4.
Approximate Delaunay keeps the old triangulation in order to save computing time, accepting a
less accurate interpolation.
To compute Euler equation errors we simulate the model for various dierent
initial conditions of nancial assets and health capital over 50 periods. We set
initial assets a0 in the range of [100,400] and the health capital stock in the range
of [40,80]. We compute e1,t and e2,t from equation (3.8) for the rst 50 periods.
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Average and maximum errors are provided in Table 3.2.
As in the nite horizon setting, average Euler equation errors are of similar
magnitudes across algorithms—which we also achieve by appropriate settings of
the respective numerical routines—so that we can again further concentrate on a
comparison of speed only.20
We nd that ENDGM is the fastest method for all numbers of gridpoints con-
sidered. In this respect our ndings dier from the nite horizon version of the
model in which the speed advantage of ENDGM relative to HYBGM was found to
depend on the number of gridpoints. The reason for this dierence is the use of
the variant “Approximate Delaunay” in the innite horizon model, as described
above. As in the nite horizon model, the comparative advantage of ENDGM de-
creases in the number of gridpoints. Both, ENDGM and HYBGM, again clearly
dominate EXOGM. For a standard choice of 25 to 50 gridpoints in each dimension,
ENDGM is 1.1530.624 ≈ 2.4 to 0.3900.156 ≈ 2.5 times faster than HYBGM and 2.5270.624 ≈ 4.0
to 0.6400.156 ≈ 4.1 times faster than EXOGM, cf. Table 3.2.
Figure 3.9: Innite Horizon Model: Speed
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Notes: Panel (a): Computing time to convergence of policy functions (criterion ε=10−6) as a
function of gridpoints (with equally many gridpoints in both dimensions). Solid line: computing
time of EXOGM; dotted line: computing time of HYBGM; dashed-dotted line: computing time of
ENDGM. Panel (b): Ratio of computing time to convergence of ENDGM and HYBGM as a
function of gridpoints (with equally many gridpoints in both dimensions).
20The maximum Euler equation errors are considerably higher for EXOGM. They occur in the
simulations just before the depletion of all nancial assets. This is due to the fact that we
do not determine explicitly the region where the borrowing constraint becomes binding and
accordingly have no gridpoints located there.
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Table 3.2: Innite Horizon Model: Performance Results
Speed Euler Equation Error
Number of
Gridpoints for
(a, h)
Seconds Relative
to
ENDGM
Maximum for
c ; i
Average for
c ; i
ENDGM
(25,25) 0.156 – -2.09; -2.10 -2.87; -2.87
(50,50) 0.624 – -2.37; -2.40 -3.61; -3.52
(100,100) 2.792 – -2.84; -2.91 -4.17; -4.15
(200,200) 15.194 – -3.14; -3.24 -4.80; -4.66
HYBGM
(25,25) 0.390 2.5 -2.16; -2.10 -2.92; -2.97
(50,50) 1.513 2.4 -2.49; -2.58 -3.73; -3.66
(100,100) 6.115 2.2 -2.91; -2.98 -4.29; -4.23
(200,200) 27.175 1.8 -3.19; -3.29 -4.91; -4.80
EXOGM
(25,25) 0.640 4.1 -1.53; -1.64 -2.80; -2.87
(50,50) 2.527 4.0 -1.81; -1.92 -4.17; -4.52
(100,100) 10.109 3.6 -2.44; -2,55 -4.17; -4.15
(200,200) 41.371 2.7 -2.40; -2.51 -4.69; -4.66
Notes: Computing time to convergence of policy functions (criterion ε=10−6) and resulting max-
imum and average Euler equation errors. Computing time is reported in seconds and absolute
errors in units of base-10 logarithms.
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3.5 Conclusion
We compare three numerical methods—the standard exogenous grid method (EX-
OGM), Carroll’s method of endogenous gridpoints (ENDGM), cf. Carroll (2006),
and a hybrid method (HYBGM), cf. also Hintermaier and Koeniger (2010)—to
solve dynamic models with two continuous state variables and occasionally bind-
ing borrowing constraints. To illustrate and to evaluate these methods we develop
a life-cycle consumption-savings model with endogenous human capital forma-
tion. Evaluation of methods is based on speed and accuracy in both a nite and
an innite horizon setting. We show that applying ENDGM gives rise to irregular
grids. We emphasize that this leads to a trade-o: On the one hand, closed form
solutions in ENDGM greatly simplify the problem relative to standard EXOGM.
On the other hand, interpolation becomes more costly due to the irregularity of
grids. We apply Delaunay methods to interpolate on these irregular grids.
Despite this more complex interpolation, we nd that ENDGM outperforms
EXOGM in both the nite as well as the innite horizon version of the model. In
the innite horizon model, ENDGM also always dominates HYBGM. For a stan-
dard choice of 25 to 50 gridpoints in each dimension, ENDGM is 2.4 to 2.5 times
faster than HYBGM and 4.0 to 4.1 times faster than EXOGM. As the number of
gridpoints increases, interpolation on irregular grids becomes increasingly costly
to the eect that the relative speed advantage of ENDGM decreases. This becomes
more apparent in the nite horizon model. Here, ENDGM dominates HYBGM for
small to medium sized problems whereas HYBGM dominates for a large number
of gridpoints. For a standard choice of 25 to 50 gridpoints in each dimension,
ENDGM is 1.4 to 1.7 times faster than HYBGM and 2.3 to 2.5 times faster than
EXOGM.
Two additional remarks on ENDGM and HYBGM are in order. First, within
the class of problems solvable with rst-order methods, neither of the two is a
general method. Both are applicable only to specic problems at hand. This re-
quires restrictions on the model’s specication and on functional forms. Second,
as HYBGM uses analytical solutions in only one dimension and standard numer-
ical methods in others, its relative advantage can be expected to decrease in the
dimensionality of the problem. For example, in a three dimensional problem, as
HYBGM can only use analytical solutions in one dimension, HYBGM requires to
solve a two-dimensional problem numerically. On the other hand, however, com-
plexity of interpolation in ENDGM will also increase. As we restrict attention to
two dimensional problems in this chapter, we cannot address how this trade-o
is ultimately resolved. We leave such extensions to higher dimensions for future
research.
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Appendix 3.A Derivation of FOC
The dynamic version of the household problem reads as
Vt(at, ht) = max
ct,it,at+1,ht+1
{u(ct) + βs (ht+1)Vt+1(at+1, ht+1)}
subject to
at+1 = R (at + wht − ct − it)
ht+1 = (1− δ) (ht + f (it))
at+1 ≥ 0.
Assigning multiplier µ to the borrowing constraint, the two rst order condi-
tions with respect to ct and it are:
∂Vt (at, ht)
∂ct
= uc − βs (ht+1)Vt+1aR−Rµ != 0
⇔ uc − βs (ht+1)RVt+1a = Rµ, (3.9)
∂Vt (at, ht)
∂it
= sh (ht+1) (1− δ) fiβVt+1 + s (ht+1)β (Vt+1a (−R) + Vt+1h (1− δ) fi)
−Rµ != 0
⇔
sh (ht+1) (1− δ) fiβVt+1 + s (ht+1)β (Vt+1a (−R) + Vt+1h (1− δ) fi) = Rµ (3.10)
and at+1 ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0 and at+1µ = 0.
In order to compute optimal policies we need to distinguish two cases.
Case 1: Interior Solution
In the rst case the borrowing constraint is not binding so that µ=0. This reduces
the system of equations to
uc − βs (ht+1)RVt+1a = 0
sh (ht+1) (1− δ) fiβVt+1 + s (ht+1) β (Vt+1a (−R) + Vt+1h (1− δ) fi) = 0.
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Rearranging gives
uc = βs (ht+1)Vt+1aR
fi =
R
(1− δ)
s (ht+1)Vt+1a
sh (ht+1)Vt+1 + s (ht+1)Vt+1h
.
Case 2: Corner Solution—Binding Borrowing Constraint
In the second case the borrowing constraint is binding so that a′=0 and µ >0.
From (3.9) and (3.10) it then follows that
uc = sh (ht+1) βVt+1 + s (ht+1) βVt+1h (1− δ) fi (3.11)
and
uc = β (1− δ) fi (sh (ht+1)Vt+1 + s (ht+1)Vt+1h)
at+1 = 0⇔ ct = at + wht − it.
Making use of our assumptions on functional forms, equation (3.11) reduces in
EXOGM and HYBGM to
(at + wht − it)−θ−
1(
(1− δ) (ht + γαiαt ))2Vt+1
[
0, (1− δ)
(
ht +
γ
α
iαt
))
β (1− δ) γi−(1−α)t
−
(
1− 1
(1− δ) (ht + γαiαt )
)
Vt+1h
(
0, (1− δ)
(
ht +
γ
α
iαt
))
β (1− δ) γi−(1−α)t = 0
and in ENDGM to(
at + w
(
ht+1
1− δ −
1
γ
i1−αt
)
− it
)−θ
− 1
(ht+1)
2βVt+1 (0, ht+1) (1− δ) γi−(1−α)t
−
(
1− 1
1 + ht+1
)
βVt+1h (0, ht+1) (1− δ) γi−(1−α)t = 0.
Observe that this equation is not linear in it. We therefore need to use a numerical
routine in the region where the borrowing constraint is binding also for ENDGM,
cf. our discussion in the main text in Subsection 3.3.2.
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In both cases—i.e., for interior solutions and for binding borrowing constraints—
the envelope conditions are
∂Vt (at, ht)
∂at
≡ Vta = βVt+1aR + Rµ = uc
∂Vt (at, ht)
∂ht
≡ Vth
= βsh (ht+1)Vt+1(at+1, ht+1) (1− δ) + βs (ht+1)Vta(at+1, ht+1)wR+
βs (ht+1)Vt+1h(at+1, ht+1) (1− δ) + Rµ
=
(
w +
1
fi
)
uc.
110
Bibliography
Adjaye-Gbewonyo, K. and I. Kawachi (2012). “Use of the Yitzhaki Index as a test
of relative deprivation for health outcomes: A review of recent literature”.
Social Science & Medicine 75, 129 –137.
Ales, L., R. Hosseini, and L. E. Jones (2012). Is There "TooMuch" Inequality in Health
Spending Across Income Groups? NBER Working Papers. National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc.
Andersen, S. H. (2010). “The cost of sickness: On the eect of the duration of sick
leave on post-sick leave earnings”. Social Science & Medicine 70, 1581–1589.
Arai, M. and P. S. Thoursie (2005). “Incentives and selection in cyclical absen-
teeism”. Labour Economics 12, 269–280.
Aruoba, S. B., J. Fernandez-Villaverde, and J. F. Rubio-Ramirez (2006). “Comparing
solution methods for dynamic equilibrium economies”. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 30, 2477–2508.
Askildsen, J. E., E. Bratberg, and O. A. Nilsen (2005). “Unemployment, labor force
composition and sickness absence: a panel data study”. Health Economics 14,
1087–1101.
Auld, M. C. (2005). “Smoking, Drinking, and Income”. English. The Journal of Hu-
man Resources 40, pp. 505–518.
Baker, T. J. (1999). “Delaunay - Voronoi Methods”. In:Handbook of Grid Generation.
CRC Press. Chap. 16.
Barillas, F. and J. Fernandez-Villaverde (2007). “A generalization of the endoge-
nous grid method”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31, 2698–2712.
Ben-Porath, Y. (1967). “The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle of
Earnings”. Journal of Political Economy 75, 352.
Berg, M. de et al. (2008). Computational Geometry: Algorithms and Applications.
3rd. Springer.
Bergström, G. et al. (2009). “Does sickness presenteeism have an impact on future
general health?” English. International Archives of Occupational and Environ-
mental Health 82, 1179–1190.
Blackburn, E. H. and E. S. Epel (2012). “Telomeres and adversity: Too toxic to
ignore”. Nature 490, 169–171.
Bosworth, B. P. and K. Burke (2014). Dierential Mortality and Retirement Benets
in the Health and Retirement Study. Working Papers, Center for Retirement
Research at Boston College. Center for Retirement Research.
Broer, T., M. Kapicka, and P. Klein (2013). Consumption risk sharing with private
information when earnings are persistent. Tech. rep. Simon Fraser University.
111
Bibliography
Brumm, J. and M. Grill (2014). “Computing equilibria in dynamic models with
occasionally binding constraints”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
38, 142 –160.
Buhmann, B. et al. (1988). “Equivalence Scales, Well-Being, Inequality, and
Poverty: Sensitivity Estimates across Ten Countries Using the Luxembourg
Income Study (LIS) Database”. Review of Income and Wealth 34, 115–42.
Bundeministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (2014). Sozialbudget 2013. Tech. rep.
Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales.
Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2014). Arbeitslosigkeit im Zeitverlauf. Tech. rep. Bun-
desagentur für Arbeit.
Carroll, C. D. (2006). “The method of endogenous gridpoints for solving dynamic
stochastic optimization problems”. Economics Letters 91, 312–320.
Chadi, A. and L. Goerke (2015). Missing at Work - Sickness-related Absence and
Subsequent Job Mobility. IAAEU Discussion Papers. Institute of Labour Law
and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
Clark, A. E. and C. Senik (2010). “Who Compares to Whom? The Anatomy of
Income Comparisons in Europe”. The Economic Journal 120, 573–594.
Cole, H. L., S. Kim, and D. Krueger (2014). Analyzing the Eects of Insuring Health
Risks: On the Trade-o between Short Run Insurance Benets vs. Long Run In-
centive Costs. PIER Working Paper Archive. Penn Institute for Economic Re-
search, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
Cuesta, M. B., E. Cottini, and A. A. Herrarte (2012). Socioeconomic Gradient in
Health: How Important is Material Deprivation? Tech. rep. AIAS, Amsterdam
Institute for Advanced Labour Studies.
Cutler, D. M., A. Lleras-Muney, and T. Vogl (2011). “Socioeconomic Status and
Health: Dimensions and Mechanisms”. In: The Oxford Handbook of Health
Economics. Oxford University Press.
Dale-Olsen, H. (2014). “Sickness Absence, Sick Leave Pay, and Pay Schemes”.
Labour 28, 40–63.
Daly, M. C. et al. (1998). “Macro-to-micro links in the relation between income
inequality and mortality.” The Milbank quarterly 76, 315–339.
Deaton, A. S. and C. Paxson (2001). “Mortality, Education, Income, and Inequality
among American Cohorts”. In: Themes in the Economics of Aging. National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Delaunay, B. N. (1934). “Sur la sphère vide”. Bulletin of Academy of Sciences of the
USSR, 793–800.
Devillers, O., S. Pion, and M. Teillaud (2001). “Walking in a triangulation”. In:
Proceedings of the seventeenth annual symposium on Computational geometry.
Medford, Massachusetts, United States.
112
Bibliography
Ehrlich, I. and H. Chuma (1990). “A Model of the Demand for Longevity and the
Value of Life Extension”. Journal of Political Economy 98, 761–82.
Eibner, C., R. Sturm, and C. R. Gresenz (2004). “Does Relative Deprivation Predict
the Need for Mental Health Services?” The Journal of Mental Health Policy
and Economics 7, 167–175.
Elstad, J. I. (1998). “The Psycho-social Perspective on Social Inequalities in
Health”. Sociology of Health & Illness 20, 598–618.
Ettner, S. L. (1996). “New evidence on the relationship between income and
health”. Journal of Health Economics 15, 67–85.
Fella, G. (2014). “A generalized endogenous grid method for non-smooth and non-
concave problems”. Review of Economic Dynamics 17, 329–344.
Fernandez-Villaverde, J. and D. Krueger (2007). “Consumption over the Life Cycle:
Facts from Consumer Expenditure Survey Data”. The Review of Economics
and Statistics 89, 552–565.
Finkelstein, A., E. F. P. Luttmer, and M. J. Notowidigdo (2013). “What good is
wealth without health? The eect of health on the marginal utility of con-
sumption”. Journal of the European Economic Association 11, 221–258.
Georgarakos, D., M. Haliassos, and G. Pasini (2012). Household debt and social
interactions. Tech. rep. Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
Gilleskie, D. B. (1998). “A Dynamic Stochastic Model of Medical Care Use and
Work Absence”. Econometrica 66, 1–46.
Grossman, M. (1972). “On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for
Health”. Journal of Political Economy 80, 223–55.
Hall, R. E. and C. I. Jones (2007). “The Value of Life and the Rise in Health Spend-
ing”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, 39–72.
Halliday, T., H. He, and H. Zhang (2012). Health Investment over the Life-Cycle.
Working Papers. University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
Henrekson, M. and M. Persson (2004). “The Eects on Sick Leave of Changes in
the Sickness Insurance System”. Journal of Labor Economics 22, 87–114.
Hesselius, P. (2007). “Does sickness absence increase the risk of unemployment?”
The Journal of Socio-Economics 36, 288–310.
Hintermaier, T. and W. Koeniger (2010). “The method of endogenous gridpoints
with occasionally binding constraints among endogenous variables”. Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control 34, 2074–2088.
Huggett, M., G. Ventura, and A. Yaron (2011). “Sources of Lifetime Inequality”.
American Economic Review 101, 2923–54.
Hujer, R. et al. (2001). “Testing for uniform wage trends in West-Germany: A co-
hort analysis using quantile regressions for censored data”. Empirical Eco-
nomics 26, 41–86.
113
Bibliography
Idler, E. L. and Y. Benyamini (1997). “Self-Rated Health and Mortality: A Review
of Twenty-Seven Community Studies”. English. Journal of Health and Social
Behavior 38, pp. 21–37.
Iskhakov, F. et al. (2014). Estimating Discrete-Continuous Choice Models: Endoge-
nous Grid Method with Taste Shocks. Tech. rep.
Joe, B (1991). “GEOMPACK: A software package for the generation of meshes
using geometric algorithms”. Advances in Engineering Software and Worksta-
tions 13, 325–331.
Johansson, P. and M. Palme (2005). “Moral hazard and sickness insurance”. Journal
of Public Economics 89, 1879 –1890.
Jones, A. M. and J. Wildman (2008). “Health, income and relative deprivation:
Evidence from the BHPS”. Journal of Health Economics 27, 308 –324.
Judd, K. L. (1992). “Projection methods for solving aggregate growth models”.
Journal of Economic Theory 58, 410–452.
(1998). Numerical Methods in Economics. 1st ed. Vol. 1. The MIT Press.
Keane, M. P. and K. I. Wolpin (1997). “The Career Decisions of Young Men”. Jour-
nal of Political Economy 105, 473–522.
Kivimäki, M. et al. (2005). “Working While Ill as a Risk Factor for Serious Coronary
Events: The Whitehall II Study.” American Journal of Public Health 95(1), 98
–102.
Kondo, N. et al. (2008). “Do social comparisons explain the association between
income inequality and health?: Relative deprivation and perceived health
among male and female Japanese individuals”. Social Science & Medicine 67,
982 –987.
Krueger, D. and A. Ludwig (2007). “On the consequences of demographic change
for rates of returns to capital, and the distribution of wealth and welfare”.
Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 49–87.
Laun, T. (2013). Optimal Social Insurance with Endogenous Health. SSE/EFI Work-
ing Paper Series in Economics and Finance. Stockholm School of Economics.
Leigh, J. P. (1985). “The eects of unemployment and the business cycle on absen-
teeism”. Journal of Economics and Business 37, 159–170.
Long, J. and J. Freese (2006). Regression models for categorical dependent variables
using Stata. StataCorp LP.
Mangyo, E. and A. Park (2011). “Relative Deprivation and Health: Which Refer-
ence Groups Matter?” Journal of Human Resources 46, 459–481.
Markussen, S. (2012). “The individual cost of sick leave”. Journal of Population
Economics 25, 1287–1306.
Marmot, M. et al. (1991). “Health inequalities among British civil servants: the
Whitehall II study”. The Lancet 337, 1387 –1393.
114
Bibliography
McEwen, B. S. (1998). “Protective and Damaging Eects of Stress Mediators”. New
England Journal of Medicine 338, 171–179. eprint: http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/
NEJM199801153380307.
McLaughlin, K. A. et al. (2012). “Socioeconomic Status and Adolescent Mental
Disorders”. American Journal of Public Health 102, 1742–1750.
Miilunpalo, S. et al. (1997). “Self-rated health status as a health measure: The pre-
dictive value of self-reported health status on the use of physician services
and on mortality in the working-age population”. Journal of Clinical Epidemi-
ology 50, 517 –528.
Miranda, M. J. and P. L. Fackler (2004). Applied Computational Economics and Fi-
nance. 1st ed. Vol. 1. The MIT Press.
Nuebling, M. et al. (2007). “Computation of Standard Values for Physical
and Mental Health Scale Scores Using the SOEP Version of SF12v2”.
Schmollers Jahrbuch : Journal of Applied Social Science Studies / Zeitschrift
für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften 127, 171–182.
Ozkan, S. (2014). Preventive vs. Curative Medicine: A Macroeeconomic Analysis of
Health Care over the Life Cycle. Tech. rep. University of Toronto.
Pence, K. M. (2006). “The Role of Wealth Transformations: An Application to Esti-
mating the Eect of Tax Incentives on Saving”. The B.E. Journal of Economic
Analysis & Policy 5, 1–26.
Pfeifer, C. (2013). “Cyclical Absenteeism Among Private Sector, Public Sector And
Self-Employed Workers”. Health Economics 22, 366–370.
Pham-Kanter, G. (2009). “Social comparisons and health: Can having richer friends
and neighbors make you sick?” Social Science & Medicine 69, 335 –344.
Press, W. et al. (1996). Numerical Recipes in Fortran 90: Volume 2, Volume 2 of For-
tran Numerical Recipes: The Art of Parallel Scientic Computing. Fortran Nu-
merical Recipes , Vol 2. Cambridge University Press.
Press, W. et al. (2007). Numerical Recipes 3rd Edition: The Art of Scientic Comput-
ing. Numerical Recipes: The Art of Scientic Computing. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Puhani, P. A. and K. Sonderhof (2010). “The eects of a sick pay reform on absence
and on health-related outcomes”. Journal of Health Economics 29, 285–302.
Santos, M. S. (2000). “Accuracy of Numerical Solutions Using the Euler Equation
Residuals”. English. Econometrica 68, pp. 1377–1402.
Scheil-Adlung, X. and L. Sandner (2010). The Case for Paid Sick Leave. World
Health Report Background Paper. World Health Organization.
Seeman, T. E. et al. (2001). “Allostatic Load as a Marker of Cumulative Biologi-
cal Risk: MacArthur Studies of Successful Aging”. English. Proceedings of the
115
Bibliography
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 98, pp. 4770–
4775.
Siegel, J. (2002). Stocks for the Long Run. McGraw-Hill Education.
Smith, J. P. (1999). “Healthy Bodies and Thick Wallets: The Dual Relation between
Health and Economic Status”. English. The Journal of Economic Perspectives
13, pp. 145–166.
Soetevent, A. R. (2006). “Empirics of the Identication of Social Interactions; An
Evaluation of the Approaches and Their Results”. Journal of Economic Sur-
veys 20, 193–228.
Stokey, N. L. and R. E. Lucas (1989). Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics.
Harvard University Press.
Storesletten, K., C. I. Telmer, and A. Yaron (2004). “Consumption and risk sharing
over the life cycle”. Journal of Monetary Economics 51, 609–633.
Subramanyam, M. et al. (2009). “Relative deprivation in income and self-rated
health in the United States”. Social Science & Medicine 69, 327 –334.
Tauchen, G. (1986). “Finite state markov-chain approximations to univariate and
vector autoregressions”. Economics Letters 20, 177–181.
Teppa, F. and C. Vis (2012). The CentERpanel and the DNB Household Survey:
Methodological Aspects. DNB Occasional Studies. Netherlands Central Bank,
Research Department.
Wagner, G. G., J. R. Frick, and J. Schupp (2007). “The German Socio-Economic
Panel Study (SOEP) - Scope, Evolution and Enhancements”. Schmollers
Jahrbuch : Journal of Applied Social Science Studies / Zeitschrift für
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften 127, 139–169.
Wilkinson, R. (2000).Mind the Gap: Hierarchies, Health and Human Evolution. Dar-
winism Today. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Ziebarth, N. R. (2013). “Long-term absenteeism and moral hazard - Evidence from
a natural experiment”. Labour Economics 24, 277–292.
Ziebarth, N. R. and M. Karlsson (2010). “A natural experiment on sick pay cuts,
sickness absence, and labor costs”. Journal of Public Economics 94, 1108–1122.
(2014). “The eects of expanding the generosity of the statutory sickness
insurance system”. Journal of Applied Econometrics 29, 208 –230.
116
Curriculum Vitae Matthias Schön
Persönliche Daten
Geburtsdatum: 29.06.1983
Geburtsort: Bietigheim-Bissingen, Deutschland
Staatsangehörigkeit: Deutsch
Ausbildung
seit 04/2010 Doktorand im Fach Volkswirtschaftslehre
Albertus Magnus Universität zu Köln
Promotionsbetreuer: Alexander Ludwig
08/2013-02/2014 Gastwissenschaftler im Rahmen der Promotion
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia
Betreuender Professor: Dirk Krueger
10/2004-04/2010 Diplom im Studiengang Volkswirtschaftslehre
Universität zu Köln
Spezialisierung: Makroökonomik, Finanzierungslehre
08/2008-02/2009 Austauschstudent im Masterstudiengang
Manchester Business School
Spezialisierung: International Macroeconomics
08/1994-06/2003 Allgemeine Hochschulreife
Burghardt-Gymnasium Buchen
Leistungskurse: Mathematik, Geschichte
Akademische Positionen
seit 04/2010 Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter
Universität zu Köln
Center for Macroeconomic Research
117
